3 part structure: i) PNC as parliament, which elects leader & makes policy decisions; created in 1964 in the PLO's formative stage, now with 669 members, but until recently had 484 members from all PLO factions as well as independents, with seats left vacant for representatives from the OPTs. Past membership nos: PNC4=100 (57 from guerrilla groups); PNC6=112; PNC9=155; PNC12=187; PNC13=290; PNC14 (94 from guerrilla groups)=315. Meets infrequently, though is mandated by its fundamental law to meet every 2 years. Resolutions passed by a simple majority, but 2/3rds of members must attend for quorate. ii) Palestine Central Council (in Apr99, had 124 members): makes policy decisions when PNC not in session, acting as a link between PNC & PLO-EC: formed in Jun70, as an ad hoc body to coordinate fida?i groups in Jordan, ceasing work after Jul71; but reestablished in 1/73 (under the chairmanship of Khalid al-Fahum); elected by PNC on PLO-EC selection, & chaired by PNC president. Membership has risen from 42 (1976), 55 (3/77), 72 (11/84), 107 (early90s), 95 (mid-90s). iii) PLO Executive Committee acts as a cabinet, implementing policy (c.18 members), selected from PNC & choosing its own chairman.  iv) Palestine Liberation Army, initially with 3 battalions: ?Ayn Jalut in Egypt, Qadisiyya in Iraq, tho in Jordan after 1967, Hattin in Syria; Chiefs of Staff include ?Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahya (1970-2), Tariq al-Khadra (up to 1984). PLO also contains the Palestine National Fund; Palestinian Armed Struggle Command (a military-police organisation: established 2/4/69 as a step t/w fida?i unification, & coordinating claims to action; was a civil police force in Lebanon in 70s-early80s, & intervened in confrontations between opposing Palestinian groups); Palestinian Red Crescent Soc (established Jord65, part of PLO from 1969); SAMED, the Palestine Martyrs Works Society (established 1970 in Jordan to provide vocational training to martyrs? children; reorganised in Lebanon in 1971; after 1975, services extended to all Palestinians); Department of Info & Culture, which inc the Research Centre (produced until 1993 the academic journal Shu?un Filastiniyya); the Department of Mass Organizations, running the unions (through the General Union of Palestinian Women, GUPW; General Union of Palestinian Workers, GUPWo; General Union of Palestinian Students, GUPS); Education Department; Information Bureau (which produces newspaper Filastin al-Thawra, biwkly English & French journal Palestine, & has news agency WAFA, established 1/6/70, ); Political Department, which represents Palestinians internationally; and Institution for Social Affairs & Welfare for the Families of Martyrs & Prisoners (established 1965).
Source: Sayigh, 1997; Rubenberg 1983

Origins in Ikhwan groups (a tag which stuck until ?68) drawn from refugees in Gaza, which (reluctantly) provided military training to Palestinian youth. Ikhwan military bodies established, eg Revenge Youth (Shabab al-Tha?r: with Khalaf, As?ad al-Saftawi, Sa?id al-Muzayin, Omar Abu al-Khayr, Isma?il Suwayrjo, Muhammad Isma?il al-Nunu) & Battalion of Right (Katibat al-Haq: with Wazir, Hassan ?Abd al-Hamid, ?Abd Abu Marahil, Hamad al-?Aidi); launched small sabotage attacks on Israel from late54 & pulled away from disapproving Ikhwan, also refusing to get involved in Ikhwan-Egypt conflict (which resulted in Wazir's expulsion from Egypt ? moved onto Saudi, then Kuwait). ?Arafat at this stage was working through Palestinian Students Union in Cairo; formed alliance with youth leaders (esp Khalaf) & Palestinian activists in Syria (esp ?Adil ?Abd al-Karim & ?Abdullah al-Dannan): in 1957, after university, 6 of the activists formed a clandestine organisation in Kuwait, taking name Fatah in ?58 (Sayigh, 84). Organisational structures established at a Kuwait meeting on 10.10.59. Prominent founders inc ?Arafat, Salah Khalaf, Khalil al-Wazir, Muhammad Yusif al-Najjar, Kamal ?Udwan. Joined in ?59 by Khalid al-Hasan, a civil servant who'd been in Kuwait since 1952; & Tawfiq al-Huri, who gave his magazine Nida? al-Hayat-Filastinuna (The Call of Life - Our Palestine) to use as a mouthpiece: largely written by Wazir, but also ?Arafat. Incorporated the activists from Katibat al-Haq and most of those from Shabab al-Tha?r. Main centres were Kuwait (Arafat, Wazir, later Qaddumi) and Qatar (Najjar, ?Udwan, ?Abd al-Fattah Hammud).

Main platform was the liberation of all of Palestine for Arab sovereignty, which could be achieved only through relentless armed struggle; but that Arab governments were not to be trusted (had prevented victory in 1948 war since they were concerned only with their own interests; also shown in treatment of refugees) > must remain independent of all Arab governments, inc Nasirism; also stress upon own distinctiveness as a people, ?Palestinianness?. Also disapproved of ideological debates & party politics, which they viewed as a distraction from the sole goal of liberating Palestine > portrayed itself as a movement rather than an organisation [hence won support from all sectors of soc, &, ironically, later from Arab governments]. Violence seen as breaking through the resignation of the refugees > national unity through armed struggle (drawn from Fanon). Filastinuna, appearing approx. 6-wkly from 1959 until Nov64, served to publicise group, & won recruits from Ikhwan (eg Ahmad Quray; Muhammad Ghnaym, who opposed Ikhwan loyalty to Hashimite throne), Ba?thists, esp after end of UAR (esp Faruq al-Qaddumi; a West Bank resident), & student groups (esp Mahmud ?Abbas, then working in Qatari civil service). Acted to unify various groups formed by Palestinian refugees in Kuwait, Saudi, Qatar. Acted in Eu through Hani al-Hasan (b.1937, Haifa) who was studying in W.Germany. In 1963, extensively reorganised, with a Central Committee formed.

By 1962-4, was winning support from Arab States, esp Syria, who sought a counterfoil to Egyptian designs & means to discredit Nasir & the PLO > Damascus became ?Arafat?s base; & Algeria (through ?Arafat?s elder brother, Jamal ?Abd al-Ra?uf) > Palestine Office created by Fatah in Algiers, & through these connections met Vietnamese, Chinese & Portuguese African leaders, & Che Guevara. These States pushed for commencement of armed attacks on Israel; also supported by ?Arafat & Wazir, to opposition of ?Abd al-Karim & Dannan; former view won out, esp with formation of PLA (Sept64) & view that a military confrontation between PLO & Israel could be precipitated by Fatah actions, thus bringing about a popular struggle; strove for al-tawrit al-wa?i (?conscious entanglement?) of the masses in a liberation war (cf conventional warfare of Arab armies invading Israel: Fatah indicated at times that this would not be able to liberate Palestine, in part due to Israel?s NWs, & its promotion would prevent mass mobilisation): believed that mass mobilisation would be triggered by engaging in highly visible armed attacks, which would also propel Fatah to the leadership of PLO institutions (Cuban model acknowledged: Sayigh, 1993, pp.120-1) >> attacks of 31Dec64 et seq. However, rifts started emerging in Fatah in ?65/6, with the Higher Central Committee in Kuwait (?Abd al-Karim, Dannan) opposing Field Command in Damascus (Wazir, ?Arafat): former (prob. also with Syrian pressure) imposed merger with Ba'thist Revnary Front for the Liberation of Palestine, under Yusif al-?Urabi, & Palestinian Liberation Front, under Ahmad Jibril, in order both to control ?Arafat & to bring in professional military expertise; tensions led to attempted putsch of Mar-May66; but resolution left Fatah with strengthened links with Syrian forces (esp Asad), the removal of ?Abd al-Karim & Dannan from HCC, & domination of Fatah by commando groups in Syria > crackdown, with mass imprisonment, esp in Jordan & Lebanon.

With ?67 war, ?Arafat & Wazir urged the immediate relaunching of the struggle from within the OTs, despite opposition of Khalid al-Hasan & Khalaf (& Syrian government); ?Arafat formally became field commander & set up clandestine HQ in Nablus from Aug67. Fatah actions in late?67 killed approx 97 IDF, but mass imprisonment of West Bank supporters > by ?68 sought a base outside OTs, & chose Jordan. Gained unofficial support from many Jordanian soldiers, but tensions with government, esp intelligence chief Muhammad Rasul al-Kaylani. Also sought leadership within PLO: formed a Permanent Bureau for Guerrilla Actions in Cairo, Jan?68, with 7 minor guerrilla groups, so as to form a bloc within PLO; PFLP, with similar ambitions, boycotted. However, reversed suspicion with battle of Karama, bringing extensive publicity & recruits to Fatah; ?Arafat moved named as leader & spokesperson of Fatah (14/15[?]Apr68, poss on Khalaf?s unilateral initiative); support from King Faysal of Saudi (financially), Husayn of Jordan (rhetorically), SU (after ?Arafat?s visit to Moscow in Feb70), Nasir who met the Fatah leadership in 1968, following Karameh (? increased arms deliveries, military training & intelligence facilities; saw as a complement to diplomacy; Haykal, Road 64: the ?irresponsible arm? of the Arab governments {Haykal had been holding meetings with Fatah on behalf of the Egyptian government from mid67, viewed by Fatah as a close ally}), China (after ?Arafat & Khalaf visited in Feb70) & Algeria (both major weapons suppliers). By late?68, tho, Israel had forced Fatah out of the Jordan valley, & guerrilla movement into Jordan?s cities brought increased tensions & armed conflicts (esp Nov?68). Karameh also allowed Fatah to take over PLO, taking many seats in PNC from May68, & 33/105 seats in Feb69 as the largest single bloc > ?Arafat elected chairman of PLO, with 4/11 seats on Executive Committee.

Fatah?s statist ambitions led it to create the organisational norms for its mass party in tradnal guise, & adopt populist pol rhetoric; but tensions due to rapid expansion, with founding elite largely drawn from Islamist parties (> paternalistic style of leadership, using Isl notion of consensus), whilst new recruits came up through Jordanian Ba'thist & communist parties. Statist ambitions also led it to set up soc welfare provisions, eg Palestinian Red Crescent Soc & schooling programme; as well as expansion of autonomous intelligence apparatus, the Rasd (briefly under Qaddumi, but under Khalaf from ?68 > became a rival power base to ?Arafat). At 1st encouraged fragmentation of Palestinian groups to ensure its own dominance; but rivalry & sense that Arab States were created groups to further their own causes led to calls to impose a unified pol front on Palestinian groups > rejected as impossible by ?Arafat (rejecting internal violence on the basis on what it had done in 1936-9), instead offered posts within PLO to other groups (inc unions & other mass orgs) on a fixed quota whilst expanding PNC so that more seats could be allocated (corporatist approach, involving cooption).

Sense of siege in Fatah after Black September, with Syrian pressure, successful Israeli purges in Gaza, Israel & Jordan attempted to cultivate an alternative leadership in OTs, Lebanese crackdown on all guerrilla activity > contradictory tendencies within Fatah. On the one hand, saw ?adventurism? of PFLP as responsible for Black Sept > Sept71 conference condemned ?extremism? within PFLP for their problems, & sought to consolidate movement: incorporated ?Isam Sartawi's Active Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine (AOLP) & Ahmad Za?rur?s Org of Arab Palestine at Jul71PNC. But also strove for revenge > breakaway faction from the Rasd, which was extensively criticised for its role in Jordan, became the ?Black Sept Org? (Khalaf?s role unclear, but supported & promoted its activities); much sympathy in Fatah for their activities, inc PFLP / Red Army strikes, & various Fatah members took BSO name in the Sept72 Munich Olympic attack (unclear whether ?Arafat authorised; but he did not condemn). With international condemnation, loss of public support & Israeli reprisals (esp death of Najjar & ?Udwan in Apr73 raid), condemned further hijackings & airport attacks by Sabri al-Banna & Haddad?s PFLP faction in 1973, & ?Arafat ordered the assassination of al-Banna?s sponsor, Muhammad ?Abd al-Ghafur (12Sept74). Oct72 Fatah congress of 300 delegates elected the leadership; also new policy formulated, viewing guerrilla warfare as one of the means (ie not the only) of struggle. Increasing leftward shift within Fatah after 1973 war, with ?the Soviet Group? (Nimr Salih, Fatah-CC member; Majid Abu-Sharar, director of news department; Ahmad ?Abd al-Rahman, ed-in-chief of Filastin al-Thawra) strong; tho opposed by various other leftist factions, eg ?Vietnamese line? under Hanna Mikha?il & ?Maoist tendency? under Munir Shafiq (as Soviet group was moving towards supporting SCR242), who gained considerable popularity among Fatah rank-&-file, who saw interests of 1948 refugees as vital >> Internal factionalism, & the formation of the rejectionist front & Abu Nidal group: came into open conflict in S.Lebanon in Apr77 when leftist group under Abu Daud (Muhammad Daud Awda) tried to break ceasefire in S.Lebanon > open clashes with Fatah mainstream forces > ?Arafat could, & sought to, gain personal control > increasing accusations of autocracy did not convene a general Fatah conference after Sept71 until pressure led to May80 conference. General comments: Fatah?s success has been due to its lack of emphasis on ideology (> support from all sectors of soc), & its principle of non-interference in affairs of other Arab States (> support from all), tho failed to uphold in Jordan, Lebanon & after Iraq?s invasion of Kuwait; generally opposed violent attacks outside the ME, esp from 1974. Main splits in Fatah in 1983 & Nov1993, when half of Fatah-RC, inc Qaddumi (as Secretary-General), boycotted meeting to protest at Oslo.

Tripartite organisational structure: i) General conference, the ruling body, which is meant to meet every 5 years, but has not met since its 5th session in Tunisia on 8Aug89: made up of members of regional congresses, military forces, mass orgs & Fatah-RC. At last meeting, had 1200 members. Earlier meetings: 4th General Conference (Damasus, 31May80); ii) the Fatah Revolutionary Council (now with 120 members), deciding policy when GC is not in session; iii) Central Committee (al-lajna al-markaziyya), which acts according to the principle of collective leadership. Members are largely elected by secret ballot from the GC, but RC can appoint 3 other members by a two-thirds majority, & others from the OTs.

supports Oslo, but calls for reconstruction of PLO & dialogue with anti-Oslo groups. Traces history back to 1919 when EEu immigrant Marxist Jews established grouping, which (after an early split) became the Palestine Communist Party (PCP) in 1921 = the official Comintern section in Palestine from 1924. Brought Palestinians in, when adopted anti-Zionist position > split in 1943, with Arabs forming National Liberation League (Usbat al-Taharrur al-Watani). Was close to the Palestinian labour movement; at 1st with Palestinian Arab Workers? Soc (established 1925), led by Sami Taha (b.1916, nr Jenin; raised in Haifa); but with the opposition of these groups to factional politics, came into conflict with them → Taha assassinated, prob on orders of Hajj Amin, in 1946 in Haifa. Also established more orthodox, non-nationalist workers? bloc, Federation of Arab TUs & Labour Socs (FATULS) in 1942 out of Haifa members of the PCP; became the Arab Workers? Congress in 1945. 1st congress of NLL was in Haifa, 1944, elected 4-person central committee with Fu?ad Nassar as most prominent of the 4 [?] / Fu?ad Nassar as S-G [?], opposed Zionism & proposed that interests of Jews & Arabs could best be served by a secular democratic state; but after GAR181, despite the intense opposition of many members grouped around Emile Touma, NLL officially accepted partition in Jan48 general conference (which Touma?s majority did not attend; Fu?ad Nassar elected S-G). With 1948 war, members in Gaza (inc Fakhri Maki, Fayez al-Wahidi) became Palestinian Communist Org (PCO; after ?67 formed United National Front with many other nationalist groups in Gaza, & much more supportive of armed resistance > eliminated in Israeli security sweeps), & those left in Israel (inc Emile Touma, Emile Habibi, Tawfiq Toubi) after 1948 formed Israel Communist Party; in West Bank, NLL continued until 1951, calling for an independent Palestinian State in the areas allocated to Palestinians in the partition plan > opposed to both Arab States? 'invasion' / 'aggression' of 1948 & Jordanian annexation: saw opportunity to develop its support among West Bankers who shared their opposition to Jordan ? quickly set up cells thruout West Bank 1949-51, campaigning for a boycott of Jordanian elections. 1st demo on 31/3/50 in Nablus, with all c.50 protestors arrested. Also took over Ramallah Workers Assoc in 1950-1, which was then crushed by the authorities & leaders arrested ? in future, avoided mobilising workers & sought support primarily from intelligentsia (esp teachers, seen as the conduit to students, who JCP most sought to influence), esp under direction of S-G Fu?ad Nassar, an uneducated Christian, from 1951.

With Jordanian annexation, changed course: became the Jordanian Communist Party (JCP) in Jun51 & dropped demand for an independent State (Cohen dates this shift to mid-50s, cf Sahliyeh) > participated in Aug51 Jordanian Parliamentary elections, & pledged its support to the unity of the Bnks. Main leaders were Fu?ad Nassar, Fahmi al-Salfiti, Fa?iq Warrad; run by a Central Committee. JCP built a strong base in Hashimite West Bank, primarily working through the intelligentsia in Nablus & Jerusalem, & had a large branch in the village of Salfit nr Nablus, which was the home of several leading activists (Fahmi al-Salfiti, Hamza al-Zirr, Arabi Awwad); also active in Ramallah, Bethlehem, & in refugee camps (esp around Jericho): despite this base in the intelligentsia, JCP publications continued to address workers & peasants 1stly, in keeping with international communist doctrine; but also sought wider appeal, paying attention in its publications to the problems of the petit bourgeois & the 'uprooted' (ie refugees). Also worked extensively through 'front' orgs, esp the 'Peace Partisans' (pro-SU antinuclear group), the Democratic Youth Assoc (from 1954, in large West Bank towns) & the National Front (from May54), established to fight Oct54 elections, & which succeeded in winning a seat in Nablus for ?Abd al-Qadir Salih. Heavily persecuted: Nasir arrested 29/12/51 & sentenced to 10yrs, & JCP printing press seized; & new legislation promulgated by Jordanian Parliament on 1/12/53, prescribing imprisonment & hard labour for JCP members. But managed to operate covertly, successfully recruiting members from 1953, & became strongest in period 1956-7, against b/ground of Suez war: mobilised against Anglo-Jordanian Treaty & Eisenhower doctrine, pro-SU. National Front won 3 seats in '56 elections, for Fa?iq Warrad (Ramallah), Yaqub Ziyadin (Jerusalem) & Salih again, who was made Agriculture Minister under Nabulsi government. Many members, inc Fu?ad Nassar, released from prison; & JCP newspaper allowed to circulate. Main competition with Ba'thists who stayed out of National Front. Downplayed its anti-religion tenets, stressing struggle against colonialism. Husayn began to act against JCP in Jan57, singling out JCP to justify his banning of pol parties in Apr: accused JCP of striving for peace, & maintaining contacts, with Israel; Warrad & Ziyadin had Parliamentary immunity lifted & were sentenced to 16 & 19 years respectively; large no of other arrests, with mosques esp used by the regime to identify & condemn members. As a result, v. weak by end of 1950s, with minimal public activities, instead focusing on carefully training cadres. Only managed to continue secretly printing its approx. monthly newspaper, Al-Muqawama Al-Shaabiya (The Popular Struggle) consistently from 1949. Riven by internal split before long: faction under al-Salfiti (acting S-G), preferred accomodation with Hashimites, oppg 1966 West Bank strikes; whilst faction under Nasir (exiled S-G), was more opposed to Jordanian government.

After 1967, al-Salfiti (& his successor Warrad) ran JCP in Amman; West Bank affairs run by Na?im al-Ashhab. Other prominent West Bank leaders were Sulayman al-Najjab, ?Arabi ?Awwad & (later) Bashir Barghuthi. al-Salfiti?s group accepted SCR242, discouraged guerrilla groups & called on Husayn to lead the opposition to Israeli occupation; whilst Nasir?s group took opposite stance on these issues. Ashhab also opposed commencement of guerrilla activities (which he argued required extensive preparation, seeing it at the current stage as counterproductive) & strove reuniting E&West Banks = put main emphasis of slowing the refugee exodus from West Bank (the lesson of ?48) & non-violent protest. Newspaper relaunched as Al-Watan. West Bank communists remained pro-Jordan, eg in Higher Committee for National Guidance, when delegates opposed an independent Palestinian State until 1973. But opposition to guerrillas & support for Jordan discredited JCP after Karameh, esp as West Bankers & SU came to support Fatah > JCP-West Bank increasingly broke with internationalism of JCP-Amman & began to articulate a more clear Palestinian nationalist position ? by 1973 was supporting an independent Palestinian State in WBG. In addition, other Arab communist parties, working through Fu?ad Nassar, created own guerrilla force, Quwwat al-Ansar (Partisan Forces) in Mar70, tho remained largely ineffective due to JCP?s lack of support. JCP backed, at Fatah?s insistence, the call for ?total liberation?, but privately accepted Israel?s existence & continued to advocate a settlement with Israel based on SCR242 (eg did not sign the ?unity document? of 6May70 which rejected 242). Instrumental in creating the Palestinian National Front in 1973; Fu?ad Nassar was accepted as a PNC member at the 10th PNC of 1/73 (tho d.1976); & began to form a military wing to the PNF from 1974; but with mass Israeli arrests in 1974 in response to PNF?s successes, JCP came to recognition that could not continue work in West Bank with associated armed activities > abandoned by 1975, & ?moderate? Bashir al-Barghuthi took control when Sulayman al-Najjab was deported. In 1975, West Bank JCP finally split, with Salfiti?s supporters forming separate Palestine Communist (Youth: dropped 1977) Org; whilst JCP formed a separate Palestinian branch, also called Palestinian Communist Org (run by a Steering Committee), but which became an autonomous group, the Palestine Communist Party (again), on 10Feb82. Received popular support in labour unions: had reactivated the General Federation of LUs in 1969, directly controlling 12/30 of these unions (tho most were small); but this had little function other than issuing statements. Also utilised the voluntary work programme & student groups (which communists dominated in 70s, only ceding position to Fatah later) for support. Bashir al-Barghuthi was editor-in-chief of al-Fajr from 1975-7; al-Watan and al-Tali?a (most popular weekly in the West Bank) were more direct organs, building popular support. Was to join the PLO in the ?Aden agreement? of 1984, but PLO reneged; eventually joined in Apr87, accepting a seat for its leader, Sulayman al-Najjab, in PLO-EC. Served as a main force in the intifada (and was a member of UNLU). Opposed to ?Arafat (eg in Democratic Alliance). With decline of communism in EEu, became PPP (Oct91): Bashir al-Barghuthi remained S-G, taking key role in Oslo negotiations; & supporting a mixed economy. Led from Oct98 third convention in Ramallah by Mustafa Barghuthi, Hana Amira & ?Abd al-Majid Hamdan. Later on (2003?), Bassam al-Salhi was appointed secretary-general. Other leaders inc Fu?ad Hana Rizq, ?Abd al-Rahman Awad Alah, Hasan ?Asfur. With Najjab's death, Hana Amira took the role on the PLO-EC. Member of NIF.

formed in ?67 with basis in the Arab Nationalists? Movement (Harakat al-Qawmiyya al-Arab). Origins in the sense that Arab disunity & pro-Wn leanings of leaders (esp Abdullah & Nuri al-Said) were responsible for al-Nakba; George Habash & Hani al-Hindi (a Syrian volunteer in 1948 war), both students at the American University of Beirut, started by helping in the formation of the Battalions of Arab Sacrifice (al-Kata'ib al-Fida' al-Arabi), led by Tawfiq al-Hakim (influences from Garibaldi, the Italian Carbonari, the Young Italy Movement, Bismarck, the Ikhwan & the Syrian National Party: ie strain of fascism {Sayigh, 1997, p.72}), which used violence against Western targets; but after al-Kata'ib leadership was captured after attempted assassination of Adib Shishakli in 1950, Habash & al-Hindi decided upon a more focused campaign against Israel (influences of Ikhwan, Haganah & Zionist underground; Habash also strongly influenced by Qustantin Zurayk & Sati? al-Husri) through the student group, al-Urwa al-wuthqa (?The Firmest Bond?; name taken from Afghani & ?Abduh's periodical), they had been organising from 1949-50 at the American University of Beirut; also recruiting Wadi? Haddad (Abu Hani), a Greek Orthodox Christian refugee from Safad; Ahmad al-Khatib, a Kuwaiti medical student; Muhsin Ibrahim, a Shi?i Lebanese teacher ?? formed what became the ANM with assistance of student groups in Lebanon/Syria/Jordan in 1951-2 (tho only took the name in 1956, with 1st conference): liberation of Palestine as primary goal, but seen as possible only through wider anti-colonial campaign in Arab States. Strongly secularist orientation drew Christians into its ranks. Slow growth, esp with dominance of Ba?thists; but expanded in 1956-7 largely through the recruitment of teachers in UNRWA camps in West Bank, Syria & Lebanon (through recruits Ahmad al-Yamani, ?Abd al-Karim al-Hamad); its branch in the Aden region, the National Liberation Front, was esp strong, & was a key part of the 1967 formation of South Yemen. Used al-Hurriyya (Freedom) magazine as outlet, ed. by Muhsin Ibrahim. With demos against the Baghdad Pact, 22 mostly ANM students were expelled from AUB & were offered places by Nasir at Cairo University ? came to coordinate with him more closely, esp after Suez crisis ? became firmly supportive of Nasir & campaign shifted from coordinating commando raids on Israel to undermining of Hashimites & assisting of Palestinians in Lebanon civil war in 1958, with Syrian help (esp ?Abd al-Hamid al-Sarraj, interior minister); derived much of its support through its closeness to Nasir (eg dominance of the General Union of Palestine Students by mid60s). But with 1961 & failed 1963 Syrian coup, shifted base back to Beirut. In 1959, decided that a separate Palestinian committee should be formed to respond to increased rhetoric from Nasir, but did not form a separate branch; only with increased dominance of those within ANM who argued that social revolution thruout Arab world was a necessary prerequisite for Palestine liberation (Ibrahim, Hawatmah, Muhammad Kishli), their opponents in the ANM, impatient with ideological debate, regrouped (to much internal contention) at May1964 National Conference to form the Palestinian Action Command, an autonomous Palestinian branch; refrained from military action at Nasir?s insistence, but were more sympathetic (esp Haddad) to commando action, esp with PLA formation & Fatah?s commencement of actions > quietly undertook preparatory steps from late63 through the ?Struggle Apparatus? & could claim 1st ?martyr? on 2Nov64 reconnaissance mission; used weekly Filastin to promote views. Increased moves to armed struggle, esp with Nasir?s increased bellicosity (& some tension with Egypt) & with urgency added by argument that Israel would soon have NWs & would have fully settled the Negev > formed alliance with PLO/PLA (who sought popular legitimacy through the struggle) to form Heroes of Return (Abtal al-?Awda, led by Wajih al-Madani {PLA commander}, with Fayiz Jabir & Subhi al-Tamimi from ANM), commencing attacks from Oct66; public rhetoric becomes increasingly similar to that of Fatah.

ANM thoroughly disillusioned by 1967 war, at 1st stressing need for careful preparation for military operations; but with popular pressure, Fatah?s relaunch in OTs & Ahmad Jibril?s Palestine Liberation Front announcing the commencement of armed activities, moved to immediate start of combat operations: joined with Jibril?s PLF, the Heroes of Return & a group of Jordanian Nasirites led by Ahmad Za?rur to form the PFLP, whose presence was announced through a (failed) attack (11Dec). Altho based in Syria, tensions with authorities, who suspected them of involvement in coup planning, esp given the historic tension between the ANM & Ba?thist > arrested Habash & 2 other leading members (19Mar68), holding them until Habash escaped in Nov > leadership left to Za?rur & Jibril. With Habash in prison, leftists led by Hawatmah managed to call a conference to issue a 'Basic Pol Statement', criticising Nasir (Aug68) > Nasir cut off aid to PFLP. PFLP?s decision to withdraw at battle of Karameh led to extensive internal disputes > Jibril broke away to form PF-GC with Za?rur & approx.1/4 of PFLP; Hawatmah & Yasir ?Abd-Rabbu led the leftists out to form PDFLP (Maoist / Trotskyist), arguing that ANM was cooperating excessively with Arab governments rather than undermining them (assisted by Fatah, Sa?iqa & PLA): with Lebanese branch, took control of al-Hurriyya > PFLP started al-Hadaf (Target), a wkly, ed by Ghassan Kanafani (& after his assassination, by Bassam Abu Sharif). But with enhanced prestige for guerrillas, also brought large nos of new recruits. Out of guerrilla groups, most strongly viewed Israelis as enemies, beginning high profile & international attacks from Jul68, coordinated esp by Haddad. Remained wary of PLO, which it viewed as vulnerable to Arab States? influence > took seats in PNC from May68 (tho again boycotted Feb69-May70), but did not join PLO. PDFLP split encouraged Marxist & Maoist turn rhetorically (declared itself a Marxist-Leninist organisation from its Feb69 national congress), tho leadership remained the same > ANM dissolved (in effect), with PFLP formally the Palestinian branch of a wider pan-Arab (but otherwise non-existent) party; this turn also led to a break with Egypt > Iraq, under Ba'thists, became main source of funding. Has seen Palestinian liberation as part of wider Arab revolution, urging & involving itself in the overthrow of ?reactionary? Arab regimes, & the internationalization of the Palestinian problem (> attacks & hijacking outside ME); rejected the call for a democratic State in PLO Charter of Sept69. Only joined PLO (with PF-GC) when it saw Fatah turn against Hashimites in May70: & remained with only token participation in PNCs until Jul71 when joined PLO-EC. Internal rifts after Black September, with many of the younger cadres blaming the leadership?s strategy for provoking the massacres at Mar72 national congress > temporary suspension of international violence (in part due to SU pressure; but resumed in Feb72), condemnation of hijacking (5/11/70) & dissolution of central committee; also failed secession of the left in Mar72. With Habash & Hindi retreating from leadership roles from 1972, PFLP increasingly led by Mustafa al-Zabri (for West Bank, Jordan), Ahmad al-Yamani (for Lebanon), Muhammad al-Musallami (for Gaza); a central committee was re-established in Feb73, & politburo in Jun73, but internal splits meant that Habash & his ?central leadership? body were in control. Tension with Syria also constrained activities after 1973; few terrorist attacks (esp explosion of oil storage tanks in Singapore 31Jan75 & suicide bomb in Tel Aviv cinema 11Dec74) & failed assassination of King Husayn (1975) > gradually reduced guerrilla activities. However, has generally favoured armed struggle over diplomacy, & rejected solutions involving partition > formation of Rejection Front in Oct74 under Iraqi aegis, & led campaign in Lebanon against the phased programme, under Taysir Quba?a; criticism of SU, due to its 2 State solution proposals. Also, due to unwillingness to restrain activities against Syria & retreat from alliance with Junblatt during Lebanese civil war (cf Fatah) in 1976, lost substantial no of its fighters ? v.weak at time of Mar77PNC, & unable to win support for their opposition to Fatah?s programme. Only rejoined PLO after ?unity statement? of Dec77 which rejected Sadat?s initiative & SCR242, & rejected negotiation, recognition, peace with Israel, claiming that ?phased? pol programme of Jun74PNC was over (also in part due to Iraqi reconciliation with conservative Arab governments ? danger in losing their source of support). After Wadi? Haddad?s death from cancer (28Mar78), claimed no longer to support ?external operations?; but has continued to attempt the assassination of individuals it sees as traitors: esp Shaykh Khuzundar in 1979, Zafir al-Masri in 1986, & successfully intimidated (& firebombing of the 2 cars of) Hanna Sinioria (editor of al-Fajr) for standing in the Jerusalem municipal council elections in Jun87. PFLP?s attempts to regroup opposition to Fatah after Camp David failed, prompting reexit from PLO-EC & cooperation with Abu Nidal faction (Jan79). From late79, obtained support primarily from Syria, SU, Libya, & became critical of Iraq & China. However, shift of strategy at Apr-May81 national congress, which accepted that partition could be 1st step t/w total liberation. Outside PLO-EC again from 1985-7, & from Jan92 when called for withdrawal from Madrid process. Retracted by May92, insisting instead for terms of participation in talks to be changed. By Sept, joined with DFLP in calling for negotiations to be based on SCR242 > led to opposition coalition of 10 being formed in Damascus. Came to be led by Mustafa al-Zabri as Habash moves out of centre stage, formally from the 6th national congress in Jul00, until his assassination in Aug01. Ahmad Sa'adat was elected to replace him in Oct01. Other leaders include ?Abd al-Rahim Malluh (non-participating member of the PLO-EC, deputy S-G from Oct01), Taysir Quba?a, Jamil al-Majdalawi (in Gaza), Mahayr al-Tahir (PF spokesman, based in Damascus), Ahmad Qatamish, Sabir Muhyi al-Din. 1st meeting between ?Arafat & PF reps on 1Aug99 in Cairo to discuss reconciliation; left the Damascus 10 grouping, & participates in the NIF. "Political initiative" of 30 Oct 00 is clearest in its limited call for a State in the 1967Ts.

PFLP central institutions are: i) the national congress, the supreme governing body, supposedly meeting every 4 years, but has only met 6 times, in Aug68 (?left? wing vs ?right?), Feb69 (accepting Marxist-Leninism), Mar72 (critique of PF?s role in Jordan), Apr-May81 (accepting an independent Palestinian State), Feb93 (Habash-led criticism of the acting leadership, for compromising too much with Fatah), Jul00 (appointing Zabri as S-G, recognising reality of the PA whilst reiterating ultimate goal of all Palestine). Also extraordinary session in Oct01, after Zabri's murder, electing Sa'adat as S-G. National congress elects the central committee; ii) the central committee, making policies between congress sessions & intended to meet every 6 months; elects the secretary-general & politburo members; & iii) the politburo, acting when central committee is not in session. At branch, regional & district levels, the PFLP operates through supervisory congresses & supervisory commands, which inter alia elects representatives to the higher organisational levels. Next level down is the league (made up of 3-5 cells). On the ground, the PFLP operates through cells & circles, consisting of 3-10 members & trainees, each with own leader & who are responsible for the training of recruits.

formed from break in Feb69 (as Popular DFLP; name change in Aug74) from PFLP, calling for more Maoist & non-Nasirist approach in opposition to Habash > demanded socialist policy & alignment of Arab world, drawing models from China, Vietnam & Cuba. Led by Nayif Hawatmah, Yasir ?Abd Rabbu, ?Abd al-Karim Hammad (Abu Adnan or Abu Qays; from Upper Galilee, a founder of ANM), Qays Samarra?i; worked in parallel with Muhsin Ibrahim's Org for Communist Action in Lebanon, which provided al-Hurriyya weekly newspaper to the DF. Also publd al-Sharara (The Spark, after Lenin's Iskra). Critical of international terrorism (esp since it was conducted by PFLP), seeing it as a poor substitute for mass action. Despite its criticism of ?Arafat, has always supported PLO unity; was foremost in articulating the goal of a democratic State to serve as a home for Arabs & Jews, accepting Jewish claims to nationhood & the role for Jews in creating the democratic State. Supported concept of a national authority from Nov73, esp articulated in Hawatmah's 24/2/74 speech, claiming this would allow the struggle for return to the homeland to continue ? was the strongest proponent of Jun74PNC resn. Was also opposed to the division between Jordan & Palestine, arguing that as it was a British creation, it was unnatural ? popular movements in both should unite. Has never advocated violence outside ME; pro-Soviet, reciprocated in SU funding, & strong Christian content. Due to its advocacy of 2 State solution, has tho used violence in Israel to achieve its radical credentials (& thus funding, esp after Iraq cut funds in 1974), eg Ma?alot 1974 which brought in Libyan assistance, & W.Jerusalem bombing of 20Dec74 which killed 12 Israelis. Despite general support for PLO/PNC, shifted allegiance to the rejectionist front in May78, criticising ?Arafat?s autocratic style of leadership, continued links to Egypt & closeness to Saudi, as well as Fatah?s attempts to lead PLO into peace process with US. Joint memorandum with 4 rejectionist groups (24May78) also condemned PLO?s policy of restraint in Lebanon. Prominent later DF-CC members include Jamil Hilal (head of information; also Secretariat of GUPWJ), Sa?id ?Abd al-Hadi (secretary to international relations dept) & Azmi Shu?aybi; other present leaders include Taysir Khalid (ie Mahmud Odeh, a non-participating member of the PLO-EC), Charles Sawwan, Salah Zaydan (head of DFLP in Gaza, member of politburo) & Farid Sarru?. DFLP split in 1990-1, with ?Abd Rabbu supporting ?Arafat in dealings with US (as he acted as head of PLO side in this 1988-90); after armed clashes between contending factions in Syria in Aug90, formed non-Marxist Fida (Apr91). Remaining DFLP joined Syria-based opposition; but argued that should recognise the legitimacy of the Dec98 PNC in Gaza. By Aug99, engaged in meetings with PLO representatives and ?Arafat to bring them back into the fold > produced joint statement with Fatah defining the Palestinian ?red lines?, and agreeing that a Palestinian referendum should be held before any final deal with Israel is ratified. Expelled from Damascus 10 grouping, & participates in NIF. In Feb04, Hawatmah held discussions with Meretz members and an Arab MK on forming a coalition of Palestinian groups to promote a two-state solution; also called for both sides to stop violence against civilians.
DFLP central institutions are: i) the national congress, the supreme governing body, which has only met in Aug70 (escalating anti-Hashimite rhetoric) & May81; ii) the central committee, which elects the secretary-general & politburo members; & iii) the politburo, acting when central committee is not in session.

established by Ahmad Jibril & Ahmad Za?rur in October 1968 in split from PFLP, again splitting in ?68 between 2 founders, with latter forming Organization of Arab Palestine. Participated in PLO-CC meetings, but only joined PNC & PLO-EC in 1974. Jibril?s PFLP-GC has always been pro-Syria (eg support for Syria?s intervention in Lebanon in 1976 against PLO > PLF split). Libyan aid from 1969, but declined due to internal divisions from Sept70; regained prominence with Qiryat Shmona raid of Apr74; brought in more Libyan & Iraqi aid. Desire for reconciliation with Syria, however, led it to support Jun74PNC; later retracted when dissent within organisation, & joined Rejectionist Front. With increased dispute between Palestinian groups after Camp David, PF-GC became main conduit for Libyan aid. Joined Fatah-Uprising in ?83, leaving PLO (& excluded from Nov84 PNC); member of National Alliance & PNSF. Gained in popularity in OTs with its popular radio programme Al-Quds, broadcast from Sn Syria during intifada. From 1989, cultivated ties with Iran, attending Isl conference in Tehran in Dec90. Later joined Damascus 10, but participates in NIF. Has used innovative means of armed struggle, eg Nov87 attack on Israeli army base by handglider (killing 6 Israeli soldiers), & its capture of an Israeli soldier in 1978 & subsequent exchange for 83 Palestinians prisoners: these acts won it respect; it has a well developed presence in Lebanon, but has failed to hold onto support in OTs. Is currently largely inactive. Deputy secretary-general is Talal Naji, who is now effectively the leader. Other main leaders have included Abu-l-Abbas (spokesman), ?Abd al-Fattah Ghanim (both of whom left to establish PLF), Abu Husam (Libyan rep), Fadil Shururu (chief political officer, as of 2003).

commando group formed by (& mostly consisting of) Syrian Ba?thists officially in Sept1966, but operationalised by Ba?th party only in Dec68 to rival Fatah & to support Jadid in his power struggle with Asad for Syrian leadership. Original leadership consisted of Yusuf Zu?ayyin [former pro-Jadid PM of Syria?], Mahmud al-Ma?ayta (from Nov70); but were replaced with Asad loyalists after the Nov70 coup; pro-Jadid branch remained active in Jordan until Jun71, when leaders arrested ? Zuhayr Muhsin appointed S-G. An early supporter of the 'national authority' proposal in 1974, & was a co-sponsor of the resn to the PLO-CC. Strictly pan-Arabist, denying a Palestinian identity except as a tactical manoevre (Mar77 interview with Muhsin: MECS1976-7: 185). Due to Syrian support, often the 2nd largest Palestinian commando group in fighting strength. Zuhayr Muhsin was assassinated in Cannes, Jul79; more recently led by ?Isam al-Qadi (S-G from 1979), with deputy as Muhammad Khalifah (who sits on the PLO-EC), Sami al-?Atari & Majid Muhsin (head of operations in Lebanon; Zuhayr's brother). Consistently pro-Syria, even fighting alongside Syrian forces in Lebanon in 1976 against all other PLO forces > disqualified from PLO until Syria pressured for its rehabilitation (Dec76); & large no of defections from Sa?iqa at this pt. Thereafter, lobbied within PLO mostly against Fatah's links with conservative regimes, esp with Egypt > member of National Alliance & PNSF. Anti-Madrid & Oslo, & leading member of the ?Damascus 10?; nevertheless, participates in NIF from 2000.

established as a guerrilla group on 6/11Apr69 by Iraqi Ba?thists, as alliance between Fatah, Egypt & Syria devd, & after Sa?iqa formed; continued to be sponsored by Iraq. Pan-Arabist, initially aimed at reversing the 'Palestinianization' of the conflict; but joined PLO nevertheless (Jul69). Led by Zayd Haydar (S-G in 1970), Munif al-Razzaz (a Jordanian; 60s/70s), ?Abd al-Wahhab al-Kayyali (at least 72-74), ?Abd al-Rahim Ahmad (at least from 1975-91), Mahmud Isma?il (93). Current S-G is Rakad Salem (b.1944); Husayn Rahhal also prominent. Opposed to Oslo, but has maintained participation in PLO (eg in 1984 Amman PNC); & participates in NIF. Shares an office floor in Ramallah with the PLF. Also has offices in Lebanon & Iraq. Much of its work now is distributing grants from the Iraqi government to families of "martyrs" in Palestine, claiming to have distributed $12.5m. Salem was captured by Israeli undercover forces in Ramallah in early Oct02; 

established by Sabri al-Banna with cooperation of Iraqi authorities & produced magazine Filastin al-Thawra. At first, maintained links with PLO intelligence apparatus from pre-BS Jordan, inc Samih Abu Kuwayk and Naji ?Allush; even possibly covert links with Abu Iyad. But escalating tensions with PLO: ?Allush was briefly detained in Aug74; F-RC associate, Muhammad ?Abd al-Ghafur, killed in Beirut on ?Arafat's orders (12Sept74); F-RC attempted to assassinate Abu Mazin, but operatives were captured & Abu Nidal sentenced to death on PLO-CC decision. Initially worked for Iraq (often acting under the name Black June) in its campaign against Syria (esp 1982-83), and attempted the assassination of the Syrian Foreign Minister. Later moved to Syrian sponsorship, and used against Muslim Brotherhood and Jordan. Most famous acts have been assassination attempt on Shlomo Argov (London, 1982); assassinations of Said Hamami (PLO rep in London), Ali Yasin (Fatah rep in Kuwait) & ?Izz al-Din Qalaq (PLO rep in Paris) in 1978, Naim Khudr (PLO rep in Brussels) in 1981, ?Isam Sartawi (1983), Abu Iyad (1991). Moved closer to Libya from late70s, and seen to be acting on behalf of them, especially from 1985: eg assassination of Yusuf al-Siba?i, editor of al-Ahram (Cyprus, 1978), hijacking of Egyptian plane to Malta in 1985 (stormed at Valletta); the assassination of journalist Alec Collett in Beirut after the 1986 bombing of Libya. Also murdered 4 British diplomats, inc Kenneth Whitty, the First Secretary at the British Embassy in Athens (Mar84). In 1989, various leaders (inc Atif Abu Bakr, chief spokesman) moved to Sudan with 150 members, denouncing Libya. From 1992, Libya enforced inactivity, and moved out of Libya by 1996-97. Unsuccessfully tried to gain control of Sidon refugee camp in early90s; & was involved in the assassination of the First Secretary of the Jordanian embassy in Lebanon in 1994, leading to vigorous attempts by the Lebanese army to destroy its remaining infrastructure; Jordan convicted (in absentia) Abu Nidal & four others to death for this on 3Dec01. May have worked on behalf of Egyptian intelligence (after moved to Cairo in 1996-7), inc assassination of Shaykh Salah ?Abd al-Mutalib (imam in Yemen, leader of Egyptian Jihad). Former members have now been allowed by Israel to live in WBG, suggesting past F-RC links with Israel (see esp MEI 596 and 684); others moved to Baghdad, including Banna. The group issued a statement from Beirut on the death of Sabri al-Banna. Present leaders include ?Ali al-Farra ("Dr Kamal"), in charge of espionage.

created as the armed wing of the non-nationalist, religious revivalist Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin) in Gaza, in December 1987 (formal charter adopted in Aug88). Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt had links with Palestinian leaders especially Hajj Amin al-Husayni, from Aug35; and its headquarters at Shaykh Jarrar, Jerusalem, in Palestine was formally established in May 1946 (though it had branches around the country before, especially in Gaza). Played a limited role in National Committees and the 1948 war; most active in Jaffa, lesser so in Jerusalem. Thereafter, was a quiescent force in the West Bank whose main goal was pedagogical and proselytizing, attempting to bring about a reorientation of Palestinian society towards religion; it did acquire some popularity, eg its candidate, Shaykh Mashhur al-Daman, won the most votes in the parliamentary election of 1962. In Gaza, it did take a significant political role, esp 1952-4; in 1955 opposition to Egyptian proposal for resettlement of refugees in Sinai; and in 1956-7 resistance to Israeli occupation (when with Ba?th formed a National Resistance Front). However, was considerably weakened by being outlawed in 1954, when its head Zafir al-Shawwa resigned. It officially opposed the creation of Fatah in 1960, seeing it as doomed to failure.

After 1967, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan did briefly attempt to organise cross-border raids (1968-70), which were opposed by the Gazan branch; declared neutrality in Black September, and quiescent thereafter. In Gaza, the Muslim Brotherhood operated through a main front organisation, Ahmad Yassin's Mujama? (established 1973), a welfare charity (clinics, kindergartens, education), which was encouraged by Israeli civilian administration in Gaza to apply for registered charity status in 1978 & was indirectly funded by Israel as a means of dividing Palestinian society (admitted by Brig-Gen Yitzhak Sager, Israeli military governor for Gaza); also funds from from local zakat collections, Gulf Islamic organisations (often via Jordan), expat Palestinians. Due to its identification of secular forces in Palestinian soc as the main opponent, there was considerable tension with PLO, which came to a head in Jan80 when Islamist activists attacked Red Crescent Soc offices & attempt to march on the home of its Director, Haydar ?Abd al-Shafi. Main base was Islamic University of Gaza: IUG founded after Sadat closed Egyptian unis to Gazans due to Palestinian protest at Camp David; Sheikh Awwad's preexisting religious college, the only higher education institution in Gaza, transformed into a Uni, with secular nationalists pacified by giving them places on the consultation committee ? claim to soc representativeness. However, with tensions over IUG's basic policy & Mujama?'s prioritisation of controlling it, Mujama? encouraged Israeli authorities to dismiss their opponents in the committee (Feb81) ? subsequent Islamisation of IUG policy & staff (eg obligation on women to wear hijab & thobe, separate entrances for men & women) ? use of violence & ostracisation against dissenters; tacit complicity from both uni & Israeli authorities when Mujama? kept a weapons cache to use against secularists. By mid80s, was largest uni in OTs (4500 students), & student elections won overwhelmingly by Mujama?. Outside the university, only limited success: support in early80s from medical & engineering associations, but dropped away; some support from UNRWA teachers; little effort made among manual workers.

Thru 80s, increasing use of violence against institutions (cinemas, places selling or serving alcohol, casinos) deemed unIslamic. Had links with Shaykh ?Abdullah Nimr Darwish's organisation in the 1948 Territories, Usrat al-Jihad; Darwish was arrested for weapons possession in 1981. Its increasingly overt political aspirations (esp in Khan Yunis under ?Abd al-Aziz Rantisi) eventually led to conflict with Israel, with it participating in anti-Israel demonstrations & strikes from 1981; and esp in 1984 when 13 members (inc Yassin) were arrested by Israel & arms cache seized, and leadership was passed to Rantisi and Dr Ibrahim Yazuri (a pharmacist). It had been organising active military cells from 1985; first attack may have been by Yahya al-Ghoul's cell, on an Israeli army truck, in Jun85; followed up by Salah Shahada's cell from 1986. This was partly in response to the splits from the Brotherhood by those who advocated Islamic liberation of Palestine (in West Bank, Hizb al-Tahrir during Jordanian annexation; in Gaza esp, Islamic Jihad in 80-90s). By 1985, Gazan membership of Mujama? was approx. 2000, largely employed in religious, community service & trading sectors; leadership was largely born around al-Nakba, grew up as refugees in Gaza, professionally educated in late60s/early70s (often in Egypt).

Differing accounts of the creation of Hamas, with its personnel largely drawn from Mujama?, in the aftermath of the beginning of the intifada. Some (eg Milton-Edwards) claim that there was a debate within the organisation at the start of the intifada; one strand saw continuing quiescence as a delegitimating force; whilst other strand thought that Israeli tacit support was necessary if the continuing infrastructural & welfare programme, underlying their cultural programme, was to continue. Compromise (after a substantial delay, to consult West Bank Ikhwan): formation of an independent body, Hamas, in Feb 1988 who would be the Brotherhood?s link to the intifada, without a formal link between the resistance & the Brotherhood in case the intifada was crushed in the nr future. Other accounts, from Hamas members (eg Rantisi's account) and sympathisers, state that the political bureau of the Ikhwan held a meeting immediately after the truck deaths (8Dec87), in which the first Hamas communique was issued, distributed in the Strip on 11-12Dec and in the West Bank on 14-15Dec. According to this account, the 7 founding members of Hamas at the initial meeting were: Ahmad Yassin, ?Abd al-Fattah Dukhan, Muhammad Shama?, Ibrahim al-Yazuri, ?Isa al-Najjar, Salah Shahada and ?Abd al-Aziz Rantisi. Other leaders inc: Sheikh Khalil Qawqa (expelled by Israel early in the intifada), Isa al-Ashar, Mahmud Zahhar, Musa Abu Marzuq, Ibrahim Ghusha, Khalid Mish?al. Hamas worked with UNLU without joining it. Aug88 Charter declared that all Palestine is Islamic trust land, can never be surrendered to non-Muslims & is an integral part of Muslim world. Created as 3 separate wings: (i) the political wing, staffed by Yassin's closest allies (Shanab, Yazuri, Rantisi, Zahhar) who produced leaflets, raised funds esp in Gulf, recruited members & coopted mosques. (ii) the intelligence apparatus, known as al-Majd (glory), under Yihyah Sanwar & Ruhi Mushtaha, for internal policing, esp of Gaza (eg killing collaborators) - Hamas members claim that this was operational under the Ikhwan from 1983; it later merged with (iii) military wing, ?Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades, which started as the smallest wing; operated through a cell system, bringing great difficulties for Israel in penetrating, as well as highly autonomous functioning (though formed by Salah Shahada). Israel barely interfered with its activities initially, continuing to see it as a social reformist organisation & thus promoting it as a viable partner in discussions in order to marginalise the PLO ? frequent meetings between Hamas figures (inc Yassin) & Israeli government officials (eg Zahhar-Rabin meeting); Yassin claimed that Israel urged Hamas to take over administration of Gaza during the intifada. This tacit cooperation ended with the Sasportas / Sa'don killings (poss. Hamas' bid for popular support when seemed to be in decline, & as IJ came out against such actions); banned by Dec89. Military actions, declared not to be incompatible with religion, seen as part of the Brotherhood?s increasing reconciliation with nationalism; brought in support from refugees, white collar workers & professionals. Agreed to abide by decisions of the PNC in 1989, but called for elections to it (1991). By 1990-1, were cooperating with PFLP in opposition to Fatah policies. Opposition to ?Arafat's role in Gulf War, instead calling for both Iraqi & US withdrawal ? Gulf States shifted their funding from PLO to Hamas (it claimed receipt of $28m per month from Saudi) ? took PLO's welfare role away from it, generating considerable public support due to their greater efficiency. Armed confrontations with Fatah, eg June91 in Nablus, July92 in Gaza ? some conciliatory meetings, calling for unity, esp with Dec92 expulsions, which weakened both Hamas' infrastructure and Fatah's primacy: Jan93 Khartum meeting represented increased coordination, pledges of mutual nonviolence, & PLO pledging delay in returning to talks until demands met for return of the deported activists. Also, with al-Aqsa massacre in Oct90, Hamas turned its primary opposition to Israel; it declared every Israeli soldier & settler a legitimate target.

After Oslo, Hamas ridiculed process & joined the wider rejectionist alliance which managed to gain some support (won student elections at Birzeit in Nov93), tho nationally, reduced to a clear minority (c.17%), esp since the PA could use foreign donor funds to replace Hamas welfare services. 1994: after protest against the PA, Palestine Mosque shootings in Gaza by PA police ? ?Arafat coopted leadership in Gaza, which subsequently opted for non-military measures; split in Hamas leadership through OTs, with West Bank leadership subsequently taking all the military action. Also, Abu Marzuq, Hamas pol leadership in Jordan, gives de facto acceptance of Israel within 1948 borders, by declaring that a ceasefire would be in place between an Israel that withdrew from OTs & Hamas == recognition of the legitimacy of the Green Line; also reiterated by Sheikh Yassin in Spring94 letter in whc he offered a ceasefire (hudna) if Israeli forces withdraw from OTs, settlements dismantled, prisoners released; & by Rantisi (in interview supra). 1996: after Ayyash suicide bombings, Dahlan (PSF) ensured the thorough dismantling of Hamas infrastructure in Gaza, inc charities & welfare agencies; also increasing force used in West Bank, shown with killing of the ?Awadallah brohers (1998) & weakness of ?Izz al-Din al-Qassam.  Confrontation with PA most explicit when Hamas leadership (Rantisi in OTs, Yassin, Abu Marzuq for diaspora) was in jail ? all subsequently released to ensure Hamas refrains from military action; new consensus around their positions: non-conflict with PA, thus cannot attack Oslo directly & reprisals against PA repression should be taken against Israel. Role is purported deterrence: no attacks on Israel unless Hamas leadership is targetted by Israel. Hamas presents itself as an alternative to the PA internationally, through diplomacy; eg in Yassin?s worldwide tour, appealing to opinion opposed to a PA-Israel-US alliance. Despite role in establishing Damascus 10 grouping, participates in NIF. Held coordinating meetings with Fatah in Cairo, Nov02, for the first time since 1995, which led to an agreement on temporarily stopping attacks within the 1948 borders.

Robinson (Building, pp.191-5) isolates 4 fissures within Hamas: i) between pol & military wings: had become semi-independent before Oslo to protect the pol decision-makers. ?Arafat used this fissure in mid95, holding dialogue with pol wing & seeking its participation in the pol process (? debate within Hamas in Aug95 about participating in PLC elections), whilst vigorously combatting ?Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades. Resulting low-key Hamas participation in elections, whilst military wing were exploding buses in Israel 2 months later (to criticism of Islamist politicians). ii) diaspora leadership, based in Damascus, much more strongly opposed to Oslo process than OTs, backing military wing esp when PA-Israel deals were thought to be forthcoming. iii) splits in pol wing on participation in elections: Imad Faluji, ed of al-Watan, argued that boycotting would lead to Hamas? marginalisation & unrivalled Fatah dominance; opposed by those who saw participation as implicitly accepting Oslo process ? never settled, with Hamas candidates running in election without formal party approval. iv) splits within military wing, with the newly created ?Cells of the Martyr the Engineer Yahya Ayyash - the New Pupils? more hardline than Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades.

thought to have emerged as a nationalist splinter from Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1980s (formally splitting in 1986), based at IUG, arguing that the struggle against occupation had to precede spreading religious values in society. IJ saw Israel (not the leftists) as the main opponent, & supported Iranian revolution, which Mujama? could not later support due to their funding links with Saudi. Is generally thought to be a number of different activist & revolutionary groups, mostly with good links to Fatah, which may have encouraged IJ to draw support from the Ikhwan. All groups prioritise the ending of Israeli occupation, seen as a prerequisite for Islamic ascendancy, & appropriating nationalist sentiment, cf Mujama?; high prizing on the sacrifice of life, with first attempts on suicide car bombs, esp the Aug87 planning in Bethlehem for a young woman, Atif Aliyan, to car bomb the Israeli Ministry of Justice (Israel prevented). The largest group is (i) the Gazan group. Led by Sheikh ?Abd al-?Aziz ?Awda until his deportation to Lebanon (1988); then by Fathi Shiqaqi until his murder in Malta (October 1995). Ideological origins in the writings of Munir Shafiq and Khalid Salah al-Din. Had built up support esp in Israeli prisons & instrumental in setting the climate for the intifada through military acivities against Israeli targets from Oct86 murder of 2 Israeli taxi drivers; spectacular escape of 6 IJ detainees from Gaza Central Prison in May87; widespread grenade attacks on Israeli army patrols; Israeli reprisals in Oct87 in Shujai?a area of Gaza city killed 3 Palestinian residents & 4 IJ members, who were declared martyrs (and Israeli forces stormed IUG during prayers for the dead ? symbolism important in building intifada); stabbing of Israeli settler in Gaza town square on 6Dec87. Also (ii) the IJ Jerusalem Brigade, led by Sheikh As?ad Bayyud Tamimi, who had been active in Hebron Ikhwan & Liberation Party in 50s/60s, but deported to Jordan in 1970, from which IJ attacks launched on Israel in late80s. Poss. responsible for the stabbing of Aharon Gross, a Yeshiva student, in Hebron Jul83, tho murderers never identified; claimed responsibility for the grenade attack on the military passing-out ceremony at the W.Wall, killing 1 soldier?s father (Oct86): Israel claimed Fatah coordination. (iii) IJ Battalion, established 1985 by Bassam Sultan, in close cooperation with Fatah (poss. a Fatah attempt to take support from Shqaqi-?Awda faction); and (iv) IJ Palestine, led by Jamal Amar & based in Sudan. In the Oslo period, main attacks on Israel were on soldiers & settlers, esp Nov94 attack on Netzarim junction (3 soldiers killed); Jan95 bomb at Netanya which killed 18 soldiers & 1 civilian; Apr95 van bomb on Israeli bus, killing 8 soldiers; and Oct00 bomb attack on W.Jerusalem which killed 2 civilians. Unlike Hamas, takes part in PLO-CC, with Mahmud Asad al-Tamimi and Ibrahim Kamil al-Itr taking seats. Damascus-based leadership consists of Ramadan Shallah (S-G), Ziyad Nahala (deputy S-G, responsible for Lebanon), Ibrahim Shihada, Ahmad Muhana. Has participated in PA cabinet meetings since Oct00; & full role in NIF.

formed 1982/83, claiming ?Arafat?s corruption had prevented effective Palestinian response to Israeli invasion of Lebanon; led largely by Fatah colonel Sa?id Musa Muragha. Joined PNSF in 1985, & despite brief rapproachment with Fatah, opposed Oslo > joined the ?Damascus 10?. Does not participate in the NIF. Effective leader now is Abu Khalid al-?Umla, & still has a substantial following in the Lebanese refugee camps.

formed by Muhammad Abu ?Abbas Zaydan (Abu-l-?Abbas) & Tal?at Ya?qub in Apr77, after split from PFLP-GC due to its support for Syria?s attacks on PLO in Lebanon in 1976 > open clashes between wings in Lebanon led to its separate existence, in an ?Arafat-brokered compromise. Started as pro-Iraqi, & a member of the rejectionist front. Continued clashes with PF-GC, esp after explosion at PLF main offices in Beirut on 13/8/77 which killed 200, blamed on PF-GC. Kidnapped 51 UNIFIL soldiers in S.Lebanon in 1978, but later released them. Based in Tunisia after the evacuation from Lebanon in 1982. Split into 3 different factions from early80s, with centrist pro-Damascus faction under Tal?at Ya?qub challenging pro-Iraqi faction under Abu-l-?Abbas & ?Ali Ishaq, who in turn effected a rapprochement with mainstream PLO in 1983 (& took part in the Amman PNC of Nov84). Minor faction under ?Abd al-Fattah Ghanim was militantly pro-Syria; & reconciled with Ya?qub?s faction which later left Democratic Alliance to join Ghanim in creating PNSF in Mar85; but this grouping declined with death of Ya?qub from a heart attack in Nov88. Abu-l-?Abbas drew intense international criticism to PLO due to PLF?s hijacking of the Achille Lauro (Oct85), after which his faction based itself in Baghdad, & its attempted seaborne raid nr Tel Aviv in May90. To defuse criticism, Abu-l-?Abbas replaced by ?Ali Ishaq on PLO-EC in 1991; but opposition to Madrid & Oslo processes > Ishaq boycotts PLO-EC seat, member of the ?Damascus 10?, but participates in NIF. Other leaders inc Wasil Abu Yusuf, Omar Shibli, Abu Nidal al-Ashqar (who is the recognised leader).

originally established by Dr ?Isam Sartawi (a non-practicing physician) in 1967 as a non-combatant organisation to provide medical services to fida?iyyun; merged with Fatah in Feb68; independently reestablished by Sartawi after he argued with ?Arafat in a PLO meeting in 11/68; began with just 17 of Sartawi?s supporters in Fatah. Was helped by Iraqi troops in Jordan, who offered to protect his training camp (Sartawi had lived in Baghdad & had good relations with government); claimed to operate through snipers on the Jordanian border. Supported Nasir ideologically & was the only group to support Nasir?s acceptance of the Rogers Plan, but had no connection with Nasirist leaders 1968-70 (Gresh, 35). Rejoined Fatah at July 1971 PNC, after effectively disbanding during Black September. Sartawi was assassinated in Portugal on 12Apr83.

an oppositional group within the PLO. Started as PPS Organisation from within the West Bank by former ANM recruits, esp Subhi Ghusha; altho created before 1967 war, its 1st statement was in Jul67. When Ghusha was held by Israel for 8 months, led by Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya (former Ba?thist leader), Samir Ghawsha & Fayiz Hamdan (former PLA major) which was represented on the 1st PLO-EC. Worked closely in support of Fatah in West Bank after 1967, and became affiliated to Fatah from 1971, but soon broke (1973). Close to Egyptian intelligence, & operating largely through airline & airport attacks (eg attack on El Al offices in Athens, 27Nov69; hijacking of Olympic Airlines flight from Beirut to Athens, 22Jul70). After decline, was revived by Syria & Libya under Samir Ghawsha in 1982 (who remains on the PLO-EC). Founder member of 1974 rejectionist group; & member of National Alliance & PNSF; but left in 1988 & re-joined PLO-EC in Sept91 after accepting the PLO's endorsement of SCR242 joined PLO-EC in Sept91. However, went on to help found the Damascus 10. PPSF activists were originally suspected of involvement in the Lockerbie bombing of 1988; uncertainties remain about their role, if any, but continues to receive funds from Libya. Participates in NIF. Seems to have split into pro- & anti- PA factions, with opposing group based in Damascus & led by Khalid ?Abd al-Majid (who also coordinates links with Damascus 10); and pro- group still tied to Ghawsha & Abu Gharbiyya. Other leaders inc Ahmad Majdalani & Nabil Muhammad al-Qiblani.

Palestinian communists in Lebanon in favour of armed struggle, also portraying itself as the dissident wing of the PCP; led by ?Arabi ?Awwad. Has been pro-Syria, eg supporting the National Alliance & PNSF; joined Damascus 10. Despite participation of most pro-Syrian groups in NIF from 2000, PRCP boycotts.

reformist movement within PLO, arising from 1990-1 split within DFLP, with Yasir ?Abd Rabbu forming break-away faction, Fida, to remove involvement from Jordanian politics; & later to critically support Madrid & Oslo processes. Continued to claim to be the DFLP until 1993, when took up new name. Largely consists of West Bank residents. Gained a seat on PLO-EC, & won a seat (Ramallah district) in ?96 PLC elections. Participates in NIF, but is strongly opposed to the use of suicide bombs (most of its leadership signed 20Jun02 statement opposing suicide bombs in al-Quds). Other leaders inc Salih Ra?fat (who is the party?s S-G), Salih Salih, Ali ?Amr, Mahmud Nawfal, ?Isam ?Abd al-Latif, Zahira Kamal, Azmi Shu?aybi, Jamal Zakot.