Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and U.S. President George W. Bush at Israel's Ben Gurion International Airport during January, 2008.
Israel’s
unsuccessful invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 2006 proved to be a
turning point for neo-conservative pre-emptive war policies. This
defeat paved the way for a new round of regional talks outside the
purview of the American initiative, and ended the unilateralist
policies that had characterized the younger Bush’s administration. The
Israeli defeat in Lebanon transferred sub-regional management of the
Global War from the hands of the Pentagon in Washington to the offices
of the Israeli military headquarters in Tel Aviv.
Israel’s setback, as well as their inability to contain
Palestinian resistance in Gaza, brought into question the assumption
that Israel’s armed forces can complement U.S. military efforts in the
region. Moreover, Israel’s defeat in Lebanon forced the Bush
administration to look for diplomatic alternatives initiated by its
Arab allies. Since the war of 2006, Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
and Yemen have commenced negotiations to allow Syria, Hezbollah and
Hamas some accommodation in the regional power structure. Yesterday’s
pariahs were thus transformed into legitimate interlocutors.
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon was in itself a symptom of
the U.S.’s inability to impose its own agenda. Israel intervened in
Lebanon to correct by military means the political shortcomings of the
U.S.’s handling of the “Cedar Revolution” a year earlier.
In April 2005, Syrian military forces and intelligence
services retreated from Lebanon as a consequence of massive anti-Syrian
demonstrations and international pressure sparked by the assassination
of former Lebanese Premier Rafik Hariri. Coined “The Cedar Revolution”
by Paula J Dobriansky, the American Under Secretary of State for Global
Affairs, the expulsion of the Syrians was hailed by the U.S. as a great
achievement in the global war on terror.
Moreover, the demonstrations in Beirut and their
aftermath were perceived by Washington as a direct outcome of its
invasion of Iraq, and as the beginning of a new American-led era in the
region. This sentiment was echoed in the Lebanese political arena by
several anti-Syrian political leaders, such as Walid Jumblatt, a Druze
political leader who was among the organizers of the demonstrations. He
told a reporter of the Washington Post that “this process of change has
started because of the American invasion of Iraq,” adding that the U.S.
supervised elections in Iraq were “the start of a new Arab world.”
The retreat of Syrian forces from Lebanon, however, did
not weaken Hezbollah’s position, nor did it secure a pro-western
hegemony in Lebanon, let alone the rest of the region. Indeed, the
belief within the Bush administration that a U.S.-friendly democratic
domino effect would sweep through the region following the toppling of
Saddam Hussein shows, as of yet, few signs of ever being vindicated.
The much-ballyhooed Cedar Revolution quickly ran out of
steam, and with it the unrealized American goals for Lebanon. These
include the disarming and dismantling of Hezbollah, the securing and
stabilization of Prime Minister Seniora’s government, and incorporating
a cooperative Lebanon in the push to pile more pressure onto an
increasingly isolated Syria.
Unfortunately, the U.S.’s and Israel’s misadventures
with unilateralism do not seem to have deterred other governments from
trying their hands at it. Colombian President Alvaro Uribe reproduces
American and Israeli tactics with the assistance of Israeli and
American military advisors and hardware in the war against the FARC,
going as far as performing a cross-border raid into neighbouring
Ecuador, and refusing to negotiate for a peaceful settlement of this
protracted conflict.
More to the point, accommodation in western Asia may be
short lived. Israel’s hawks are growing increasingly nervous due to a
witch’s brew of Iran’s continued sabre-rattling and rocket tests, a
well dug-in Hezbollah, a democratically elected and assertive Hamas,
and, finally, the American people’s current war-weariness and their
pre-occupation with their November election.
In fact, Israel’s military and security establishment
are not happy with the prisoner swap agreement with Hezbollah, nor with
the cease-fire with Hamas.
In both cases, armed non-governmental entities that
Israel categorizes as “terrorist organizations” achieved major
concessions through military operations. Hezbollah and Hamas, in turn,
perceive said concessions as military victories. Israel’s security
services argue that Israel’s all-important power of deterrence has
“suffered substantially” because of these concessions.
Although Israel is a key player in Washington’s
geopolitical strategy, its recent military failures coupled with its
hard-line internal security doctrine render it a possible military
liability, and a risky partner, at a time when the U.S. is already
overstretched militarily.
The prevailing Israeli security doctrine does not
presume that a decisive military victory in the region will be
necessary, but rather that the security of their state depends largely
on its power of deterrence. The perceived need to reconstruct such a
level of deterrence may lead to a new round of skirmishing or, more
dangerously, a reprise of the strategic bombing of nuclear facilities
and military installations. By stoking the embers of an already
unstable and incendiary region, wars with Syria and/or Iran may break
out, which could conceivably drag in not only the United States, but,
in Iran’s case, Russia and China as well.
Western Asia must put aside its historical animosities
or it risks its very future. A possible understanding initiated and
sustained by local powers may lead toward enhanced regional, and
therefore global, security.
Continued irresponsibility and brinkmanship amongst the
region’s local powers, and meddling from the world’s powers, promises
just the opposite. Only when the global anti-war movement is able to
assert effective pressure for peace on the region in its entirety, and
when those who actually live there are able to assert themselves, will
future wars, at least in this region, be avoided.
This article was originally published at Alternatives.
|