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A few months ago, the Israeli military published figures on this year’s
recruitment, regarding the number of soldiers enlisted and the units they have
chosen to join. The statistics revealed that 25 percent of 18-year-old Jewish
men, and 40 percent of Jewish women don’t join the military for various reasons.
For the first time, the number of non-draftees has reached a quarter of the
Jewish population. The proportion of soldiers who leave the military in
their first few months of service is around 18 percent, a number that is also
on the rise. Moreover, the demand for serving in combat units is decreasing,
falling in the course of one year by 1.5 percent. The details regarding reserve
soldiers were not published, but it is known that their rate of service
avoidance is increasing even faster.
The publication of the numbers, together with comments from the Israeli
military spokesperson, have created a significant ”debate,” or rather, a
hysterical outcry in Israel over the rising share of non-draftees, and the need
to expand the pool of recruits, mainly by punishing through social and economic
exclusion those who don’t join the military.
But the national debate over the threat of “deserters” has overlooked the main
reason for this phenomenon: the demographic growth of the ultra-orthodox
community in Israel.
Study in religious schools is a ground for almost automatic exemption from military
duty. Yet, Israeli journalists, politicians and the self-righteous (and
self-defined) “defenders” of morality have largely chosen, instead, to target secular
middle-class dodgers. These youngsters find their way out of the military mainly
by going to the military psychiatrist, claiming to be unsuited for military service.
In the last 20 years, there has been a slow but steady rise in the numbers of
non-drafted secular Jews, most of whom are exactly the kind of material the Israeli
military is looking for: good and skilled students coming from stable
backgrounds, who had the potential to become officers or do other kinds of “vital
work” for the military. However, instead of taking a military path, these young
men and women continue their lives, in Israel, studying in universities,
finding well-paid jobs or even becoming rock and pop singers.
Yet what seems to bother the Israeli military and the mainstream politicians
even more than the loss of these potential soldiers is the level of social
acceptance that they enjoy in parts of Israeli society. Israel, a state
that has an army that has a state, is very much based on militaristic values
and the importance of “contributing to society” through military service. These
values have very much been contested since the 90s, with the erosion of the
social state, the fast and brutal process of neoliberalization and the continued
occupation of the Palestinian territories.
Israel
is locked in an ambivalent situation. Since the beginning of the Second
Intifada and the bursting of the “New Middle East” fantasy bubble, nationalism
and militarism are back in fashion, but, in a society that is today much more
diverse and polarized; a great extent of the traditional social foundations
that made national/military cohesion possible, are lacking. This crisis is one
instance of a larger process that many other countries also have been
undergoing during this period of transition from the “global village”
capitalism of the 1990s to the militarized capitalism of the post-9/11 era.
In the ’90s, the traditional nationalist ethos weakened in concert with the
weakening of the Israeli public’s social and economic security. The transition
to a type of war situation at the end of the year 2000 caught Israeli society
somewhat unprepared, in a condition of reduced unity and solidarity. The depth
of this crisis became manifest during the last Lebanon
war, in the military’s incredible level of mismanagement, both in carrying out
its military task and in its provision for the civilians in northern Israel. The
Israeli government and military abandoned the poor under rocket fire in damp and
filthy bomb shelters, while upper-middle class families found refuge in hotels
in Israel
or abroad.
All these events and processes contributed to the acceptance of the non-draftees
in certain sectors of Israeli society, and made it possible for many young
people, mainly from middle-upper class backgrounds, to consider not joining the
military. However, Israeli Jews from lower socio-economic classes—mainly Mizrahis,
and new immigrants from Russia and Ethiopia—still join the military in high
numbers, largely in order to attain a better social and economic status in
Israeli society.
Most of the non-draftees wouldn’t call their decision political. Neither do
they show a great interest in politics, and they might even recoil from Israeli
politics. For most of them, the decision not to enlist was based mainly on
personal reasons and wasn’t directly connected with any thought regarding the
ongoing occupation, the last war, or what is likely to come next.
Does this group of young people who avoids military service actually represent
a beginning of the de-militarization of Israeli society? What kind of effect do
they have on Israel’s
war-politics and the continuation of the occupation?
It is still hard to say if this process has a direct impact on decision making
in Israel.
Sadly, the majority of Israeli society is still very much militarized and sees
the military as an important part of life. Moreover, the Israeli education
system works together with the military in order to fight ”desertion” by
sending soldiers to secondary schools, advertising the benefits of serving, and
organizing military training for students between 16 and 18 years of age.
The depoliticized character of most of the non-draftees also makes them much
less of a threat to the state’s politics. They can be easily dismissed as selfish,
spoiled and egoistic kids, not to be taken seriously as a group of people who
diverge from the militaristic norms.
Still, the growing numbers of the non-drafted and refuseniks (conscientious
objectors), as well as the decline in motivation to join combat units, does
worry political leaders. Even Ariel Sharon once said in an interview that the rising
numbers of leftwing refuseniks was one of the reasons for the redeployment of military
outside of the Gaza Strip. Many more high-ranking officers speak about the non-draftees
as a strategic threat to Israel,
making it much harder to go to war, or to continue with the daily tasks of
occupation.
The shrinking pool of recruits is one of the weak points in the occupation politics
of Israel, and should be
taken into account as a factor that might force Israel into negotiations and more
dovish moves in the future. Nevertheless, as long as the phenomenon
doesn’t take a clear political form by showing resistance to war and occupation
in more ways than just simply avoiding service, they can be portrayed as
nothing but an irritant that deserves casual admonition from the nationalist moral
preachers.
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