Members of the Hamas armed wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, in the Gaza Strip.
Despite concerted efforts by the Quartet and Israel to undermine
Hamas rule following the January 2006 Palestinian national elections, the
political and military position of Hamas one year after Fatah’s failed attempt
to overthrow this elected government appears even stronger.
While opinion polls point to declining popularity among the
Palestinian public for Hamas, the Hamas-led government in Gaza is perceived by
Palestinians as effective on civil matters, capable of resisting Israeli
attacks and of forcing Israel to the negotiations table.
Conversely, the public image of the government appointed by
Palestinian President Abu Mazen is deteriorating, as its performance on civil
and political matters is viewed as mediocre at best. Israel’s refusal to
implement negotiated agreements seriously detracts from the political image of
Abu Mazen, as well as eats away at the credibility of Salam Fayyad’s government
on issues not directly related to the conflict, such as corruption, civil
security and economy.
The failure to show tangible results in the peace process, in
addition to the achievements of the Palestinian resistance in Gaza, have seriously
undermined the credibility of the political negotiations with the Israelis.
According to March-April polls carried out by the Jerusalem Media and Communications
Center and the Palestinian Center for Survey and Research, Palestinians are
frustrated with the negotiations and support for the resistance is on the rise.
Similarly, the Israeli population does not believe in the peace
process, and does not trust the Olmert-Barak government to deal with Hamas in
Gaza. According to an opinion poll published on 12 June by the Israeli radio station
Kol Israel, a quarter of Israelis have no opinion on whether they would
prefer a ceasefire agreement with Hamas or a large-scale military operation in
Gaza. The same poll states that fifty percent of Israelis do not believe that
Prime Minister Olmert, currently accused of corruption, has a mandate to decide
on such an operation.
The Israeli public does not believe a cease-fire with Hamas is
possible, but it also does not trust the Israeli military to stop the shooting
of rockets from the Gaza Strip.
Moreover, according to Avi Isaskharov and Amos Harel from Haaretz
(13 June 2008), the Israeli military also does not believe it is capable of
answering the challenge of Gaza. The military assumes that in order to end the
firing of rockets from Gaza, it will need to reoccupy the Strip for several
months, but it does not believe the public or the government will agree to the
resulting likely high number of Israeli causalities. Moreover, the Israeli army
and government know that a military operation will not help to obtain release of
the Israeli soldier imprisoned in Gaza and may even jeopardize his life.
The major achievement of Hamas thus far is leading Israel, the
strongest military power in the region, into a political-military impasse. If
the cease-fire negotiations in Cairo succeed, Hamas would have succeeded in
neutralizing the Abu Mazen appointed government in Ramallah. However, a failure
of these negotiations will strengthen both Palestinian and Israeli distrust in the
possibility of a negotiated exit from the crisis, further weakening Abu Mazen’s
government, although it is unlikely to spark a major Israeli invasion into the
Gaza Strip.
We are back to square one as Palestinian and Israeli public opinion
does not believe that reaching a peace agreement is possible. The Palestinian
negotiators become increasingly irrelevant due to the failing peace
negotiations, and Israel is unable to use its military power to change the
current political scenario. The question is how this impasse will be broken.
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