|
Flanked
by international and regional non-Arab dignitaries representing the UN, EU,
OIC, NAM and the leaders of Turkey, Malaysia and Pakistan as well as the
foreign minister of Iran, the leaders of the 22-member League of Arab States on
Wednesday re-launched in Riyadh their five-year old Arab Peace Initiative,
determined to reactivate it with mechanisms and a follow-up diplomatic campaign
that will again take it to the United Nations Security Council despite a U.S.
veto, which aborted a similar move in the bud last year.
Confidently,
seriously, unwaveringly and collectively Arab leaders are again binding
themselves and their countries to their “strategic option” of peace with
Israel, offering their Initiative as a realistic, pragmatic, affordable and
workable platform that could make a comprehensive regional peace within the
reach of the living generations, but unfortunately they are reciprocated by a
non-committal Israel and United States who instead are dealing tactically and
evasively with an historic opportunity that if missed would plunge the Middle
East into an open-ended conflict, to the detriment of all parties involved.
According
to the Israeli daily Haaretz on March 18, The Israeli Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and the U.S. State Department consider the Arab initiative a
forthcoming but non-binding (to them of course) Arab position that accordingly
could only be encouraged and not dismissed out of hand to negotiate further
Arab concessions.
The
24-member board of trustees of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group
(ICG), co-chaired by former European Commissioner for External Relations, Lord
Chris Patten, and former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Thomas Pickering, warned in
a statement ahead of the Riyadh
summit that the opportunity is not “open-ended” and the status quo cannot be maintained
indefinitely.
“If
the current chance for a breakthrough is not grasped over the next few months
-- with the government of Israel and the U.S. having the most critical role in
this respect -- there is a real possibility that support for a two-state
solution among Palestinians and in the wider Arab world would disappear, with
all the renewed tensions this is bound to generate,” their statement warned.
Nine
facts should be brought to the attention of the peace-loving world community to
understand the counterproductive tactical passive Israeli and U.S.
engagement and the credibility of the old-new Arab endeavour:
First, shockingly both allies are rejecting or demanding amendments to the
Arab plan, but have no concrete alternative plans of their own to offer except
Bush’s “vision” and Israel’s
unilateral long-term and transitional plans for the Palestinian-Israeli track
of the sixty-year old conflict, but nothing for settling the collective Arab-Israeli
conflict.
“We
expect an offer by Israel,”
Secretary General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, said. Ironically when Israel
occupied Palestinian and Arab lands in June 1967, late Israeli minister of
defence, Moshe Dayan, announced the Israelis were waiting for a phone call from
any Arab leader. Forty years later, in defiance of U.N. resolutions, the
Israeli army is still occupying and colonizing the lands and oppressing the
people, but nonetheless the call is coming collectively by twenty-two Arab
leaders.
Second, Israel
rejected publicly then undermined the Arab initiative of 2002 in the same year
by reoccupying the Palestinian self-ruled areas and Washington the next year
steered the Quartet of the U.S., UN, EU and Russia to come up with their own
initiative, the “Road Map,” which was nonetheless accepted by the Arab states
and the PLO, but Israel attached 14 undeclared conditions to her acceptance
thereof, which were backed by Bush’s letter of guarantees to Ariel Sharon on
April 14, 2004, a backing that bought the plan to its demise and the peace
process to its current dead end and made it possible for the Arab leaders to
consider reactivating the initiative their summit meeting in Beirut approved in
2002. However the U.S.
as recently as last year vetoed a similar Arab move to have the UN Security
Council adopt their initiative.
Third, revitalizing the Arab initiative comes only
after the failure of the Quartet, Israel and the U.S. to deliver on their four
year old “Road Map” and the 15-year old Madrid
Conference process of 1991, which has proved futile and
declared “dead” by the Arab League chief, six years after declaring its death
by the comatose former Israeli premier Ariel Sharon.
Fourth, the comprehensive and collective Arab approach
to solving the conflict with Israel
is building on the dead end the bilateral and step-by-step approaches reached.
It is worth noting that the most enthusiastic advocates of the comprehensive
approach are Jordan and Egypt, who only with Mauritania were the three members
of the Arab League to sign bilateral peace treaties with Israel, because they
are the most threatened by the absence of a comprehensive peace and by
persistence of the status quo.
Fifth, reactivating the Arab
initiative is in itself an indirect declaration of disillusionment with the U.S.
sponsorship of the unproductive peace processes that have ruled out involvement
by the world community, prevented the implementation of international
legitimacy resolutions and for sixty years proved a failed alternative to UN
engagement.
Sixth, the Arab Peace Initiative is also building on
the international legitimacy of more than 70 resolutions
adopted by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council during the past 59
years, which were rendered inapplicable by the opposition thereto of Israel
and the U.S.
who managed to veto thirty more.
Seventh, the new found confidence of the Arab leaders stems from the forgoing
facts, the Arab and Palestinian consensus on the initiative, which is backed by
the Turkish-led Organization of Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement
as well as by the world community, all which also neutralized the Iranian and
other opposition to the initiative. “We deal with world powers with
understanding but on equal footing,” the Saudi Arabian monarch, King Abdullah,
said on Monday, confirming the new confidence.
Eighth, the seriousness of Arab leaders stems from the fact that they are the
most to loose from the deadlocked no-war-no-peace status quo and that is why a
veteran moderate Arab state like Saudi Arabia is staking her
leading Arab and regional role and risking a political rift with her historic U.S.
ally.
Ninth, although the two sides are not on a collision course, obviously the
Arab Peace Initiative is drifting apart the U.S. and its most trusted Arab
friends; however hanging on to her strategic alliance with Israel is alienating
more normally friendly moderate and liberal Arabs at a time Washington is
decisively in need for their support on other regional involvements.
Under
the pressures of the latest Israeli war on Lebanon, the U.S-led war on Iraq,
the brewing U.S. crisis with Iran and the 59-year old U.S.-backed Israeli war
on the Palestinian people, the Arab League governments found a diplomatic
opening to re-launch their initiative to try on their own this time containing
the ensuing possible internal threats and regional turbulence.
Possible
Diplomatic Leverage
In view of the
absence of an Arab military option due to Israel’s overwhelming superiority, a
diplomatic option due to the U.S. identification with the Israeli policies,
ruling out the people’s war though it proved effective wherever the Arab
regular forces where absent in the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Iraq and the Jordan
Valley in 1969, Arab leaders found an opening to balance the U.S.-Israeli
alliance by the diplomatic counterweight of a long forthcoming world community
as their only remaining option, availing themselves of the U.S. critical
need for their support in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and vis-à-vis Iran.
Were the U.S.-Israeli
allies to continue passively and tactically evading commitment to the Arab
initiative as the only concrete peace offer in the town, the Arab leaders still
could prod the alliance to be more forthcoming by highlighting the fact that
the cool bilateral peace treaties with Jordan, Egypt and Mauritania are
increasingly besieged by popular opposition, proved un-conducive to regional
security and stability, let alone being a collateral for the security and
peaceful development of their signatory states, and threatened by escalating
violence and extremism emanating from their inability to develop into vehicles
for a just and lasting regional reconciliation and co-existence as envisioned
by their signatories and sponsors. Increasingly also those treaties are
threatened by the absence of a comprehensive deal, now made possible by the
Arab initiative.
To counterbalance
the U.S.-Israeli evasive engagement, Arab leaders could give muscle to their
peace offensive, which so far has proved effective enough for the U.S. and
Israel not to dismiss it out of hand and not to play down the world consensus
on its seriousness and credibility; they could suggest trading those bilateral
treaties for their collective initiative as a possible diplomatic leverage to
prod both allies to ponder choosing between an all-comprising peace and a
comprehensive no peace.
All mainstream
Israeli leaders have on record judged those treaties as “strategic assets;” U.S. military, political
and financial guarantees for sustaining them is proof enough they are
“strategic assets” to the United States
too. To secure these assets both allies should be made aware the treaties have
to be of similar strategic value for the Arab signatories as well, otherwise
why sustaining them!
The precarious regional
situation, the snowballing threat of violence and extremism, Arabs standing to
loose most of the deadlocked status quo, disillusionment with sixty years of
U.S.-sponsored conflict management, absence of other alternatives, all are
reason enough for Arab peace advocates to ponder such an option to bolster
their initiative and prod their peace protagonists to be more forthcoming.
Peace making in the end could not be but a two way effort.
Tactical
U.S.-Israeli Approach
The Arab initiative
was endorsed unchanged by the Arab League summit meeting in the Saudi capital
Riyadh on March 28-29 amid mainly Israeli demands for amendments thereto and a
flurry of diplomatic activity unprecedented in recent years aimed at amending
it, despite a denial by the visiting US Secretary of
State, Condoleezza Rice.
A
parade of dignitaries flooded the region. The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
was preceded by the EU's special envoy Marc Otte, UN envoy, Alvaro de
Soto, Belgian Foreign Minister,
Karel De Gught, and Norwegian state secretary, Raymond Johansen. Rice followed.
German Chancellor and current EU President, Andrea Merkel, and US House
Speaker, Nancy Pelosi, as is Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, were all expected
to join. “I believe this is a moment of gathering dynamism,” Ki-moon said in Israel
days ahead of the Arab summit.
However,
Ki-moon’s optimism has yet to be vindicated. Only partially the diplomatic
boycott of the Palestinian government was breached, but the economic siege and
the financial strangling of the Palestinian Authority remained intact. “Norway announced immediate
lifting of embargo and decided to deal with all members of the government and
to restore ties,” Palestinian Information Minister
Mustafa al-Barghouti told the Palestine radio, adding: “France, Spain, Italy and Sweden
are following.”
With
the exception of Norway’s
Johansen, all visiting dignitaries were representatives of three quarters of
the international Quartet of Middle East mediators, whose failure to realise
their 2003 Road Map has created the current impasse and whose Road Map plan was
floated originally to thwart the 2002 Arab plan. All of them came with one message, which the Quartet affirmed on Thursday night,
March 22: The Arab summit has to make the Palestinian government meet its three
conditions and “the commitment of the new government in this regard will be
measured not only on the basis of its composition and platform, but also its
actions.”
The Quartet was referring to the Palestinian unity government recently
formed on the basis of the Saudi hosted, mediated and sponsored Mecca Accord,
which made it possible to form a ruling coalition of the rival movements of
Fatah and Hamas as a pre-requisite for both convening the Arab summit and
endorsing the Arab Peace Initiative.
Rice came to the region ahead of the Arab summit planning tactically to
bypass the Arab diplomatic offensive by suggesting two parallel tracks that
were rejected by both Israel and the Arabs: A Palestinian – Israeli
negotiations over the final status issues, which was rejected out of hand by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, and a meeting of
the international Quartet with the Arab quartet of Saudi Arabia, UAE,
Egypt and Jordan plus Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
She floated the idea of “adding
an element of active diplomacy” and suggested Arab governments take steps
toward conciliation with Israel before an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement
is complete, and after a meeting with Ki-moon test ballooned the idea of the
Quartet + Quartet plus two, as a confidence building down payment to Israel;
she was helped by Olmert, who said he “wouldn't hesitate” to look at an
invitation to such a summit “in a very positive manner.”
Bringing
Arab heavyweights like Riyadh
and Abu Dhabi to
unilaterally normalize relations with Israel
beforehand would be indeed a breakthrough, but it would also be a death blow to
Arab consensus that could undermine not only the Arab initiative but all peace
prospects for the foreseeable future. Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ahmad Abul
Gheit, on record refused such a prospect.
Points of Conflict Unresolved
The Palestinian unity government is one of four major obstacles Israel
is citing for her rejection of the Arab initiative because this government
include Hamas, which is condemned also by the U.S.
as a “terrorist” organization. The other three are: The reference in the
initiative to the Palestinian Right of Return on the basis of UN resolution
194, full withdrawal of the Israeli occupying forces to June 4, 1967 lines,
including eastern Jerusalem,
which is the third obstacle. Israel
accordingly is demanding corresponding amendments, which is a sure recipe to
undermine Arab and Palestinian consensus on the initiative, which is its main
asset, as well as any other negotiable initiative as had been the case since
1948.
Rice
disappointedly ended her fourth Middle
East shuttle in four months without announcing any
dramatic breakthrough neither on Israeli-Palestinian track nor on the Arab –
Israeli track. Olmert quashed her planned accelerated negotiations with
President Mahmoud Abbas on the final status issues, which represent exactly the
foregoing Israeli points of conflict with the Arab initiative; on the rock of
these same obstacles the Oslo accords grinded into a halt when both sides had
to begin the final status talks at the end of the interim self rule in July
1999; the failure to resolve them next year at the trilateral
U.S.-Israeli-Palestinian summit in Camp David led to the second Palestinian
anti-occupation uprising, which in turn led to the following five years of
tit-for-tat violence that deadlocked the peace process and brought the Road Map
to its demise.
At
a March 27 news conference in Jerusalem Rice announced that Olmert and
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will meet every two weeks, but will not
tackle “core issues” like final borders, Jerusalem
and Palestinian refugees. She had her country’s carte blanche support for Israel
to blame for Olmert’s resolve to disappoint her publicly. The United States
has given Israel
$51.3 billion in military grants since 1949, most of it after 1974—more than
any other country in the post-1945 era. Israel
has also received $11.2 billion in loans for military equipment, plus $31
billion in economic grants, not to mention loan guarantees or joint military
projects. This open-treasury support has been all along the main leverage for
Israeli territorial expansion, demographic cleansing, diplomatic inflexibility
and obsession with the military-dictated peace pre-requisites.
Prior
to her ongoing reoccupation of the Palestinian autonomy areas in 2002, Israel
was in effective control of 85 percent of historic Palestine compared to the 55
percent it is entitled to under the UN resolution 181 (the partition plan); the
1948 war between more than 120.000 WWII-trained Israeli troops and the less
than 50.000 combined forces from seven Arab states, then under British and
French mandates, ended with the displacement of less than one million
Palestinian refugees, whose national and private rights have been at the core
of the Arab and Palestinian-Israeli conflict ever since, thus turning by the
sword the Arab majority of the UN-sponsored state into a minority. More than 22
percent of Arab citizens of pre-1967 Israel,
who mark the Land Day on March 31, have been systemically dispossessed of their
land to own now less than 3 percent of the area of the Hebrew state. In the
Israeli occupied West Bank
more than 62 colonial settlements, built on Palestinian publicly and
privately-owned land since 1967, are now host to more than 450.000 Jewish
settlers.
Dispossession
and displacement of Arab Palestinians have at least to stop, let alone redressing
the historic injustice, to make room for peace making. A Palestinian state on
22 percent of historic Palestine,
within the pre-1967 armistice lines of 1948, is only part and not all of the
solution. 73
Palestinian groups urged the two-day Arab summit in Riyadh
to uphold the Right of Return. Hence the Arab summit’s rejection of acquisition
of land by force, reiteration of land for peace as the basis of the Arab
initiative and refusal to heed the Israeli proposed amendments.
Changing
the initiative is virtually impossible in the near future because the rules of
the Arab League demand that all decisions be accepted unanimously, Amr Mousa
said. “There will be no amendment to the Arab peace initiative,” Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal also reaffirmed on
March 25, adding: “(It) is the best framework for a comprehensive and fair
resolution of not only the Palestinian-Israeli problem but the entire
Arab-Israeli conflict.”
However, the Arab leaders meeting in Riyadh
left the door open for Israeli engagement; they decided not to discard the
Quartet’s Road Map and approved it as one of the terms of reference for peace
making in addition to their initiative. Another provision stipulated “reaching
a just solution for the problem of Palestinian refugees to be agreed upon in
accordance with the Arab peace initiative in implementation of the resolution
of the General Assembly of the United Nations No. 194.” Both provisions keep
the door open for diplomacy.
For
Israel, history for making peace starts in 1967, for Arabs in 1948, and here
lies the conflict that has deadlocked the peace process and the efforts of the
international community to resolve the Middle East chronic and yet intractable
conflict, because the core issues that sparked six major Arab-Israeli wars and
could ignite more military confrontations predate the 1967 war, where Israel is
seeking to make history stops. Here is the chestnut of the Arab-Israeli
conflict, which failed all previous peace efforts and could make or break
future similar endeavours. The ball is in the Israeli court.
Nicola
Nasser is a veteran Arab journalist in Kuwait,
Jordan,
UAE and Palestine.
He is based in Birzeit, West Bank of the Israeli-occupied Palestinian
territories.
|