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It is of course possible to see this as a cynical, disingenuous act by Israel to prop up the discredited Abu Mazen, following the fratricidal split between the West Bank and Gaza, as well Hamas and Fatah. While questions of both Israel and Fatah’s intentions by this act linger, it still does create a genuine opportunity for both Israel and the Palestinian people, and comes amidst other gestures of goodwill towards the Palestinian Authority. This includes the unfreezing of over 100 million dollars in tax revenues as well as the removal of many roadblocks.

Zacharia Zbeidi has reportedly accepted the amnesty deal offered by the Israelis. This speaks to the enormity of the opportunity that has emerged. Speaking in an interview with Ynet, Zbeidi said “You have a unique opportunity to turn a new page with the Palestinian Authority.” He warned, however, that the al-Aqsa Brigades would not sit idly by should Israel violate the ceasefire.”

In an interview in 2005 with the Alternative Information Center’s (AIC), published in News from Within, Zbeidi laid out terms for a ceasefire between the al-Aqsa militants and Israel. In it, he said that Israel must continue the peace process, release political prisoners, stop building the Wall and remove checkpoints, amongst other conditions.

Barely two years later, however, in the 15 July Ynet interview, Zbeidi stated this was Israel’s “last chance to turn a new page with the Palestinians,” and that the three-month interlude was Israel’s chance to prove to Fatah and the Palestinian people that they are committed to a peace process. This echoes closely his words in 2005 in his AIC interview, where he stated that it was incumbent upon the Israelis to prove their willingness to wage peace.

This, of course, is a two-way street to many Israelis, who would prefer to see Zbeidi, amongst other al-Aqsa militants, pay for their role in suicide bombings. Yet, that a militant such as Zbeidi is expressing his willingness to make peace overtures is significant, and the opportunity should be seized.

That does not mean however, that the situation is as pliable as it first may appear.

There are several other potential outcomes that may prove less than beneficial to the peace process. The most likely is that this ceasefire will offer only a brief respite, allowing both sides to consolidate their positions while nothing changes substantively. This is in keeping with the now decades-old pattern of ceasefires, broken ceasefires, and mutual recriminations, as with the January 2002 ceasefire, and the ceasefire called off in April of 2005.

The other likely scenerio is that the exact opposite outcome will come to pass. Intended to prop up Mahmoud Abbas, this ceasefire and closer ties to Israel may further serve to discredit the already unpopular leader of the PA. While he continues to retain strong support abroad, within the occupied Palestinian territories, he is largely seen as a lackey for the international community, rather than serving the interests of the Palestinian people. This image may be reinforced amongst Palestinians already fed up with the corrupt PA and Fatah.

To which party a shift in public support would end up going, though, is another question. It may actually serve to bolster Hamas in the West Bank amongst those who continue to support a harder line. This comes as the Palestinian Left movement, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), has refused calls to disarm, while condemning both Fatah and Hamas for their actions, and calling them counterproductive internal feuds that distract from the struggle against Israel.

The existence of a plurality of armed groups, and without a unity government, makes it difficult for the PA to ensure the ceasefire will hold, particularly as the security forces are still reeling from their defeat at the hands of Hamas last month in Gaza.

It is difficult to see how Abu Mazen will succeed in uniting the Palestinian people, or even just the West Bank, despite many of the conciliatory gestures by Israel designed to raise flagging support. As Danny Rubenstein pointed out in a Haaretz article, Mahmoud Abbas no longer has anything to sell the Palestinian people. He has failed utterly in reconstituting a functional government. The legislature cannot meet, and he has no forward momentum. He also faces the specter of the Wall, potential for a rekindled civil war, and increasing calls for the serious discussion of a binational state. These issues are all of course inseparable from one another, insofar as they are now interwoven into the discourse and events of modern Palestine following the failure of Oslo.

In order to succeed, Abu Mazen must navigate these minefields successfully, a task not easily done. He may enjoy some restored credibility now that popular commanders such as Zacharia Zbeidi have publicly taken actions that express support. Ultimately, what he is facing is the final stages of the disintegration of the Oslo process, an unenviable situation for any leader, especially one with no clearly expressed vision other than restoring the status quo. What he is likely to find is that the status quo is no longer viable, and he will be forced to either find a vision of the future, or be swept aside.