The OCHA Mid-Year Review on the OPT

On 11 July, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) – Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) published its mid-year review of the Consolidated Appeals Process on the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). The review explains briefly, sector by sector, what was achieved and what are the goals for the second half of this year.

According to OCHA-OPT, “humanitarian coordination is based on the principle that a coherent approach to emergency response will maximize its benefits and minimize its potential pitfalls – in short, that the ‘whole’ will be greater than the sum of its parts.”

The mid-year review focused on the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), which “has two major components, firstly the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) which outlines the causes and scope of humanitarian need and identifies priority areas, in the form of 'Strategic Objectives', based on situation analysis, scenario building and review of work done, and secondly strategic response plans, including individual projects, to meet the objectives.” Over fifty organizations participate in the consolidated appeals that are subject of the mid-year review. It therefore comprises quite a large share of aid agencies active in the OPT.

Although progress was cited in several areas, including repaired shelters and increased access to water and food, some remarks on how the aid agencies work are appropriate.

Regarding food security the review notes that “the continuous closing of crossings (for cargo) between Israel and Gaza… still significantly increases the cost of operations.” It seems as if the agencies accept the situation and accommodate to it while they could and even should attempt to hold Israel accountable for the extra costs they are forced to pay. Furthermore, aid agencies should publicize how large these additional costs are. Although their stated goal is to enable the Palestinian population to be food self-sufficient by working to reinforce productivity of accessible agricultural land, in practice aid mostly does not succeed in making Palestinians self-sufficient but rather solves immediate food shortages. Moreover, solving short-term food insecurity also relieves Israel from its obligations under article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which states that “the occupying power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population.” Furthermore, the aforementioned agricultural land can easily be declared “military area”, making it impossible for Palestinian farmers to reach their agricultural land. Except for a “rapid assessment about the impact of the expansion of Buffer Zone on food security, agricultural and livelihood”, the report does not mention this or how the agencies will (attempt to) protect Palestinian agricultural land from being confiscated.[1]

The review further cites the need for rehabilitation. For instance, one target in the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Cluster (WASH) cluster is “rehabilitation of sewage network benefiting 1,750,921 people”, and among used indicators in the agricultural sector are “greenhouses rehabilitated (per dunum)” and “open fields rehabilitated (per dunum)”. This means that for instance green houses, open fields, water networks and sewage systems that are damaged or destroyed by the Israeli army or settlers are being rebuilt by the agencies. This rehabilitation enables Palestinians to use their properties again so they would be able to grow crops and have access to clean drinking water and functioning sewage systems. In Gaza the shelters of 8,400 families have been repaired, many of them were damaged during Operation Cast Lead or by other attacks by the Israeli army. Yet by repairing and rehabilitating what Israel has destroyed without holding Israel accountable for the costs, the agencies are facilitating and indirectly financing the occupation. The repairs and rehabilitation efforts support the occupation because everything that Israel has destroyed is rehabilitated by aid agencies without presenting the bill to Israel. Thus, there are no (financial) consequences to Israel for its destructive activities, and there is no (financial) incentive for Israel to stop these activities.

The mobile health clinics run and provided by the agencies are mainly needed because the existing health clinics are not accessible (within a short period of time) by people living in certain areas due to the Separation Wall, roadblocks, checkpoints, etc. Accordingly, even though the mobile health clinics are helping Palestinians by providing them necessary healthcare, the agencies are again relieving Israel from its obligations under international law and facilitating the occupation.

It follows from OCHA’s mid-year review that the majority of aid and donor agencies seem to take a reactive stance when it comes to the OPT, meaning they mostly respond to the Israeli blockades, demolitions, etc. rather than working to end the occupation. Through the aid they are providing, agencies are relieving Israel from its responsibilities under international law. As signatories to the Fourth Geneva Convention, it is the obligation of the donor countries providing money to the aid agencies to make sure that other signatories, including Israel, comply with its obligations under this Convention. As long as this is not happening, projects as described in the mid-year review will continue to facilitate and even indirectly finance Israel’s occupation. So, if the donors’/agencies’ policies towards Israel do not change, they can spend as much money on the Palestinians as they want: it will only marginally improve the Palestinian’s  situation  because it will not end Israel’s occupation.