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Final Status Issues: Boarders, Refugees, Jerusalem , Water
Political System and Democracy
Social and Economic Attitudes
Expectations and Priorities

 28 February 2007

 Background about Opinion Leaders’ Survey, Methodology and Sample

General Introduction:

The opinion leaders’ survey conducted by the Development Studies Programme is considered the first of its kind in Palestine. It is the first in regard to its population and the issues approached. The survey is significant and important; it discusses issues representing scenarios and strategies for the current and future status of the Palestinian Territory. The survey lays a solid ground towards reading the Palestinian leaders’ approach, helping to understand the process of mobility and polarization of the Palestinian public in relation to the changing events on the ground.  

It is important to mention that this survey differs from general public opinion polls in that an opinion leaders’ survey does not include the majority of community segments and does not represent the population as a whole, as is the case in general public opinion polls. In the conduct of this opinion leader survey, the population of the sample was targeted and selected from lists that are available as explained later.

The issues discussed in the survey are comprehensive and diverse; the poll includes the issues of most concern and interest to the Palestinian community over the mid to long term. Some issues deal with general approaches, some with scenarios and strategies, while others monitor the positions of less controversial issues. In addition, the style in formulating the questions as well as the quality of answers are diverse; some answers reflect preferences of the sample population while others reflect their visions and the assumptions towards the most viable strategies and approaches.  

For the purpose of this survey, the concept of an “opinion leader” was defined as follows: Palestinian individuals living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip who contribute to changing and altering the status of the Palestinian community on the long-term level. These individuals influence public awareness and decisions regarding various political, legislative, social, economic, cultural, and academic issues. In addition, these groups have the capacity to access resources, and thus empower themselves on different levels, increasing their influence on the national level. The term opinion leaders may imply a sense of unity among the individual members of this group. However, the group is heterogeneous and diverse; its members affiliate with various political, social, cultural, and economic situation and interests.  

The Development Studies Programme aspires that the outcome of this contribution would lay the foundation for a comprehensive study on Palestinian public opinion that takes into consideration the factors and variables which shape and direct Palestinian attitudes and opinions. A rich space for understanding and analyzing the public attitudes, their changing dynamics, and the influencing factors can be attained through comparative studies of public opinion poll surveys and opinion leaders’ surveys. Such comparative analysis gives insight into the future direction of decisions made by political and social authorities.  It also gives insight into how the interests of opinion leaders are articulated and gain legitimacy in the eyes of the public.   

Third Section: Methodology of Field Work and the Sample Design:

The sample frame and design relied on purposive sampling (names, addresses and occupation of respondents were identified in advance). Each questionnaire was put in a separate and closed envelope. The sample was classified upon place of residency and was distributed to researchers for field work in the different districts in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. For accuracy of data collection, it was reaffirmed that researchers (although well-trained in field work techniques) make an appointment with each respondent on the telephone and personally visit the respondent to complete the questionnaire in the same session. Another option was to hand the questionnaire to selected respondents and pick up the completed document within a maximum of two days. Confidentiality of information was highly respected; questionnaires were placed in closed envelopes with no signs or references to the person who completed the survey questionnaire.

The classification of opinion leaders is as follows:

1.       Political elite: political parties and factions, legislative council, politicians and ministers;

2.       Social elite: local organizations, charitable societies, kinship, university staff, educated people (artists), mayors, unions, and women organizations;

3.       Economic elite: private sector managers, owners of significant investments and capital;

4.       Cultural and Academic elite: thinkers and media leaders, writers, educated people, and religious leaders, such as Imams, priests, and Muftis.

The above classifications were made only for the sake of selecting the sample; such classifications are not always clear in the social stratification of the Palestinian society. For example, there is high potential for the same individual to be a leader, a member of a political party, have significant tribal or kinship affiliation, and conduct significant economic activity in society. This situation is popular in most societies. However, developed societies have clearer classification where different groups develop and interweave joint interests, values and approaches based on class division (politically, and more specifically, economic in nature). 

A preliminary list of individuals and organizations in all Palestinian districts was identified by the field researchers. Researchers followed clear and specific criteria in the identification process. This criteria is consistent with the definition of the concept of 'opinion elite' and its classifications. In addition, the survey team at the Development Studies Programme consulted senior and credible researchers to review the sample target respondents and the classifications. After the identification of a sample population in accordance to the above mentioned classifications, a second sampling process was conducted. The sample population was classified into social and economic categories, and a systematic probability sampling was done in accordance with scientific principles. As a result, the representation of the sample targets is as follows:  

1- Palestinian Universities and Colleges

2- Legislative Council

3- PNA Ministries

4- Palestinian Municipalities

5- Writers and local Media

6- Syndicates and Trade Unions

7- Chambers of Commerce.

8- Banks, Insurance and Investment companies.

9- Political parties and social activists

10- Civil society organizations divided according to sectors (agriculture, human rights, health, education, research, and environment).

11- Religious Organizations 

12- PLO Organs (Executive Committee, Palestinian National Council, Central Council)

13- Women Organizations

14- Youth Organizations

15- Independent thinkers and writers

Upon the completion of the field work and the finalization of the results, it appeared that:

·         Eighty-five percent of the sample is male, which reflects the reality of the leaders in in public decision-making positions.

·         Seventy-seven percent of the sample lives in an urban area, which reflects the fact that public opinion leaders are more likely to live in an urban area or city despite their origins in a village or refugee camp; this compares with 15 percent of the respondents from villages and 8 percent from a refugee camp.

·         It’s also important to point out that 77 percent of the sample is over forty years old and 41 percent are fifty or above, while only 3 percent of the sample is between the ages of 20 – 29 years old.

·         As for the economic situation of target respondents, the salaries of half the sample exceed 5000 NIS per month, whereas 39 percent declared that their income is between 2500-5000 NIS .

·         In addition, 83 percent of the sample has a Bachelor Degree or above.

·         The sample is distributed among three sectors; 36 percent belong to the civil society sector, 35 percent to the governmental sector and 29 percent are active in the private sector.

·         The political affiliations of the sample are as follows: 64 percent express their support to specific political parties, and 36 percent express their political attitudes and affiliations as independent. The sample was distributed as follows: 30 percent support Fatah, 13 percent support Hamas, 8 percent support the Popular Front, 3 percent support Al-Mubadara, 3 percent support the Democratic Front, 2 percent support the Third Way and the Peoples Party, and 1 percent support the Fida Party, Islamic Jihad and other lists.

·         Thirty-six percent of the sample (those who identified themselves as independents) perceive themselves in the lines of a broad political spectrum, encompassing Marxist, Islamic, Democratic, liberal and/or National thoughts and approaches.

It must be noted that the representation of the opinion leader sample’s political affiliation does not reflect broader support for each party in general public opinion polls (see table).

Table of Sample Distribution:

Finally, the Development Studies Programme looks forward to elaborating on the methodology of opinion leader surveys in the future. As this is the first experience with this type of survey research in the Palestinian Territories , the Programme will consider all feedback from experts upon the release of the results to help analyze this experience addressing public opinion leaders. 

Analysis of the Results of the Opinion Leaders’ Survey:

Section One: Living Conditions: The majority describes the economic and security conditions as bad; yet, there is cautious optimism for the future.

• The absolute majority of opinion leaders (90 percent) think that the economic situation in Palestine is either bad or very bad
• Seventy-four percent believe that Palestinian society is heading in the wrong direction while 22 percent believe the opposite.
• In regard to the current security chaos, 52 percent of respondents feel personal insecurity.
• Despite that, the percentage of pessimistic persons does not exceed a third of the sample (31.1 percent), which is equal to the percentage of those who have optimistic expectation about the future, while 38 percent of the respondents have swinging feelings between pessimistic and optimistic.

Section Two: Final status issues, peace opportunities, and historical reconciliation:

I: Final status issues (refugees, Jerusalem , settlements, borders, water and other natural resources):

This section analyzes the opinions of leaders regarding the proposed scenarios for solving critical issues, i.e. those identified as final status issues:

1- The Right to self-determination: A democratic Palestinian state for all citizens on historic Palestine is the preferred solution while a two-state solution is perceived to be the most realistic.

-    Among the various scenarios proposed for self-determination, 'one democratic state in historical Palestine for all its citizens without discrimination based on religion, race, ethnicity, color, or sex (to be determined by a constitution and upon international safeguards and guarantees)' is the preferred scenario among the respondents (68 percent). However, only 16 percent support such a scenario and believe that it is feasible; 52 percent support it regardless of its feasibility.

-    Almost an equal percentage support a two-state solution scenario (65 percent) where one is Palestinian and the other is Israeli (in reference to the 1988 Declaration of Independence and 242 UN Resolution. Indeed, it is the most realistic solution from the point of view of its supporters. Fifty-four percent of supporters believe that a two-state solution is feasible while 11 percent support this potential solution regardless of its feasibility.

-    Sixty-eight percent of the opinion leaders do not support a potential scenario to establish 'An Islamic State on all lands of historic Palestine (Jews and Christians to be treated as minorities of non-Muslim subjects enjoying the protection of Muslim state.' Likewise, sixty-two percent of respondents believe that such a solution is not feasible.

2-  Borders: The borders of the Palestinian state are 1967 borders. Any modification or alteration of borders should consider geographical congruity between the various Palestinian territories including the congruity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip:

-    Seventy-seven percent of the respondents prefer establishing an independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Sixty-five percent believe that such a scenario is possible while 12 percent support it regardless of its feasibility.

-    Of the respondents, 63 percent think that any amendments or alterations of borders should take into consideration the necessity of geographical congruity between the Palestinian Territory (including the Gaza Strip and the West Bank ). Forty-five percent accept minor border alterations (i.e., land swaps of similar size and quality).

-    The majority (92 percent) reject alterations of borders to solve the issue of settlements on the basis of annexing the huge settlements to Israel . Moreover, 87 percent reject the idea of establishing a state with temporary borders pending the negotiation of permanent borders.

3- Settlements: The majority prefer dismantling settlements or full withdrawal from all the settlements and for them to be handed over to the Palestinian Authority as the first scenario. The second preferred scenario is evacuating settlers and maintaining settlements for Palestinian refugees’ residential purposes.

-    The majority of respondents (97 percent) prefer dismantling all settlements or full withdrawal from all settlements within the Palestinian Territories , and handover to Palestinian authorities. Sixty-eight percent of the sample who supports such a scenario thinks that it is feasible while 29 percent support it regardless of its feasibility.

-    Sixty-one percent of the sample prefer to evacuate settlers and maintain settlements for Palestinian refugees’ residential purposes. Only 39 percent think that such a scenario is applicable while 22 percent support it regardless of its feasibility.

-    The scenario that witnessed the highest percentage of rejection proposed conducting a resident-swap between settlers and Palestinians living inside Israel . Ninty-five percent of the sample reject this option. The second least preferred scenario is maintaining status quo for the larger settlements and consider their residents as Israeli citizens within the Palestinian State . On the other hand, only 17 percent of the sample approves dismantling or full withdrawal from the settlements, while conducting a handover of most settlements to the Palestinian authorities, and annexing the larger settlements to Israel according to a land-swap agreement between the two states.

4- Refugees: The most preferable and applicable scenario from the point of view of the respondents is the implementation of UN Resolution 194 (the Right of Return and/or Compensation).

5- Seventy-five percent of respondents prefer the implementation of UN Resolution 194 (the Right of Return and/or Compensation), according to which refugees would return to their places of origin as Israeli citizens, and receive compensation payments for those who are unwilling to return. Thirty-three percent prefers this scenario and thinks that it is feasible while 42 percent prefers it regardless of its feasibility. However, 17 percent of the respondents think that this scenario is not feasible and they would not support it.

-    Of the respondents, 54 percent accepts an Israeli recognition of Israel’s responsibility for this question as a first step, and then proceeding to discuss possible solutions. Half of those believe this scenario is feasible and would support it while the other half prefers it regardless of its feasibility.

-    The majority (89 percent) totally rejects a scenario of giving compensation to Palestinian refugees and settling them in their host countries of residence.

-    Twenty-five percent prefer a fair, comprehensive, and final “negotiated” solution for the issue of refugees (with no reference to the UN resolution) and believe that such a solution is feasible and realistic.

6- Jerusalem: Respondents prefer East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian State over other potential scenarios.

- Eighty-four percent of the respondents would declare East Jerusalem as the capital of an independent Palestinian state. Sixty-nine percent believe that such a solution is feasible and realistic while 15 percent support this option regardless of its perceived feasibility.

-    Eighty-four percent of the sample would not accept a potential scenario in which East Jerusalem was declared as the capital of the Palestinian State if it were re-divided to give Israel control over the Jewish quarter.  Although 40 percent believe that such a scenario is feasible, they do not prefer this option. Further, 44 percent reject the scenario and believe that it is not feasible.  Nevertheless, 16 percent voiced preference for this solution.

-    A unified East and West Jerusalem under international sovereignty is the preferred scenario for 30 percent of the sample. Of the respondents, 26 percent support this option if the unified city is the capital of the two states.

-    Less acceptable scenarios would be to internationalize East Jerusalem or administratively divide East Jerusalem (with the Palestinian State undertaking the religious, police, and civil functions and Israel maintaining security powers) -no more than 5 percent of the sample supports either scenario.

7- Water: The most preferred scenario is to preserve the water rights of both states with formulas and formats for cooperation in this area. A majority also prefer to have Palestine and Israel maintain full sovereign rights over their water as any other two independent states.

-    Sixty-six percent of the sample prefer to preserve the water rights of both states with formulas and formats for cooperation in the area and believe that this scenario is feasible. However, 19 percent prefer such a scenario regardless of its feasibility.

-      Of the opinion leaders, 94 percent believe that the water rights of both states should be preserved with formulas and formats for cooperation in this area. They also believe that this scenario is feasible.

-     Sixty-three percent reject a settlement agreement which incorporates specific items related to water-sharing in accordance to the needs of the two parties of the agreement.

Section Three: Peace and Reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis:

Despite the halted efforts to achieve reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis, the majority of respondents believe in the possibility of achieving peace and reconciliation between the two peoples:

-    Thirty percent of participants believe in the opportunity of achieving historical reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis where normalizing relations between the two people would be the natural by-product of reconciliation. Thirty-nine percent agree with this to a certain extent, while 29 percent do not agree.

-    Of the respondents, 33 percent disagree with a potential scenario to establish two independent states with open borders, whereby 65 percent agree completely or to some extent.

-    Of the respondents, 67 percent express complete or partial support for establishing joint economic projects between Palestinians and Israelis, towards developing relations that might lead to a joint open market. (This scenario is possible if a comprehensive reconciliation is achieved between the two people.) However, 32 percent disagree with such a scenario.

-    In contrast to the support for strengthening economic relations, 68 percent of respondents do not think that there is a possibility to launch joint political institutions and reinforce cooperation between the two peoples on the political, economic, and security levels, achieving a confederation between the two states of Palestine and Israel.

-    However, a clear majority of respondents (85 percent) support economic and cultural relations with the surrounding Arab region.

Section Foure: The relations between the Palestinian state and its neighbors, especially Jordan, Egypt, and Israel: The Palestinian state should establish normal relations with its surrounding countries while opting out of regional and international coalitions and alliances:

-    Ninety-four percent of the respondents prefer a Palestinian state that maintains normal relations with the surrounding countries; a majority, 86 percent, believe that such a solution is feasible.

-    A high percentage of the respondents reject the idea of a tri-lateral confederation with Jordan and Israel, or a confederation with Jordan. Eighty-three percent reject a tri-lateral confederation with both Egypt and Jordan. (Tri-lateral confederation is identified as: the Palestinian state would temporarily allow a Jordanian role in the West Bank and an Egyptian one in the Gaza Strip, where the security and economy are the main targeted sectors within such scenario). However, 91 percent and 90 percent, respectively, reject the idea of a bilaterally confederated state with Israel, or a trilateral confederation with Jordan and Israel.

-    Finally, sixty-six percent of the sample rejects a potential confederation with Jordan. 

-    A majority of the respondents believe that achieving the Palestinian priorities obligates the Palestinian Authority to stay out of regional coalitions and alliances while maintaining balanced relations with the international community.

      - A small percentage (15%) said that the Palestinian authority should align itself with moderate Arabic countries close to the USA, particularly Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. However, the percentage of respondents who believe that the best way to achieve the Palestinian priorities would be through affiliating with Iran-Syria-Hezbullah, does not exceed 3 percent.

Section Fiver: Negotiations and Conflict Management Scenarios:

1-  The Palestinian Liberation Organization is the most legitimate body (in capability and legitimacy) to manage the final status negotiations: The respondents were asked to identify the most capable and legitimate authority to manage negotiations on the final status issues with Israel. The answers were divided nearly equally between three bodies:

-    Thirty-five percent believe that the mission of conducting final status negotiations should be given to a negotiating commission consisting of PLO and Islamic movements while 30 percent believe that the negotiations should be handled by a commission consisting of the PLO and the PNA

-    Thirty-three percent believe that the Palestinian Liberation Organization is the most legitimate body to be responsible for negotiations. Only 2 percent of respondents believe that the Islamic movements are the most capable and legitimate bodies to manage negotiations.

2-   Ratification of agreements: The majority believe that Palestinians in both the Palestinian Territory and the Diaspora have the most authority to ratify any substantial agreements with Israel (i.e., those which deal with final status issues):

-    Sixty-six percent favor presenting the agreements for a general referendum by Palestinians all over the world whenever there is a need to ratify core agreements with Israel which tackle final status issues.

-    Of the respondents, 13 percent believe that the National Council should be authorized to ratify such agreements. However, 11 percent of the respondents would authorize a general referendum on the agreements within the Palestinian Territory, while 8 percent would authorize the combined votes of both the National and Legislative Councils. Finally, only 3 percent would approve