Brigadier General Gadi Shamni, head of the Israeli military Central Command
As
part of the Israeli newspapers’ extended coverage in run up to the Jewish high
holidays, Brigadier General Gadi Shamni, currently head of the Israeli military’s
central command, gave an exclusive interview to the Haaretz newspaper in
Hebrew on 3 October.
General
Shamni praises the Palestinian Authority (PA) forces for their ongoing war
against Hamas, viewing the struggle against the Islamic organization as a joint
venture of the Israeli military and the Palestinian security forces. Shamni remarks
that these joint efforts against the Hamas civil and military infrastructure improved
following Israel’s closure of a shopping mall in Nablus, which was operated by
an Islamic charity. “We taught them that there are ways to undermine Hamas’
capacities. They understood the logic and value of this. An association such as
al-Tadmon (which operated the mall in Nablus) financed Hamas. After Nablus, the Palestinian
Authority complained. We told them, we don’t stop you from acting, the more you
do the less we will intervene.”
According
to General Shamni, Israel
supports the PA in its struggle against Hamas by providing intelligence. “They
can do the rest alone, and they do it well,” he notes, adding, “I was informed
that the Palestinian Authority replaced the board of directors of the
association in Nablus
with people loyal to the Palestinian Authority. We had confiscated the cars of
the association, now we will return them.”
Israel supports the
Palestinian Authority’s efforts against Hamas as part of a wider plan to pacify
the occupied Palestinian territories. Since the death of Yasser Arafat, those
efforts include transforming the Authority from a vehicle of state building
into a body that administers the life of the Palestinians and collaborates with
Israel in repressing threats
to Israel’s
defined security and national interests.
The
idea of establishing a political entity short of a state in order to negotiate with
Israel
for Palestinian independence was Arafat’s sole justification for signing the Oslo
Agreements. Israel,
however, conceived the agreements differently. Israel’s inability to suppress the
first Intifada by force led the Rabin government to accept a negotiated outcome
of the uprising. In addition, the peace process and the creation of a
Palestinian entity allowed Israel
to open diplomatic relations with powerful emerging countries, such as India and China,
led to the cancellation of the Arab indirect boycott with Israel and
opened the door for Israeli industry to access global markets.
However,
due to the political weight of the settlement movement, which is larger than
the settler population and embodies many of Israel’s religious and nationalist
symbols, every Israeli government must negotiate an agreement with this
movement before negotiating any agreement with the Palestinians. The extent of
Israeli readiness to retreat from the occupied Palestinian territories and the extent
of Palestinian independence then becomes a compromise between Israel’s perceived
political, economic, and demographic interests, on the one hand, and the level
of flexibility of the settlement movement, on the other. In addition, the
Israeli military establishment conceives an independent and sovereign
Palestinian state as a threat to Israel’s security interests.
The
political flexibility of the settler movement’s security assumptions, in
addition to the aim of sustaining a Jewish political majority in Israel, led to the outline of a new political consensus
in Israel.
This consensus, which includes most of the center-Left and center-Right
political forces represented in the Knesset, states that Israel will retreat
from the West Bank, to a line agreed upon by an internal Israeli agreement, and
a Palestinian independent but not sovereign entity will be created. Paradoxically,
this Israeli perception, and sole Israeli proposition for peace currently on
the table today, strips the Palestinian Authority of its political agency,
excluding it from the negotiations table, but requiring the Palestinian
security forces to become Israel’s security contractor.
The
new Israeli consensus was outlined in an agreement between Yossi Beilin and
Michael Eitan prior to the 1995 assassination of Rabin. It was an attempt to
reframe the legitimate limits of Zionist objectives in response to the massive settler’s
antigovernment demonstrations during the Oslo
process, in addition to the growing intellectual criticism of Zionist history
by Israeli intellectuals.
The
Israeli assassination policies as of 2000, the construction of the Separation Wall
in the occupied Palestinian territories and the re-establishment of a network
of informers that feed the Israeli security services led to the pacification of
the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza. After the death of Yasser Arafat, these
policies, which undermined the basis for a sovereign Palestinian state and dismantled
the political infrastructure of the Palestinian national movement, led to the institution
of a Palestinian Authority stripped of national objectives and ready to
negotiate its political space in accordance with Israeli interests.
The
Palestinian Authority under Abu Mazen and Salam Fayyad is no longer an entity on
the path to Palestinian statehood, but a reliable subcontractor of Israeli
security policies. Israel finally imposed its agenda on the Palestinian
Authority, and defeated for all practical purposes the Palestinian national
objectives of the last 34 years: the creation of an independent and sovereign
Palestinian state on the territories occupied by Israel in 1967.
Nevertheless,
the Israeli victory is short sighted. A political entity short of a sovereign Palestinian
state will have no popular legitimacy and will not be able to meet Israel’s expectations.
Contrary to General Shamni’s expectations that in the near future the
Palestinian Authority will be strong enough to take control and become a state
stripped of sovereignty, Israel will be forced to remain on the ground
continuously to support PA military efforts against Hamas. Moreover, the acceptance
of defeat led key Palestinian intellectuals to claim that because a Palestinian
sovereign state is not in the agenda, Palestinians should demand the
substitution of Israel with a democratic state. It can be anticipated that a
continuous Israeli presence in the occupied Palestinian territories will
strengthen this position, reframing Palestinian discourse within the context of
democratic demands from Israel, undermining the state’s Jewish Zionist
character.
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