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Voting patterns in the southern Israeli city of Dimona, which has one of the highest unemployment rates in the country, skews heavily towards rightwing political parties.

Oslo-Period Analysis Missing the Mark

The relation between economic wellbeing and political opinion is a topic that has sparked interest among many scholars—Israelis, Palestinians and internationals—who have studied the political peace process between Israel and the Palestinians since the early 1990s.

During the 1990’s, the prevalent opinion amongst a majority of local and international researchers was that economic prosperity is highly correlated with the desire for peace in both Israeli and the Palestinian societies. It was also believed that reducing the levels of violence would quickly lead to investor confidence, job creation, trade and economic prosperity.[i] It has therefore been argued by numerous economists and political analysts that there exists a reciprocating synergy between advancing the peace process and economic prosperity, an idea that has contributed to an optimistic outlook for the political and economic prospects of the region.[ii]

This approach, however, has encountered challenges. The Palestinians have chosen to accept the personal and economic sacrifices necessitated by the second Intifada, protesting the unjust and patronizing approach of the Israeli government. The Israeli recession following the outbreak of the second Intifada was transformed, at least in aggregate terms, into a boom within only a few years. The high growth rate of 2004-2007 came at a very tense political and military period, a time that even included a war (the 2006 Israeli war against Lebanon). As a result, Israeli economists began to discuss the disconnect between the political and economic situations, and about the marginal impact of the Palestinian economy on Israel.[iii]

In order to make a meaningful analysis of the relations between class identity and political choice in Israel/Palestine, one must look beyond the aggregate indicators of economic prosperity, examining the effects of political events on the economic wellbeing of different classes of each society.

Impoverished People Excluded from Economic Gains

Upon closer examination of Israel’s economic gains from the years of the Oslo political process, it becomes apparent that only the top 10% of the population enjoyed any significant growth, with the remaining 90% of the population staying at approximately the same income levels throughout the period.[iv] The economic benefits of the peace process were thus only felt by the top earners of Israel’s society, and it is therefore not surprising that enthusiasm for these benefits was mostly restricted to members of Israel’s upper class. This is apparent, for example, in the many articles on “peace dividends” within the Israeli economic discourse (in the Hebrew-language journal Economic Quarterly, 24 articles appeared on the topic of peace dividends between 1988 and 2004, more than on any other topic related to the Israeli occupation).

The Israeli economic recession of 2000-2003, which was prompted by the second Intifada, primarily affected Israel’s weakened classes, not only because these people were most vulnerable to the recession (prone to losing their jobs, possessing limited coping strategies and few savings to rely on), but also because the Israeli government’s response to the recession was to cut welfare and social benefit payments.[v] Although in the years 2004-2007, Israel seemingly climbed out of the recession, this improvement was once again a benefit primarily for the upper classes, while social gaps continued to widen and poverty kept rising.[vi]

In the occupied Palestinian territories (OPT), a similar process has taken place, only with much more force. Despite the massive amounts of foreign aid poured into the OPT and despite the hopes for peace-driven prosperity, the Oslo years brought an increase in unemployment and poverty for the Palestinian population in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.[vii]

National Identity as an Alternative to Class Identity

In light of the economic deterioration of the lower classes in both Israel and the OPT, it is not surprising that popular support for the peace process is divided along class lines. Israeli political thinkers have often noted the seeming paradox of Israel’s political structure, the paradox known as the “Israeli anomaly.” Voting patterns among the Israeli elite tend to favor left-wing parties, while the Israeli poor tend to vote for the rightwing parties. This phenomenon seem to defy the very nature of the Left-Right divide, as the rightwing parties prefer to divert funds from welfare to war, and the leftwing parties vice-versa.[viii]

The Israeli national elections of 2006 were no different than previous elections in this matter. The wealthier Israeli communities cast their votes for parties considered more “Left,” and the poorer, weakened communities voted mostly for the more “Right” oriented parties.[ix]

The following chart shows the voting patterns in four lower-class Jewish communities in Israel (cluster 4 on the socioeconomic scale) versus four upper-class Jewish communities in Israel (clusters 8-10 on the socioeconomic scale). For each community, the percentage is given for voting for the Left-most parties (Hadash and Meretz) vs. the Right-most parties (Israel Beitenu, National Unity and Baruch Marzel).

The argument that wars and conflicts tend to affect mostly the income of lower-class households is almost universally accepted, and in Israel it has been demonstrated most vigorously with the economic aftermath of the second Intifada.[x]

From here, the logical conclusion should be that Israeli lower-classes would support an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in order to better their own socio-economic situation. Hence the seeming paradox or anomaly. 

For the Palestinians in the OPT, a similar situation exists. The Oslo years brought economic deterioration to the majority of Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, but the second Intifada (through the disproportionate, yet predictable, response by Israel’s military) brought the greatest crisis to the Palestinian economy since the 1967 occupation.[xi]

It was after a rapid deterioration of the economic conditions in the OPT that Palestinians voted for the Hamas government, thereby choosing to risk further escalation in Israel’s measures and further deterioration in their economic wellbeing. The reason for that vote, according to the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), was “voter disillusionment with PA governance, particularly in areas of fighting corruption and enforcing law and order.”

Alternative Class Identity

The economist Thorstein Veblen claimed that members of the leisure class do not measure their situation according to objective criteria of the wealth they own, but rather according to their social status, determined by their position in the social hierarchy. The political Right in Israel does not offer the lower classes better medical services or education than the political Left. Nor does it offer them more places of work or the safety net of social security. Instead, it promises them that they will never be at the absolute bottom of the social scale in Israel, precisely because the continual occupation of the OPT ensures that Palestinians will remain in the most inferior position in society.

Even if the choice to vote for the political Right does not consciously stem from the desire to build one’s status at the expense of repressed minorities, the phenomenon of oppressed groups adopting racist, intolerant or nationalist attitude toward other groups deemed inferior to them in the social hierarchy is well-known.[xii]

Under the label "Jewish national unity," which categorizes the Palestinians as the enemy, the impoverished in Israel can define themselves as part of the dominant group in society. Jewishness becomes a social asset that can be channeled for economic superiority. In order to understand this, it is necessary to examine two scenarios to delineate social hierarchy in Israel.

The first scenario is the division between the rich and poor. Such a division situates the Jewish poor in Israel in the same group as the Palestinian poor (the majority of Palestinian citizens in Israel), but it further situates them at the bottom of this division. The second scenario is the division between Jews and non-Jews. In this division, the Jewish poor find themselves in the same group as the well-off Jews. Not surprisingly, Jews from lower income groups prefer a division according to ethnic nationality over one according to social class. In the calculus of status, the solution of two states, which the Israeli-Zionist Left proposes, will put the residents of developments towns, the majority of whom are unemployed and socio-economically weakened, back to their position before the Israeli occupation in 1967; they will be positioned on the bottom of the status scale in the country, just a notch above the Palestinians in Israel. This is why the internal Israeli political discourse concerning the fate of the occupation takes precedence over economic discourse.

The wealthy in Israel are not any more enlightened or generous than the weakened, but they do not need to openly express contempt toward “the other” to establish their status. In both scenarios of social hierarchy, the wealthy Jews come out on top. In this context, the question of economic benefit—how can wealthy Jews earn higher income—can play a more critical role, while at the same time questions of ethnic identity can take a back seat.[xiii]

The wealth of many well-off Jews in Israel results from indirect exploitation of Palestinians. This exploitation includes the wealth accumulated by means of cheap Palestinian labor and goods, a discriminatory tax system and a captive market for Palestinians, in which they have no choice but to acquire products form Israel. The idea of Palestinian autonomy does not scare well-off Jewish Israelis, because they know that the Palestinians will in any case remain dependent on the economic strength of Israel. Thanks to this position, the image of the "enlightened Left," which has been attached to the Israeli Labor Party and Meretz, only adds prestige to the supporters of these parties and their ability to conduct their business in the world, without threatening to change anything on behalf of the Palestinians.