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True, some may laugh at our situation now—the Palestinians have two states:

Gazastan or Hamasistan and Westbankstan or Fatahstan. Some are now talking about a solution of two states for one people or three states for two people!

These people have every right to poke fun at our tragedy-turned-farce, with bloodshed on the streets of Gaza following infighting between brothers turned foes. Still, despite the bloody outcome, the resulting violent tear in the Palestinian political fabric and the ramifications these have on the social and moral levels, there are still major questions that require answers.

Why and how did matters reach such a point? Who is responsible for pushing Palestinian society to the precipice of internal fighting? And what are the reasons that turned our tragedy into farce? Finally, what options are open to the various parties?

Dealing with these questions in a methodological and accurate fashion requires a return to the beginning so that our study and evaluation is not a superficial and naïve process, as if the bloody events occurred on the spur of the moment without any background. This radically contradicts the logic imposed by the analysis of any socio-political event. 

A methodological reading of the events will protect the analysis from hasty and erroneous conclusions. It will also provide us with an opportunity to view it in its historical, political and social context, thus uncovering the depth of the crisis, the failed strategies or the exaggerated wagers on delusional and feeble choices.

This method of studying the events will force us to go back to the factors that brought these contradictions to the Palestinian arena, so that we do not fall into the illusion of interpreting the infighting that gripped the Gaza Strip as if it were simply a reaction. The truth is that it was a reflection of the growing struggle between visions and options of the feuding political forces, regardless of the political rhetoric of each one and their justifications for resorting to arms as a way of defending the Palestinian national interest, as if this interest could not be achieved except though shedding Palestinian blood at the hands of other Palestinians.

Some of the Reasons

In order for the truth not to be lost, we must return to the basics. The infighting did not take place on an isolated island. Rather, it was the result of a political context, environment and a series of events which created fertile ground for the contradictions between Fatah and Hamas to grow, leading eventually to the moment of confrontation. This environment clarified the failure of strategies for a political solution according to the American-Israeli project—these strategies which are so good at losing opportunities and continuing to insist that peace is possible, but only a peace that is in full harmony with the conditions of the Israeli-US alliance. 

Hence, we can understand why the Israeli political elite insisted that there is no Palestinian partner for peace and propagated this phrase within the Israeli political arena and media discourse.

Since the Arab defeat of 1967, Israel has refused to commit to international resolutions, namely UN resolutions 242 and 338. It also rejected the opportunity presented by Yasser Arafat in his famous speech to the UN in 1974 in which he said, “I have come here holding an olive branch in one hand and a gun in the other. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.” Still, Israel continued its rejection and arrogance… 

Then came the first Intifada that peaked with the Madrid Conference, where the Palestinians showed a willingness for peace and for offering difficult concessions. However, Israel saw the Oslo Accords as a tool for continuing its domination and occupation in a new form. Even though these accords were signed, the Palestinians found themselves living an increasingly desperate reality: land confiscations, settlement construction and expansion, poverty, unemployment, checkpoints, humiliation, demographic divisions and the transformation of Palestinian cities into besieged Bantustans. 

Still, with each new bump in the political process, Israel continued to cast blame on the Palestinians, endlessly repeating, “there is no Palestinian partner for peace.”

Subsequently, the second Intifada came as a rebellion, rejection and expression of the level of desperation and frustration the Palestinian people had reached. Yet, Israel continued to sing the same tune. In exchange for the historical and political concessions the Palestinians offered, Israel, with direct support from the United States, escalated its intransigence. Arafat was described as an obstacle to peace and a complete siege was imposed on him, up until the time of his passing. Then came Mahmoud Abbas and the American-Israeli alliance continued its foolish policy. Despite Abbas’ realistic outlook and flexibility, he was still unable to convince Israel that he was the right partner. 

The logical explanation for Israel’s policy is that the standards and conditions specified by Israel for any Palestinian partner to accept are represented in their necessary submission and full surrender to the Israeli conditions and agenda.

This policy has led all of the resolution projects on the table to a dead end. In light of this, the Palestinians, who showed a willingness to be flexible and realistic with these projects, found that what was required of them was no less than surrender; to accept the role of an instrument limited to executing Israeli dictates.
 
Israel and its ally, the United States, did not realize that the boundaries of Palestinian concessions remained, in all cases, governed by a series of red lines. This meant that any Palestinian political force or leadership that sidestepped these would lose their legitimacy and status, something that would put them in a state of fierce opposition to the majority of the Palestinian people and their social and political forces. 

This failed American strategy put Fatah and its late leader Yasser Arafat—and later Mahmoud Abbas—at a dead end. It paved the way for the rise of Hamas, which built up its forces and fortified its role based on the failure of political settlement projects and the futile concessions Fatah presented without achieving peace. 

This brings us to the second reason for these contradictions. 

Hamas found its golden opportunity in the failed peace settlement project, which was based on the Oslo Accords and other initiatives proposed since the Madrid Conference in 1990. Additionally, there was the corruption that came in tandem with Fatah’s rule over the Palestinian Authority. In light of this, Hamas began to present itself as an alternative and loyal defender of Palestinian national rights. 

This social and political movement is what explains Hamas’ decisive victory in the legislative elections and municipal council elections in 2006. These elections were a reflection of a buildup over previous years and not only a momentary and isolated reaction.

The election results bred a number of basic facts: 

* Hamas’ control over the majority of PLC seats and municipalities in the largest Palestinian cities in the West Bank and Gaza. 

* Fatah’s loss, for the first time, of its absolute control over PA institutions. This led the political and social Palestinian reality to a process of disintegration and a radical, deep restructuring for the first time. 

* Marginalization of all the democratic Palestinian political forces (the PFLP, DFLP, PPP) in light of the election results. This deprived Palestinian society of a role these forces could have played in controlling the escalating tension between the two politically and socially feuding poles. 

* Palestinian society reached an unprecedented state of polarization, whereby the conflict revolved around Fatah and Hamas. The remaining political and social forces that make up the Palestinian socio-political fabric were excluded and dealt with as if they did not exist. 

* The United States, Europe, Israel and most Arab countries declared their boycott of Hamas; an economic siege was imposed on the Palestinian people, which most Palestinians perceived as collective punishment for their democratic choice. 

In light of these developments, the conditions for the creation of a dual authority began to develop within the Palestinian political and social scene. On the one hand, Hamas controls the majority seats of the PLC and municipalities in the most important West Bank and Gaza Strip cities. On the other, Fatah controls the presidential institution, the security services and PA civil institutions (various ministries). 

This situation quickly began to feed into a struggle over authority. Fatah continued to behave as if it did not lose its power, falling back on the fact that it controlled the security services (presidential security, national security, intelligence and preventative security). At the same time, it began escalating its pressure on the field against Hamas (strikes and demonstrations for payment of civil servant salaries.) 

Concomitantly, Hamas believed it was its right that its role in PA institutions and security services should equal its overwhelming electoral victory, and hence, it began to equate its electoral legitimacy with security legitimacy. In Gaza it took the initiative to form the executive force, and thus it may have quickly established the conditions for a clash over authority between the two poles. 

Furthermore, in spite of its defeat, Fatah did not really acknowledge Hamas’ authority. And Hamas, in spite of its victory, could not exercise this authority like it had envisioned. This was all accompanied by continuous campaigns of incitement and mobilization: Fatah accused Hamas of pushing an extremist religious agenda linked to external forces. It also said the movement does not possess a realistic political project. On the other hand, Hamas accused Fatah of carrying out an American political agenda, and that it feeds on and amplifies the corruption within Palestinian society. 

Hence, we have the failure of the American political strategy in dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its full adoption of the Israeli vision, conditions and discourse, in addition to the imposing of an economic and political siege on the Palestinians by the United States and EU, with Arab collaboration. This is in addition to the continued Israeli policies of closures, assassinations, arrests, demolitions, settlements, the construction of the separation wall, incursions into Palestinian cities and villages, etc. This has all led to the creation of a dual authority on the Palestinian political scene and set the stage for the eruption of Palestinian-Palestinian infighting in the Gaza Strip. The confrontations ended with Hamas taking control over the Strip. Events then progressed quickly—Mahmoud Abbas announced the dissolution of the national unity government and considered the executive force, formed in Gaza by Hamas, as illegal. He described Hamas’ actions as a coup against legitimacy. At the same time, Abbas mandated Salaam Fayyad to form an emergency government, which was sworn in by President Abbas on 17June 2007. 

Consequently, we are confronted with new facts and a new reality in Palestine, which are extremely interrelated and complex.

An Analysis of the New Situation

Those who are deluded into thinking that things are moving towards a final settlement are sorely mistaken. On the contrary, the course of events and the reactions that followed, which lack any logic or reason, will push the Palestinian reality and political projects into a new cycle of loss and confusion. 

True, Hamas has taken control over the Gaza Strip and has raised its flags at every corner. Then what? What are the next steps? 

And yes, the formation of an emergency government in the West Bank was declared. Good, but then what? Yes, Israel and the United States have succeeded in pushing the Palestinian people and its political forces to infighting and splits and into a cycle of creative chaos…okay, then what? 

The truth is, whether they wanted to or not, everyone has been brought into this new cycle of conflict, which will only become increasingly entangled and intertwined. Anyone who believes they have won the round with a final blow (be it a military or political) is greatly mistaken.  The same difficult questions, challenges and options still surround everyone. 

In spite of Hamas’ control over the Gaza Strip, it continues to orbit within the gravitational well of the conflict and the balances of power that govern it objectively and subjectively. Hence, it is unable to escape the bottle neck of the Palestinian reality wrought with political/social/economic/strategic challenges. In light of this, any stronghold on Gaza will not suffice, nor will any clinging to the legitimacy of the dismissed national unity government and refusing to recognize the government of Salaam Fayyad. 

In the end, it must present a vision and project that surpasses the borders of the Gaza Strip and it must search for a political solution and vision that allows it to overcome the walls of the ghetto that surrounds it. 

Was Hamas really aware of the depth of the crisis it pushed itself into? Or did it walk into the trap unknowlingly, only to find itself besieged politically, economically and diplomatically…and hence, how will it behave? What are the choices available to it to get out of this trap and to cut its losses as much as possible? 

As for Fatah and President Mahmoud Abbas, they are in no better state. The margins of the movement will remain limited to them. The declaration of an emergency government constituted a sort of reaction and will fail to deal with the components of Palestinian political, social and economic contradictions. 

Hence, words and illusions, such as that the emergency government is legitimate and it represents all of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza, are not enough. In the end, it will face the wall of reality. How will this government exercise its authority over the Gaza Strip in practice? 

Therefore, the government of Salaam Fayyad will face a series of major challenges: 

First: It must prove its existence and legitimacy in the Gaza Strip, or else it will be considered and dealt with as a government whose jurisdictions do not exceed the West Bank. 

Second: It must realize that without the cushion of the political forces, it will face difficult questions at the level of its national legitimacy. In the end, it is a group of independent personalities and technocrats. However, the tasks it must face are not limited to administrative and service-oriented tasks or distributing salaries. The Palestinian cause is first and foremost a political cause, and it is impossible to separate politics from economic and political issues. 

Third: It is facing the most important and dangerous challenge of all, represented in its ability to overcome the trap of American-European-Israeli generosity that has opened its doors in all directions. This is something the majority of the Palestinian people will not view as an innocent gesture. On the contrary, they will perceive it with skepticism and wariness, a form of political control over the emergency government. 

The US administration and Israel moved with the speed of light in declaring their absolute support for Salaam Fayyad’s government, an immediate lifting of the economic siege and Israel’s announcement that it will release seized tax money. All of this took place in the first moments after Fayyad was mandated to form the government, even before this government announced its political and social platform. 

This reality will create a component of serious threat and will portray the emergency government as it if rode in on the tanks of American, European and Israeli financial support. This move has created a trap that Fatah is arriving upon quickly, whether consciously or not, and which will strip it of any ability to convince the Palestinian street of its political and social platform. The final equation will look as if the Hamas government was punished for adhering to the option of resistance and national rights, while the emergency government is being rewarded for its willingness to concede on these rights.

The American-Israeli position

Perhaps the United States and Israel believe they can finally pick the fruits of their policy of creative chaos, siege and military pressure, while, in truth, they must realize that this pressure will lead the entire Palestinian situation into a total eruption, the fires of which will not be confined only to the internal Palestinian situation. In all probability (this has become very clear now), through their dubious embracement of the emergency government, the United States and its allies are pushing the Palestinians toward more crises and conflict. 

Despite all of these risks and warnings, in the coming weeks the United States will probably still seek to prove the soundness of its vision over the success of its political and economic model in the West Bank through lifting the siege, pouring in money and easing restrictions on Palestinian movement. This is based on a previously formed conviction that the emergency government will follow the trend of moderation and realism to which American-quality standards will be applicable. Meanwhile, the siege will be tightened on the Gaza Strip and on Hamas as the representative of extremism and terrorism. 

This is what the scenarios drawn-up look like at the moment, but will matters move according to this logic?

What Next?

Hamas may believe it scored an important victory by taking control over the Gaza Strip and Fatah may believe it succeeded in pushing Hamas into the Gaza trap and that it is now capable of pushing forward with its successful and internationally acceptable model for the West Bank. Similarly, the United States may appear to have succeeded in isolating Hamas and dismembering the Palestinian political structure, and in finally achieving a state of concrete categorization in Palestine between moderates and extremists. 

So, let each party think what it wants, that they achieved some sort of victory or accomplishment, which will guarantee a chance to get their hold on all the links in the chain of the Palestinian reality. 

Still, in spite of all that has happened, all the parties need to realize that the Palestinian situation has become even more complicated and is far from being determined. Therefore, they should be careful not to maintain exaggerated expectations, because the options will continue to be governed by the balance of powers in motion and the major political and social questions they pose. 

In this sense, Hamas must realize that its national role does not end at the borders of the Gaza Strip. It is required to provide answers to the Palestinian people, wherever they are. It must determine its political and social platform clearly in a way that reflects its rational awareness of the objective and subjective forces that govern this conflict. In addition, it must also recognize the boundaries of its own power. In spite of Fatah’s military defeat in Gaza, it is still an effective power and a force to be reckoned with, and which only the foolhardy would attempt to sidestep. Hamas should also not view the events in Gaza solely from its own perspective, but should acknowledge the magnitude of the shock it created in the Palestinian conscience and collective memory, given the bloody fighting in which it involved. The impact of this clash will also shape Hamas’ image and role to the core. No nationalist Palestinian will ever justify or forget any force that participated in this massacre, which violated the sanctity of Palestinian blood and consciousness and struck them at the heart. 

Will Hamas search for bridges—or build them if they do not exist—to ensure for itself a way out of the Gaza ghetto? Will it rethink its behavior and assess its role so as to recognize in the end that the PLC and municipal council election results do not mean that it is the only destiny for the Palestinian people and must therefore create a mutual space with others (Fatah, and the democratic and national forces, etc.)? This is because the option of dialogue and national unity on the basis of the Palestinian national consensus program remains the only possible realistic choice to escape the cycle of infighting, dismemberment and severance with the culture of denial and exclusion of the other. 

As for Fatah, it must realize that the balance of powers in the Palestine has changed and it can no longer continue its policy of domination as if nothing ever happened. 

It must also realize that forming an emergency government and Hamas’ calm response to this (in the West Bank) does not mean the latter has surrendered to the status quo. Hamas has also become a considerable force that is not easy or wise to sidestep. Also, on the popular and military level, it constitutes a latent force that can, upon necessity, push these elements into action to impede any projects. Those who base their calculations on the premise that Hamas does not have the opportunity to resist in the West Bank are very wrong. Such an assumption reflects a naïve analysis which may also, due to this miscalculation, lead the West Bank into a cycle of confrontation in which everyone will burn in its fire. 

Fatah must also face an obligation to reevaluate its actions and choices. It must pay attention to its role and national function, so that, in light of what happened in Gaza, its reactions do not push it into corners that would put it and its political platform in a dubious position on the street. If it does reach this state, it will look like it is playing the role of political instrument to further the US-Israeli agenda. 

Hence, Fatah is at a crossroads. It must seek and find a meeting point with others in a manner that would save the Palestinian cause, its liberation project and political and social constants, from loss and squander. This is not possible unless there is a commitment to the principles of national unity as the only option, and an abandonment of the policy of exclusion and domination. 

However, what about the hundreds of Palestinian democratic forces, civil society institutions and non-governmental organizations throughout Palestinian society? 

In light of this stark polarization and bloody clash between Fatah and Hamas, it seems the biggest lacuna is the space of the Palestinian democratic forces (PFLP, DFLP, PPP, FIDA and the Palestinian National Initiative). The recent developments uncovered the tragic consequences of their absence. Because of their weakness and unsteady role, they lost an opportunity—they should have played the role of an active force that could regulate the intensity of the contradictions between the two poles feuding over authority. These forces were pushed to the sidelines, regardless of the soundness and morality of their social and national perspectives.

When matters reached confrontation and a resort to arms to settle internal contradictions, pleas and calls from these forces were insufficient. The situation needed an initiative in the field to lead the public to counter the insanity of the fighting. However, the ability to play this role requires a dynamic and strong force that would qualify it to impose an agenda and to draw boundaries for these two parties. The most important condition for the success of such a mission is represented in unifying the democratic forces and developing the democratic choice politically and socially as an active choice with the ability to have an effect. It should also be able to engage in this conflict and to build a strong social movement and not leave Palestinian society and the national project at the mercy of the battles and conflicts between Fatah and Hamas. 

By the same logic, we can assess the role and performance of the so-called Palestinian civil society institutions and NGO’s, which have always marketed themselves and their programs as the protectors of Palestinian society and its democratic substance. However, they revealed their inadequacy and proved how weak they are, when they did not rise to the occasion or react to the dangerous events that have swept over Palestinian society ever since the PLC elections up until the eruption of internal fighting. 

The shortcomings of these institutions, organizations and centers lead us to question their role, social weight and ability to have any effect, something which should push them to reevaluate their programs, projects, structure and relationships within Palestinian society. 

As for the United States, its insistence on continuing to wager on erroneous strategies in this region in general, and on the Palestinian level in particular, will undoubtedly lead it from one failure to another. Hence, it will make the same mistake, for the thousandth time, if it believes that the Palestinian people will simply accept a compromise over their national rights in exchange for an economic bribe. 

In light of what has been presented, any political project based on pitting the Palestinians of the West Bank against those in the Gaza Strip, thus sidestepping the political and social specifics that govern Palestine, or those that attempt to force the Palestinian people to decide between the option of political surrender or siege and starvation, will meet inevitable failure. 

And anyone who believes the Palestinians in the West Bank will remain mere bystanders while the other half of the people in Gaza are subjected to siege and starvation is seriously mistaken.

 If matters reach this point, everyone is going to be surprised by the intensity of the reaction on the Palestinian street, which did not give legitimacy to any party to trample on its rights and dignity or rip apart their national and social unity. At this point, the cards will be reshuffled all over again and all the political forces will be faced with a difficult test: Hamas, Fatah and the national and democratic forces. Any party that misreads or miscalculates will be the first to pay the price with their legitimacy, respect, role and organizational unity.

Possible Options

In light of these parameters and their direct and indirect dimensions, the Palestinian political parties, especially Fatah and Hamas, will find themselves before only one realistic choice: a return to national dialogue and consensus with all the other forces on the basis of a joint social and political program that would preserve the status and role of each party in safeguarding the constants of the Palestinian cause.

The flip side of this is represented in the impossibility for any Palestinian political force on its own to control the destiny of the Palestinian people and its national cause. 

Autocratic assumptions have proven to be a failure. Any option based on ending the internal conflict through infighting or an intention to further split the already dismembered nation and people, will only result in everyone falling into more misery and frustration. 

This is regarding the Palestinian forces. As for the international community, it is time that the EU, US, Arab regimes, UN, and democratic and social institutions and forces, muster up the courage to stop this dependency on adopting Israeli dictates. It must take all the measures and positions necessary to end the Israeli occupation and implement international resolutions in both spirit and letter. 

This is the only potential and realistic option to end the conflict in the Middle East. Any continuation of providing cover for Israel’s hostile policies and considering all their actions as self-defense while relying on the premise that the only possible peace is complete submission to the American-Israeli project and its conditions will only lead to one result: pushing everyone toward an unending cycle of conflict.