
|
|
The Palestinian Legislative Council's Elections: A New Stage and Old Questions
Some have called the results of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections, which took place on 25 January 2006, an Earthquake; others describe it as a "Hamas Tsunami," and still others have declared it a "comprehensive revolution." How do we evaluate the results of the elections in an objective manner, without emotion or ideology? What is the likely shape and scope of the coming phase?
|
First, the whole world must admit that the Palestinian people, in the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem, have given clear proof that they are a nation deserving of respect and honor. They were able, across the whole spectrum of Palestinian politics, and despite the trying circumstances imposed by occupation, to show a high standard of national responsibility, acknowledged by foreign observers who expressed their full satisfaction with the way the elections were performed.
The Palestinians passed the test of democracy with excellent results, giving the whole world a manifest impression that they are deserving of freedom as much as any other people. The elections opened new levels of commitment to people?s choice, the transfer of authority, and the effectiveness of a multiparty political system.
Evaluating the Results of the Election
The whole world agrees that the results of the elections came as a big surprise; even the Hamas movement didn?t expect such overwhelming victory. Fatah, on the other hand, in its worst nightmares, did not expect such a humiliating defeat.
Most had predicted a significant shift in the balance of political power within Palestinian society, in which there would be a shrinking in the number of seats for Fatah in the PLC and a concomitant increase in Hamas seats. But no one expected the gap to be so wide between the two political groups. Some political observers, on the other hand, forecasted that Fatah would still preserve a slight majority in the Legislative Council to face an ardent and strong Hamas, Left and independent opposition.
The results of the elections were radically different from these conservative expectations; what happened was in fact a revolution in the Palestinian social and political sphere.
Prior to the elections, there were some serious indications of what was to come, although they were not given the deserved political analysis or required attention. When Hamas won the elections and took the overwhelming majority in the municipal elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip last year, there was a strong indication of the seriousness of the coming change in the PLC elections, a change that would go far beyond the political status quo which has long been prevailing in the region.
Before going through an analysis of the dimensions of this shift, let us take a look at the final results of these elections as announced by the Central Elections Commission.
Number of persons eligible to vote in the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem 1,332,396
Number of voters 1,042,424
-Percentage of voters in the West Bank- 73 percent
-Percentage of voters in Gaza Strip- 76 percent
-Average of voting in both- 74.5 percent
The distribution of votes and seats of legislative Council according to groupings (Party and Regional)
|
Groups percentage (the lists System)
|
District System
|
Overall No.
|
|
Name of Group
|
Number of Votes
|
percent
|
No. of Seats
|
Name. of Group
|
No. of Seats
|
No. of Seats in Council
|
percent in the Council
|
|
Hamas
|
440,409
|
42.2%
|
29
|
Hamas
|
45
|
74
|
56%
|
|
Fatah
|
410,554
|
39.3%
|
28
|
Fatah
|
17
|
45
|
34%
|
|
PFLP
|
42,101
|
4%
|
3
|
|
|
3
|
2.2%
|
|
Democratic Front, PPP& Fida
|
28,973
|
2.7%
|
2
|
|
|
2
|
1.5%
|
|
Mustafa Barghouti
|
26,909
|
2.5%
|
2
|
|
|
2
|
1.5%
|
|
Hanan Ashrawi (The
Third Way)
|
23,862
|
2.2%
|
2
|
|
|
2
|
1.5%
|
|
|
|
|
|
Independent
|
4
|
4
|
3%
|
|
Total
|
|
|
66
|
|
66
|
132
|
100%
|
*Faulty ballot: 29,864 *Blank ballot 21,687
From a first glance at the results, it is clear that Hamas and the independent candidates who support Hamas got 78 seats in the Legislative Council. On the other hand, all the others including the Fatah movement got 54 seats, of which 45 are for Fatah, 7 for the Left (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front, PPP, Fida and Mustafa Barghouti) and two for the It is also clear from the results that the difference between Hamas and Fatah according to the Party system (The Lists System) was marginal (42.2 percent ) for Hamas and (39.3 percent) for Fatah. This means that Fatah supporters backed the party on a national basis, but avoided endorsing particular candidates. The problem, and consequently the defeat inflicted on the Fatah movement was the competition in the district vote, where Hamas got 45 seats from a total of 66, while Fatah got only 17, with 4 seats going to the independent candidates who were supported by Hamas.
The lesson derived from competition for the district votes, which was a knockout blow to Fatah from Hamas, was in fact a harsh lesson for the Fatah candidates from the public, who saw them as examples of corruption and failure. The results also revealed the insignificant presence of the Left in the street.
This fact showed clearly that the Left forces in the Palestinian society haven?t convinced the public that they were a realistic alternative force for change. What made things even worse for the Left was the weakness and disunity of its various movements. Consequently, the Palestinian Leftist forces wound up small, isolated and with a narrow constituency.
Some analysts contributed Hamas?s victory to religious factors and the underestimation of the strength of Hamas by the Fatah movement. They believed that Hamas would interfere in personal life and impose the wearing of the Islamic headdress.
In fact, Hamas achieved this overwhelming victory not through religious sloganeering but through its political role in calling for resistance, confronting the Occupation, and preserving the national rights for the Palestinians?those rights which were either stolen or overlooked in Oslo and the Road Map. The other factors which were a real catalyst for the victory of Hamas were its criticism to the Fatah and Palestinian Authority?s performance on both the social and economic levels, and the necessity of fighting corruption.
For this reason, Hamas raised the slogan of ?Change and Reform? in the elections.
Therefore, the results of the recent election reflected an overwhelming Palestinian desire for change and significant restructuring of the political, as well as the social, body. The Palestinian people, who gave Fatah a period of ten years to rectify its position and institutions, are now evaluating the results.
The Palestinian people, deep in their hearts, say they support the Hamas movement, not because it is better than Fatah, or because of its religious power, but because they are aware of the failures and unacceptable performance of Fatah. This means that the overwhelming support Hamas received from the Palestinian public is not an absolute, open one, or a blank check to do as it pleases. It is giving Hamas an opportunity, challenging the movement to work for the benefit of the people and provide political, economic, as well as security solutions, which Fatah failed to offer through in last ten years.
So, it is not a shift of ideological alignment from Fatah to Hamas, but one that challenges them both, whereby an account will be tallied at the end of the four years to discern the difference in performance between the two groups.
The election represents a historical turning point in the Palestinian political and democratic process. To be fair, we have to give Fatah credit for allowing the democratic process to move forward within Palestinian society, promoting the further development of democratic political forces in the entire region. And the elections were ample proof that no political leadership is immune to critique, and this will be true also in the future, whether they are Fatah or Hamas. Every four years, everyone will hold his breath, expecting the unexpected.
Thus, the victory of Hamas in these elections is not eternal or final; it is in fact an opportunity given to Hamas to prove that it is able to meet the current political and social challenges facing the Palestinians. Any future achievement by Hamas on the political and social fronts will stem from the desire of the Palestinian public for change, and the exposure of Fatah?s failure during the past years. However, Hamas cannot build a future by only exposing the failure of others. The important challenge facing Hamas is whether they will succeed in making positive changes.
So, while in the zero sum game of the electoral process, the failure of any one political force is a victory for the opposition parties, this fact is in no way a predictor of the opposition?s future success.
The Outcome as Reflecting the Present Sociopolitical Circumstances of Palestinian Society
For the Fatah movement, the results were catastrophic, taking into consideration the fact that the movement was the major power in the PLO and consequently, the Palestinian Authority, for a considerable period of time.
This defeat puts the Fatah movement in a new historic phase, in which it must come face to face with a number of questions about its role in the past years, its current circumstances, and its future challenges.
The biggest and most important challenge facing the Fatah movement at present is its capacity to read, comprehend and evaluate the depth of its failure. Will it be able to stand on its feet again and reorganize its base constituency? Will it be able to learn the necessary lessons from its previous experience, and utilize it for the future challenges? Or will it start blaming one side and criticizing the other, resulting in nothing but more turmoil within its ranks and leading towards further defeats?
The biggest challenge facing Fatah and the Left forces is not the fact that Hamas came out victorious, but the underlying causes for this great and unexpected defeat for Fatah and the Left.
Dealing with the crucial issues will lead to positive dialogue, self-criticism and understanding of the apparent challenges. Moreover, it will reveal the true causes of the defeat.
The questions will not answered solely by evaluating policies and social programs and fighting corruption, but goes far beyond this.
Is Fatah?s political structure?created forty years ago?still suitable to lead the masses, or is the Movement in a bad need of infusing new blood into its organs?
I say this for a simple reason ?there are some who attribute Fatah?s failure to the rivalry among its factions and its disunity.
Though blame can be assigned this way, the more important question is still unanswered. Why wasn?t the Fatah movement united? And what caused these contradictions inside it?
It was not internal rivalries, but the central political and economic forces within Fatah, who put their personal interests above the greater interests of the movement and the Palestinian public.
Additional factors leading to this electoral loss were the difference in the mentality and age between old and new Fatah members, the gap between the rich and poor, the political differences?between those who prefer resistance and those who adopt negotiations as a means to liberate the land, for instance, or between those who were for or against Oslo. All these factors contributed to division inside the Fatah movement and consequently lead to the defeat of Fatah in the elections.
What made things even worse was the reluctance of the movement to struggle against its corruption and the personal interests of groups and individuals within the movement.
These factors intensified conflict within the movement, eventually leading to a breakdown. This was clearly reflected in the rejection by several factions, especially during the primaries and the recent elections of the Legislative Council, to orders from the Fatah hierarchy.
Fatah is now faced with a true internal challenge for a reorganization of its vision, programs, structure and leadership. There is another challenge facing Fatah, related to its strategy and ways of dealing with the results of the elections. Will Fatah act maturely and prudently or will it put itself in endless turmoil, ultimately leading to even more fatal mistakes in the future.
Fatah is now facing a number of challenges and has different options to choose:
-To turn its back to all the calls of Hamas to participate in a coalition and bear a part of the responsibility, which would consequently push Hamas into a corner to face the political and social confrontation alone, without providing any cover for the new Hamas leadership. Yet, this will also mean giving Hamas free reign to restructure the Palestinian Authority in a way that would serve its policy. This will also lead to a very difficult relationship between the Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas on one side and Hamas leadership on the other.
-The second option is the readiness of Fatah to participate in the government in order to protect its very existence and work to deter Hamas from inflicting a radical change in the government structure and its institutions.
-The third choice for Fatah is to reactivate the Palestinian PLO, with its different organs?The Palestinian National Council (PNC), and the Executive Committee?in an attempt to deter Hamas from fully controlling the Palestinian Legislative Council. This is a very important card in the hands of Fatah, as the PNC, the highest representative body, which represents all Palestinians around the world and has the authority to sign agreements as the PLO, is still the sole and the legal representative of the Palestinian people.
Whatever opposition or choices Fatah adopts, it is almost certain that it will not give Hamas a free hand to act unilaterally and will do its best to complicate things for Hamas and magnify its wrongs.
In the light of these facts, how will Hamas respond?
It is quite clear that the size of victory has stunned Hamas. Inasmuch as they perceive it as a great achievement and a cause to celebrate, it creates many serious challenges for Hamas.
There is definitely a difference between Hamas as an oppositional resistance force, and Hamas as a leader of the Palestinian Authority. It resembles a childless bachelor who suddenly finds himself the head of a large family with many children.
Hamas has no choice but to behave in line with its great victory. It will likely act in a cautious manner, committing itself to the following:
1. A readiness for dialogue with all parties and forces, especially Fatah, in an attempt to form a coalition government according to a unified political and social program.
2. Calming the fears of the Palestinians, especially regarding their personal freedoms; therefore it is not expected to take any step that might provoke social resentment or an unfavorable reaction by any sector of Palestinian society.
3. Confronting and dealing with the Israeli reaction, which is the biggest challenge. It is expected that Hamas will prolong its truce with Israel. This is conditional on its capability of controlling the other forces, which might test Hamas? reactions by committing attacks against Israel.
4. Making a quick move to achieve some substantial economic and administrative reforms on the ground, in order to prove its seriousness in dealing with essential issues.
5. Showing some elasticity by opening new channels for dialogue with Europe and the United States of America.
6. Pushing political negotiations slowly but steadily, with minor changes, to prove its commitment to the key Palestinian national rights.
It is clear that Hamas is at a very sensitive crossroads; it will need great skills to tackle so many such delicate issues, and make its way through this political minefield.
The Situation of the Left Movements in Palestine Following the Elections
These are some of the likely outcomes of the elections, but there are also other issues at stake. The elections clearly reflect a crisis of the Left forces, who have failed to convince the Palestinian public of their platforms. This shows that either their program was not of great interest to the Palestinians or the Left did not succeed in letting the wider Palestinian public understand their program.
The marginal results of the Left, some of whom played a major role in the past, show that these forces are now stumbling gravely. Do the Left parties have the determination to revise and radically change their vision, conduct, programs and structure for the future?
The PFLP, DFLP, Peoples? Party, FIDA, and the Mubadarah ?initiative? have no choice but to start a dialogue between themselves, based on self-criticism and evaluation, to reconstruct a new body that will move as one force capable of restoring the role of the Palestinian democratic forces, in order to save themselves from extinction.
A great responsibility lies on the PFLP, being the largest of the Leftwing movements, with its long history and credibility.
These Leftwing forces cannot overlook the results of the elections and continue to act on a narrow minded policy of party politics, which will only lead them from one crisis to another.
Democratic Maturation of the Palestinian Public
Another outcome of the recent elections for the PLC was the political maturity of the Palestinians. Some parties tried to manipulate the public with glittering slogans and electoral programs, spending huge amounts of money to gain votes, and were shocked to find that very few people cast votes in their favor.
The elections reflected the strict commitment of the Palestinians towards their history and national movement and this was shown clearly through:
1. The great setback in Fatah popularity and significant shift towards Hamas.
2. Hamas? ability to preserve its lead and attract the silent majority of the people.
3. The PFLP?s preservation of its position as the third power in the street, despite the unexpectedly poor showing.
4. A great setback for the DFLP, the People?s Party and FIDA?those groups gained only two seats in the council.
5. The big surprise of the marginal results obtained by the ?Mubadarah? group led by Mustafa Barghouti. This group overestimated its backing among the Palestinian public and the results were extremely disappointing.
6. The same criticism, applied to the: The Third Way led by Salam Fayyad and Hanan Ashrawi, which directed a very expensive a European style campaign, and were ignored by the masses.
These various political players were deluding themselves, not understanding that the conduct and awareness of the Palestinian people are governed by three basic factors:
1. The link between Palestinian history and the current events; adhering to their national rights and working towards change, reform and reconstruction; sticking to their choice of resistance throughout the long history of confrontation with Israel.
2. The elections proved that the Palestinians possess a high level of dignity and self-respect.
3. So, the elections and the results were a clear message to the entire world, especially Israel, the United States and Europe, that solving the historic and complicated conflict cannot be done through intimidation and the imposing of rules and laws void of any credibility.
The policy of misleading the world by portraying the Palestinian national forces as terrorists does not change the attitude of the masses towards their true leaders. The natural response in the face of any attempt to deal with the choices of the people will be faced by more solidarity and sympathy toward their leadership.
The threats uttered by the Israeli and American officials, as well as some European governments, will not scare the Palestinians or deter them from standing side by side with their new elected leaders who are going to form the new Palestinian government.
|