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Home arrow Blogs arrow Nassar Ibrahim arrow The Culture of Defeat, the Culture of Victory, and the Lost Peace in the 40 Years Since the 1967 War
The Culture of Defeat, the Culture of Victory, and the Lost Peace in the 40 Years Since the 1967 War Print E-mail
Written by Nassar Ibrahim, Alternative Information Center (AIC)   
Thursday, 14 June 2007
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Forty years ago, I was 14 years old. I was an eyewitness to the war, the defeat and the continuing tragedy of the Palestinian people that has lasted until this day. I was witness to how the dreams of the Palestinians came crashing down after they placed their bets on the Arab regimes to regain their land, their homeland and their rights. Hence, the Palestinians faced a new Nakba [catastrophe] of no less magnitude than their first. To the millions of refugees from the first Nakba, hundreds of thousands of additional displaced were added. My memory is forever etched with the scene of flocks of refugees heading east into nothing save an unknown destiny and future. 

The defeat of 1967 constituted a tremendous blow to the Palestinian consciousness, the tremors of which continue to reverberate in the insane occupation under which they live. 

Today, we are marking the 40th anniversary of that war and the political, social, cultural and psychological results of it. What kind of picture does this paint? 

How does the victor deal with his victory? And how does the defeated understand and cope with his defeat? What is the fate that awaits us all, both the victor and the defeated, in the end? 

What is more complicated than a direct reading of the outcomes of this war, both politically and militarily, is ascertaining the ramifications of the war on the collective consciousness of all sides. The policies and choices stemming from these perceptions created in this environment, still have a tremendous impact. 

No Palestinian or Arab will ever forget the deep wound inflicted on their understanding of the world, and their dignity. Nor will they forget how their wager on a victory by the incompetent Arab regimes was proved false. This was the beginning of Palestinian self-realization.  Palestinians began to realize the gravity of their situation, and the full intentions of  the Zionist movement. Zionists concentrated on wiping the Palestinian people off the map, thus manifesting the false adage, “A land without a people for a people without a land.” 

 After the June 1967 War, the Zionist-Imperialist project moved from the level of establishing and validating its existence to one of complete control and domination. This dimensional aspect is two-fold: the Palestinian discovery of their tragedy and self, and the transfer of the Zionist project to a level of domination. This transformation is what has shaped the characteristics and strategies of the subsequent conflict over the decades that followed the war.

It is true that the Palestinians endured two tremendous catastrophes. Yet, at the same time, they have shown an incredible ability to absorb these catastrophes and continue steadfastly, turning to resistance until they succeeded. In the end, the Palestinians were able to impose themselves as a force to be reckoned with, a force which could not be overlooked in any situation. The Palestinians were helped in this regard by their Arab neighbors, who continued, despite the defeats and incompetence of the Arab regimes, to embrace the Palestinian cause. They considered it a cause of the Arab nation, at least on a cultural, psychological and intuitive level. 

The Palestinian people succeeded in absorbing the blows and then moving on to resistance, building active political organizations and developing a vibrant Palestinian national identity. Throughout the history of their contemporary national movement, the Palestinians were able to administrate the conflict in terms of maintaining a presence for the Palestinian cause at all levels. This journey of resistance can be tracked through major points along the way: the forceful launching of the Palestinian national movement after the 1967 War, the resistance in Jordan, then its move to Lebanon, the first Palestinian Intifada in 1987, then the second Intifada in 2000. In the context of this journey, the Palestinian refugee cause and the continuous Palestinian suffering remained blatant witnesses to the ongoing injustice and the basis for unending resistance movements. This fact has allowed the Palestinians, despite all the odds against them to maintain their continued existence under occupation. 

Most Palestinians who live in refugee camps, despite the continued blows against them and the continued lack of balance in military and economic power between them and Israel continue to exist. This is in addition to the absolute support Israel receives from the United States and the majority of Europe. There is also the Palestinian resistance and refusal, even if this is solely represented in their continuous existence as a strategic and permanent challenge to Israeli conditions for control. All this has proved that the Palestinians have succeeded with merit, despite the destructive Arab defeats around them. The Palestinians have engaged Israel completely and involved them in a state of perpetual conflict. This has forced critical questions upon Israel about its future and existence, if not on the direct or present level, then in the long-term. The course of its continuous entanglement with its Arab surroundings, and given its demographic makeup and economic and demographic intertwining with the Palestinians, forces these questions.

Nonetheless, the experience of the Palestinian national movement indicates that its reaction and interaction with defeat and missteps did not benefit the movement with lessons learned. The Palestinian social structure was able to absorb and understand the defeats that befell them in the face of the Arab weakness and incompetence. In response to this, the Palestinian national movement was created, and had a role in contributing to this resoluteness and endurance. However, more was required of this movement than that which was only within the boundaries of steadfastness. Its more important function was to guarantee the conditions for a revivification as the first step to achieving the Palestinian goals of freedom and independence. This has not been achieved as of this moment. 

What is even more dangerous is that the dominant force in the Palestinian national movement has begun to integrate and submit to the logic and conditions of the victorious party through a gradual and accumulative process. This has been manifested through continuous, careful attention and concessions which have struck at the heart of the rights of the Palestinian people’s national rights. This has struck deeply at its status and legitimacy, and has thrown the nationalist movement into crisis. 

The poor performance of the Palestinian leadership constituted the framework for the political behavior and culture that has dominated the Palestinians in terms of dealing with the defeat. This is as if it were the end of the road even, if this contradicted the essence of the concept and conditions for a peaceful and a just solution. This was clearly evident in the responses of the Palestinian and Arab sides (the Camp David Accords, Oslo, the Hebron Protocol, the Cairo security agreement, the Paris Economic agreement and finally, the Roadmap), even though these projects lack the minimum conditions needed as a foundation for the end of the occupation and the establishment of a just and comprehensive peace in the region. 

This lack of ability in the political actions of the dominant Palestinian political elite put this elite in an ambiguous  position in the consciousness of the majority of the people. After the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, this elite found itself in the role of a tool for imposing the conditions of the occupation.

An intellectual review of this behavior shows it to be a reversion to the culture of surrender to the status quo. Since 99 percent of the power for a solution is in the hands of Israel and its ally, the United States, then any conceptualizing by the Arab political elite outside the framework of this equation, is viewed as extreme, unrealistic and irrational behavior. 

Insofar as this political culture deprived the Arabs and Palestinians of the ability to apply pressure and effectively invest in the status of Palestinian popular resistance and opposition, it also contributed to feeding the arrogance of the other side. It reinforced a culture and behavior of condescension and a refusal to accept even the minimum of the defeated side’s positions. In light of this, Israel has refused to recognize the other and is working to eliminate it as an issue and annihilate all of its rights. In the end, the only option available to the Palestinians is a complete surrender to the conditions of the victor. This will be duly noted upon our reading of the political culture that has governed Israeli practices. 

The reality that followed the defeat of the Arabs in the June, 1967 War did not have to be so tragic in terms of the continued conflict and the limitations on any possible political solution. However, the distorted Israeli consciousness that resulted from their overwhelming military victory in this blink-of-an-eye war is what dictated all of their consequent behavior and strategies.

The speedy Israeli victory over the Arab states placed Israel firmly in a new political reality. It suddenly found itself removed from its isolation, playing the role of controlling power in an attempt to accommodate and invest in the results of its victory as much as possible. 

In light of this interaction at the political, social, economic and cultural levels, the elite in Israel began, from the start, lost its ability to comprehend this victory with any sense of depth or awareness. This meant it lacked the ability to successfully deal with its defeated neighbors in a way that would guarantee conditions and circumstances conducive to building real bridges with its vast Arab surroundings. Additionally, it lacked the ability to build foundations for its existence in this sensitive region. Israel found itself burdened with contradictions that surely cannot be resolved by a mere victory in battle or fleeting military confrontation. 

Hence, Israel moved towards a reinforcement of a distorted culture and self-perception. Israel consistently and increasingly distanced itself from rational political thought and behavior. Consciously or unconsciously, it began to feed its own illusions and aspirations, loosened from the moorings of any boundaries, and oblivious to fundamental historical, geographical and demographic lessons. 

One of the most commonplace notions was, for example, “The invincible Israeli military” and that Israel alone was stronger than all the Arab countries combined. 

Hence, the controlling elite in Israeli society drifted so far politically and culturally into its own delusions that it was no longer governed by any rational logic. The dominant Israeli weltanschauung was that they were beyond history and reality, a kind of “super” army, “über-state,” “über-society.” And, as long as this is how it perceived itself, it had no need to pay any attention to those around it. This logic of force began to generate an ideology of force, a culture of force and a consciousness of force, followed by a policy of force and finally a peace by force. Hence, it is not strange that with one victory after another, Israel found itself moving farther and farther away from peace or a sense of security and safety. 

What deepened this imbalance in Israeli political practice was its acceptance and willingness to take on the role of a tool designed to impose the United States’ strategies of domination over the region. This made the entire Israeli society look as if it were merely a military team that was to implement the demands on it and pay the price of the Americans’ aspirations, which sought to expand and control, even if this were at the expense of the fundamentals of Israeli society’s very existence. 

Consequently, Israel fell into the trap of its own victory, because the most dangerous ramification of victory—any victory—is for the victor to lose their inability to envision the boundaries of this victory or boundaries of their own power. Objectively, any victory in history is, in the end, a relative victory. Anyone who sidesteps this truth essentially loses half of their victory, and hence, loses half of their wisdom. In the historical and tangible sense, this constitutes Israel’s first loss and waste of a victory. 

Any force that does not realize the boundaries of their power or ways of using it wisely is more dangerous and idiotic than any perception of power the weaker party may still have. Israel won the 1948 War and the 1967 War. What next? 

Israel, which is a small country, has not realized that regardless of its prowess, it is too small to devour its prey—the Arabs and Palestinians—either politically, culturally, historically or psychologically. 

As long as the situation remains as such, and as long the conscious boundaries of power, victories and their uses remain a dynamic issue, then matters will always move towards confrontation. 

As long as this culture of force is draining itself to the maximum in  both quantitative and qualitative terms, including human capital, and as long as the resources of any country or society in the end are limited, there will be no potential for progress, only at best, stagnation. Additionally, the weaker or defeated party continues to build up its awareness as an instinctive reaction to the defeat and to the feeling of humiliation and searches tirelessly for opportunities to regain its rights and invest in what it possesses. In the Palestinian and Arab cases, this is not something to be underestimated—the relative difference between the victor and the defeated gradually decreases until it reaches a point of equilibrium whereby the conflict is transformed into intertwining circles and waves where the victor and the defeated can no longer be differentiated in terms of the destruction, death, terror and frustration. 

At this point, the defeated and the victor become two sides of the same coin. It becomes impossible to speak of peace, stability, development or the security of the victor as long as the defeated resist and stand in the face of the victor. They stand as a reminder of its existence and of the fact that defeat and victory are not the final destiny for any nation, civilization, culture or empire. 

Now, 40 years after the defeat of 1967, we find ourselves faced with a reality where it is difficult to clearly differentiate or delineate between the victor and the defeated, whereby all parties are still burning in the flames of the conflict which only grows more intense. 

Israel and its allies have proven their rare talent in losing opportunities to invest in their victory and now they face a crisis. 

If Israel had behaved with the rationale of a victor that sees and realizes the value of its victory in a way that creates out of it a platform for proposing a fair, ethical political solution (separate from the discussion over the justness of war by the various parties), the Arabs, Palestinians and Israelis would have, decades ago, been living a different reality than the one we presently live. 

However, it seems that Israel’s easy victory caused it to lose balance and start to behave according to the logic of a major colonialist country. This is in spite of the limits of its capabilities and its destiny, which threw it in the midst of the Arab world. Based on this, it began behaving as if it were the destiny of the Arab world, the Middle East and the Palestinian people. It began seeking to impose its conditions and logic with no consideration for what already existed. Instead of seeking to perceive itself as a natural and ordinary country in the region, a country that respects itself, its surroundings and its neighbors, it sought absolute domination. This threw it into a state of contradiction and friction that could not be untangled in the midst of its vast surrounding. 

The Israeli experience represents a flagrant example of the culture of force that lacks the most basic elements of wisdom—a culture that feeds the collective consciousness of the victor with a culture of condescension and contempt for the defeated. It formulates equations according to the racist and pathetic saying, “If the Arabs or Palestinians do not surrender to this amount of force than they will heed and kneel to the use of more force.” Hence, the victor becomes hostage to its blind force at the expense of the force of wisdom and reason. 

However, what happens if the Palestinians do not lie down and surrender, something which has been proven throughout the course of the conflict? 

In this case, there is only one option: a continuation of this dance of war and destruction. In the midst of this, no one will remember who is the victor including the victors themselves. This is because this equation of eliminating the other, destroying and humiliating them militarily, politically and culturally in such a devastating manner will push everyone into a cycle of complete terror. In the framework of this equation of terror, there is not even room for a protocol for any celebration of victory that used to have meaning and value because the continuing dance of death leaves no time for even a smile. 

Confronting the distortion into which the Israeli society has slipped, under the pressure of the insanity of power calls for a political and social force and a cultural elite that has the courage and patience, and before all else, a historical vision. One that would work diligently to save Israeli society, not from the Palestinians but from Israel itself. This Israel, which insists on pushing the Israelis into the trap of the illusion of destructive force that gives it the ability to swallow up the entire Middle East and restructure and rebuild it as it wishes. Israel, which behaves in accordance with  a Rambo-like culture, capable of invading whole countries and armies without being wounded or exhausting all the bullets of its guns. 

Yes, this is possible, but only in movies or cartoons. 

 We can understand imposing conditions for surrender on the country that suffered a military defeat in a war between classical armies in the framework of a conflict over interests and the redistribution of power, markets, resources, etc. However, these approaches and the reading of this equation differ radically when it is about a historical conflict between two blocs and human communities heavily-laden with deep convictions and symbols where both cling to the place with all of its implications and dimensions. This is the case in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the land of Palestine. Where, on this land the heavens and the earth mix together, and each side calls its gods and prophets to stand with him behind their barricades. With such a reality, we are faced with ever more dangerous equations and complexities. Any overstepping of this fact by dealing with the conflict as if it were merely a decisive military battle means in terms of political and cultural practices, the loss of direction and the strategic compass. This will result in a heavy price by all standards and will confront those with this mentality and culture—sooner or later—before questions  about their existence in all senses of the word. 

This deep methodical and psychological dysfunction of both the defeated and the victor in their perception and in dealing with major events has, as we have noticed, turned into dominating behavior. The dynamics of this distortion over power continues even when relationships shift or change radically between the two sides. That is, when there is an overthrowing or exchange of positions, even if it is in the relative sense and the defeated party succeeds in improving its stance and achieving certain victories. The party that has grown accustomed to victories thus finds itself suddenly confronting certain defeats (a perfect example of such a case would be the July 2006 war in Lebanon). The new victor (the Arab side) was not able to comprehend or invest in the results of its victory to gain certain political achievements. Rather, its practices and political limits continued to orbit in the same circles it had grown accustomed to as if it could not believe it could actually come out the victor.

Furthermore, the new defeated party (Israel), which has been addicted to victories, also could not fathom that it could have been defeated. Hence, it continued to behave according to the logic of the victor, blaming its missteps on factors and components far from the core of its failings. 

This is how the lessons of victories and defeats continue to be lost on everyone with equal thoughtlessness, while the approaches continue as if victories and defeats are final and have nothing to do with the reality of life and changes on the ground.

In the midst of this dual distortion, confusion and inability by both the defeated and the victor, available opportunities to achieve real and lasting peace continue to be lost and wasted. The price of this ignorance will be paid up front with the blood, security, future and humanity of everyone. 

In the end, any victory (regardless of the concept of a fair war) does not embody any achievable goal or concept. It will inevitably turn into a state of oppression, which will unavoidably call for counter-reactions that aim to change the forthcoming reality. Hence, the insane race continues around the perimeters of this cycle of conflict in the hopes of reaching an impossible finish line. 

Is there any way to avoid this conclusion? Let us take a look back and contemplate the reality in which the Palestinians and Israelis live in after the decades of conflict and after all the victories and defeats they have experienced. 

After every round of conflict, the dominating power throws all of its energies into systematically feeding this deception and arrogance, and the culture of power while negating the other in preparation for the next round. 

As long as the conflict is governed by this culture, then a permanent and lasting peace will continue to be the missing link in this chain.


 
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