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Perhaps the facts of the
historical struggle over Iraq’s
oil are general knowledge. However, at present, there are many attempts to
establish a legal framework that would overturn the successes of that struggle
and allow foreign companies to control Iraq’s wealth.
The “Oil and gas
draft law” was first issued at the beginning of this year and would have
remained confidential if not for action taken by some Iraqi experts on this
subject—first and foremost Mr. Fouad Amir—and the pieces they sought to publish
on internet sites, which put this subject up for debate. The draft law also
came under internal disputes from members of groups in ruling positions in Iraq, which
urged a second draft, issued mid-February. This was followed days later by a
memo, the fruit of bitter negotiations in which American officials were
directly involved. These shuttle meetings were aimed at resolving objections to
certain articles from the Kurdish parties, especially those articles concerning
the central Iraqi government and the oil union ministry’s administration received
revenues and their redistribution. While the Kurds were fighting for the
complete sovereignty of Kurdistan in this
regard, the Americans defended the centralized formula, attempting to put tools
in place that would allow them overall control over the process.
The law provides
“participant contracts” to the giant oil corporations—especially the American
ones—in current and future oil fields. This ends, in all practical terms, the
historic step represented in nationalizing Iraqi oil. Moreover, this is in distinct
contradiction to what the Iraqi government has claimed. The law is not related
to drilling contracts or developing fields, but about putting a practical hand
on them.
In order to realize the
significance of this matter [the law], US Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice
presented it before Congress at the beginning of the year as part of her
defense of the achievements made by the Bush administration in Iraq. She
described it as a “noteworthy and considerable” law. According to the study
conducted by Mr. Fouad Amir, some US congressional representatives
were cynical about the “important achievement” because it was still under wraps
at the time, considering it as merely part of other Bush administration
justifications. Actually, they were wrong in their interpretation about why
there was so little revealed information, because they had not yet realized
that their administration behaves like a mafia more than an authority whose
actions are propelled by ordinary standards.
Furthermore, we should
also note Rice’s surprise visit to Iraq on February 17, which came in
tandem with the issuance of the second draft, rejected once again by the Kurds.
This was presumably the visit that resolved obstacles to the issuing of the
subsequent memo on the second draft, which is used today as a primary appendix
to the final agreement. This visit was portrayed as one that took place in
order to deal with the difficult issues facing the security plan. However,
according to the same aforementioned sources, we cannot underestimate the
discussion over the new oil and gas draft law and the pressures being exerted
to accept it. This seemed to be the primary, albeit undeclared, motive of Rice’s
visit.
What is noteworthy is
that Mr. Eyad Alawi, who is considered the US’s
trusted man in Iraq—who does
not have any official standing after his failure in the most recent
representative elections—was directly involved in these negotiations and in the
moves towards reaching an agreement between the ruling parties in Iraq.
The Iraqi House of Representatives
is supposed to ratify the draft in a period not exceeding next May. In
preparation for this, the council announced days ago that it had reached a consensus
to accept it. This seems to have happened in compliance with US will, which
does not oppose voices within the ruling parties that publicly show their
dissatisfaction or opposition.
Now, returning to Mr.
Alawi, we must note the characteristics that distinguish this man and make him
so appealing to the Americans. This digression takes us beyond the specifics of
the Iraqi context. Rather we can compare it with similar cases in the region
that show the mechanisms of American pragmatism and that show clearly that they
can preserve their strategic cohesion and never act randomly.
The Americans keep Alawi
and struggle towards the eventual handing over of responsibility to him, precisely
because he does not have a collective political career; he has no roots in any
popular base to which he would have to answer to or consider their interests. This
plays more of a role than his modernity or his secularity, and compels the
Americans to give him continuous support at all levels. If, at a later stage,
they fail to boost him up in a way that would allow him to take charge from
other personalities such as al-Haydari and the current Prime Minister, al-Maliki,
they will adapt to the reality and put responsibility on the latter to carry
out their plans to the maximum possible, because ultimately, these plans require
an authority with real influence and legitimacy.
Hence, the Americans
understand that passing the new fuel and gas law, given its significance, needs
such characteristics in a leader. Therefore, they are using the current Iraqi
government for this purpose. Perhaps, they are preparing for the government’s demise
once its tasks are finished and its forces lose favor. This has already begun.
So, in light of the expected overall opposition, is this interpretation enough
to understand the support for this bright man?
There are two important
characteristics left to present at this stage:
The first is the wave of
resistance that was launched from within Iraq itself against this project.
The oil labor unions in al-Basra took action along with the support of all the
workers in this sector—both laborers and cadres, and with the participation of
intellectuals, experts, university professors and the overall public. Studies
were conducted and public meetings were held. Plans were made to frustrate the
American attempt to pass this law. This is a battlefield that the Iraqis are
fighting in spite of the horrifying violence around them, which aims to
dismember the fiber of their society and force it to its knees, or at least
render it completely useless. This opposition, and the developments that will
inevitably accompany it, are sources of hope that transcend the battle over the
fuel and gas law, which constitutes one central point for reforming the Iraqi
resistance against the occupation and against the horrific usurpation of the
country, which can be considered an annihilation in all practical senses.
Second, the
international networks opposed to the war and occupation of Iraq have taken
over the matter and are working on organizing protest actions in various fields.
Actions that aim to simply proclaim condemnation of the law are not enough.
Perhaps this matter will force the movement from one of general solidarity with
Iraq
against the occupation into one with the ability to coordinate the necessities
for resistance and into actual influence on the ground. This would benefit Iraq and would
benefit the movement itself and turn it into one with true meaning.
This article was
originally published in Arabic in al-Hayat, and translated into English
by the Alternative Information Center (AIC) by request
of the author.
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