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Yesterday,
(like every day) in Baghdad,
over 100 people were killed in a single incident. This time it was in al-Sidriya,
one of the most devastated quarters. One hundred others were killed in al-Hila,
while others were killed throughout Iraq in large numbers.
Several days
ago, the UN Refugee Committee issued one of its most passionate appeals,
sending a warning message regarding the unprecedented numbers and waves of
those currently fleeing Iraq: literally, several millions have left Iraq since
the invasion and occupation by the Americans, especially since the eruption of
internal violence, in which hundreds of people are killed on a daily basis. We
are now back to paragraph one!
In Gaza, in Beirut,
in…
Yasser
Arafat said time and time again that Palestinian blood was a red line. Sheikh
Ahmad Yassin agreed, may they both rest in peace.
After that,
the highest Shiite reference, Mr. Ali al-Sistani, stated that Shiites would not
respond to the atrocities carried out by al-Qaeda in Iraq “even if they were
all exterminated” because infighting was a red line!
In Lebanon, there
is no party that has not declared its “absolute” objection to their country
slipping into a civil war. This party issues a fatwa banning infighting, while
that party issues decrees, and all of them accuse the other of being the source
of the current tension.
How then do
these civil wars, which nobody wants, continue to break out?
There are of
course, the sinister policies of the United States in the region, which, if they
do not intentionally ignite these civil wars—that is to actually plan them,
which is not completely certain—they cause them as a result of the interactions
of their administrative methods and their indifference to the final outcome.
Two British
university researchers said in a recent book, entitled Iraq in Fragments: The
Occupation and Its Legacy, that the opportunity to build a state in Iraq was sabotaged by the US government’s
inclination to control this process more than it was by the weak points already
present in the Iraqi social and political structure. The authors maintain that
the key contradiction lies between the claimed American aspiration to make Iraq a model,
which would supposedly be the greatest challenge and the strategic goal for the
Americans, and their actual focus on achieving this control in a direct and
more fundamental sense, and that this contradiction has always been for the
benefit of control. Hence, the US’s
primary interest was on determining the cooperation that might take place
between the different sectors of Iraqi society and controlling their
contribution to the “project of building the state,” so that no party could
ever threaten American control. The study illustrates the methods the Americans
put into action to administer this control, which provoked a variety of
factional rivalries and deepened the conflict between the central powers and
the local ones. It created institutions and then limited their roles. It pushed
parties and tribes into clashes with each other. The same results could happen,
with local variation, in Palestine and in Lebanon.
But is this
enough to explain the ease with which the eruption of violent civil strife is
possible today in any part of the Arab world?
It would be
arbitrary, ridiculous and disingenuous to disregard another element that has facilitated
this American behavior: the internal breakdown of Arab societies has never before
reached the point it is at today. It is more like a skeleton, stripped of its
clothing, standing there fragilely in the face of a hurricane. The first signs
of this extensive disintegration are indicated in the nature and methods of
opposition. The disunited resistances produced by these societies are closer to
relief groups than to organized work. In Palestine,
women’s organizations called for forming a human chain in protest of the
infighting and in the hopes of preventing it, while the majority of people
condemn the infighting of the conflict between Fatah and Hamas. In Lebanon, it appears that the dangerous
ramification that followed the spark of confrontation at the Arab Beirut
University truly
surprised some of the leadership. This is not something to be happy about
because it means a lack of an accurate assessment of the situation. That is,
this fear of an uncalculated eruption of violence seems to have pushed everyone
towards lowering the sound of the current war drums. In addition, a petition
campaign was launched, aimed at achieving the maximum level of inclusion and
variety possible. This campaign was initiated by a group of youths, hoping to
create a non-sectarian, non-violent body that could penetrate the current
mechanisms or even rise above them. It hopes to embody a single voice that
could perhaps stop the catastrophic spiraling. This initiative, as much as it
is necessary, is equally still hovering around the peripheries.
The most
striking sign of the extent of this internal exposure of Arab societies is
represented in the departure of any search for solutions to these explosive situations,
instead relying on outside initiatives. There are direct and public
international negotiations about Lebanon represented in the intense
current diplomatic maneuvers to get the Lebanese situation back on track. There
is a parallel regional track represented in the Saudi-Iranian negotiations,
which is searching for possible formulas for a truce in Lebanon if not
for a solution. Sometimes, this departure takes on the nature of a barter or
gamble that dominates all else. This is exactly what happened following the Paris 3 convention, endorsed by President Bush’s speech,
in which he attacked Hezbollah, Syria and Iran,
boasting about the sums of money the US
has earmarked for Lebanon.
This seemed to be specifically directed to President Siniora.
Neither the
international efforts nor the regional framework are the problem, in spite of
the implications that each takes on, and which necessarily call for evaluation
and variation. The problem really lies in the lack of ability of the local
forces—who are directly involved, whether in terms of their potential to
develop their own possible solutions or even more basic issues—to play that
role.
The material
for the re-clothing of the skeletons of these societies are the projects that they
adopt, which reflect the images of themselves and their aspirations. Iran’s secret
for example, is this more than its oil or its seeking to own nuclear
technology. Even more developed and stable societies in the world possess such
self-perception. Without this, there is no reprieve and the situation will
continue to lead to disturbances, some that can be contained and some that will
eventually explode.
*This article was
originally published in Arabic in al-Hayat, and translated into English
by the Alternative Information Center (AIC) by request
of the author.
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