Alternative Information Center - Economy of the Occupation 11-12: The Separation Wall In East Jerusalem

The Alternative Information Center’s report "The Separation Wall In East Jerusalem: Economic Consequences" provides a detailed and critical economic analysis of the damages and effects of the Separation Wall in East Jerusalem, the first report to do so. This information is especially relevant given the United Nations establishment of the Registry of Damage for Palestinians negatively impacted by the Wall, thus preparing the case for demanding monetary compensation from Israel.

Beyond the issue of compensation, the political, demographic and geographic changes wrought by the Wall further enhance the current trend which makes a two-state solution increasingly difficult to implement.

Considered to be a holy place by an immense number of people from three different religions, the city of Jerusalem has always held great significance for the politics of the Middle East in general and all the more so for the politics of Israel-Palestine. In a policy aimed at maintaining the Jewish majority of the city’s population, Israel has systematically discriminated against Jerusalem’s Palestinian population. This, however, did not prevent Jerusalem from becoming one of the most important points of connection that bridged the Israeli economy with that of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, exactly because of Jerusalem's multi-ethnic reality.

In 2002 the Wall's construction in the Jerusalem area began. While the wall has severe consequences over the livelihood and wellbeing of the entire Palestinian population throughout the West Bank, in Jerusalem the Separation Wall has the most stark and wide-spread effect. 92% (141,974 acres) of the lands confiscated for construction of the Wall are in the Jerusalem area. Jerusalem is the only region in which the Wall cuts through dense urban districts, separating many not only from their work place but also from services and needs such as local medical centers or schools (as well as from their friends and families). The earnings of Palestinian workers who work within the borders of the Green Line are a very important income for the Palestinian economy. The Wall will therefore disconnect whole communities from what used to be the hub of their economic activity and may disrupt the entire Palestinian economy by constricting this flow of income. Even with the Wall not yet complete, 95% of Palestinians from the areas "outside" of it and 77% of the areas "inside" the Wall (relative to Jerusalem) report that they have difficulties getting to their work place.

The Wall has already caused more than one billion dollars in damages resulting from direct income loss for these people, and it is estimated that it will keep causing a further damage of 194$ million per year.

The Separation Wall further disconnects the main travel routes between Bethlehem and Ramallah, creating an artificial separation between the North and the South of the West Bank. The Wall thus cuts vital connections between the economy of these cities and the Jerusalem economy.

Special thanks to Rami Adut for his many contributions to this research from its very beginning and especially for his help in compiling the data for the study, for Yael Berda for sharing her expertise and for OCHA for allowing the use of their maps.

The discussion in this publication will focus on Jerusalem and the effects of the Wall of Separation on the Jerusalem population. Jerusalem is but one city, but due to numerous significant reasons it has a central position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is a mixed city, where discrimination and violence are visible on a daily basis in the lives of its inhabitants. Both Israelis and the Palestinians want Jerusalem to be their capital, and the multitude of holy sights in the city - for the three major monotheistic religions (Christianity, Islam and Judaism) – have contributed towards making the city’s politics extremely volatile.

The Wall of Separation was, and is continuing to be, built across the entire West Bank and extends for over 703 km. Only about 90 km of this are built in Jerusalem, and yet the Wall in Jerusalem is especially important and deserves special attention. In Jerusalem the Wall cuts deep into a developed urban area, and thus affects the daily lives of schoolchildren, workers, families and whole communities. Out of about 875,000 Palestinians (38% of the West Bank’s population) that are being directly and adversely affected by the Wall, over a quarter live in the Jerusalem area (Müller, Andreas, 2004, p. 22-23, 53-64 and OCHA, 2006, p. 3, Aronson, 2006, p.4).

Yet the purpose of this publication is not to discuss individual wrongs and try to shock the reader with descriptions of human-rights violations or the mistreatment of East Jerusalem Palestinians. Here we intend to discuss general trends in the economy, so that the full economic impact of the Wall can be properly assessed and future demands for compensation can be calculated accurately.

A recent book published by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, The Security Fence in Jerusalem: Its Impact on the City Residents, has revealed detailed statistical findings about the impact of the Wall of Separation on the lives of Palestinians in Jerusalem and its vicinity for the first time. Although the raw data and analysis presented in the book is very important, the text seems to rely heavily on several problematic popular assumptions that are common to Israeli Zionist public opinion. These assumptions, such as the requirement to maintain a Jewish majority and the permanence of the annexation of East Jerusalem, are not recognized by the Palestinian population or by the international community. Still, the information and analysis are both accurate and thought-provoking and could establish the foundations for a new debate on the future of Jerusalem. This highly useful new source will therefore figure prominently in this publication. (Kimhi, 2006).

During the 1967 war Israel occupied the entire West Bank (among other areas). Most of the territory remained under military administration except for 70 square km, or 12% of the West Bank, which was annexed directly to Israel. This area includes the former Jordanian municipality of East Jerusalem, which was 6 square km. The area was henceforth regarded as part of Israel (under the jurisdiction of the Israeli municipality of West Jerusalem) for all administrative purposes of Israeli policy, though the international community has never recognized the annexation and equal Israeli citizenship was not granted to the residents of East Jerusalem (Kimhi, 2006, p. 139-143).

In 1967 many Israeli policymakers believed that Israel would soon withdraw from the occupied territories in exchange for a peace treaty with the neighboring Arab states. However, almost all policymakers also believed that East Jerusalem was different and must be occupied permanently (Gazit, 1985).

In July 1967 a group of twenty prominent Palestinians headed by Anwar Al-Hatib - the governor of the East Jerusalem governorate before the occupation - signed a petition protesting the annexation of Jerusalem and instructing Israel not interfere in religious matters in the West Bank for the duration of the occupation. Israel responded by sending four of the signatories to exile (Ibid).

Eventually, Jerusalem played a key role in strengthening the ties between the occupied territories and Israel. West Jerusalem was strongly tied to the Israeli economy, and East Jerusalem was strongly tied to the Palestinian cities of Bethlehem, Ramallah, Jerico and beyond. When the East and West parts of the city were joined, economic ties between the OPT and Israel became much stronger as a result. Jerusalem became a gate through which Palestinians from the West Bank could enter Israel almost freely, until the checkpoint regime of the 1990s prevented that free movement (Ibid).

Israeli public discourse at the time coined such phrases as “the eternal capital of Israel” and “one unified Jerusalem”, which now form the rhetorical backbone of the annexation policy, repeated ad infinitum by countless politicians and parties, as well as being regularly cited at national events and in official publications. Despite the objection of the international community, Israel maintains that Jerusalem has been united permanently, and that both sides of the city are the capital of the Jewish state. Israel has therefore refused to accept the Palestinian demand that East Jerusalem become the capital of the future Palestinian state, a point of disagreement which has served as an excuse for Israeli politicians to avoid negotiations with the Palestinians.

Declarations about this “unification” of Jerusalem, however frequent, cannot change the demographic reality of the city. Jewish Israelis even avoid entering much of East Jerusalem, which is frequented almost exclusively by Palestinians (Garb, 2005).

Jerusalem is a city under complete Israeli control, but that doesn’t mean that it is an “Israeli” city. According to Israel's identity card system, there are four different 'types' of citizen in Jerusalem, all of which are distinguished by carrying one of the four different identity cards.

The most privileged (though far from most homogenous) group in Israeli society are the Israeli Jews, who enjoy the highest level of civil rights and who hold most of the political and economic power in Israeli society, specifically in Jerusalem.

About 20% of all Israeli citizens are Palestinians. Palestinian citizens of Israel are officially full citizens and share the same rights as Jewish citizens. In reality however, they are discriminated against in politics and in the allocation of national resources. As a result Palestinian citizens of Israel suffer from higher poverty rates when compared to their ratio of the population, and are at the same time underrepresented in official positions (Khaider, 2005). In Jerusalem there are comparatively few Palestinians with Israeli citizenship as most 'Palestinian Israelis' are resident in the areas that became the state of Israel in 1948.

Palestinian residents of Jordanian administered East Jerusalem had Jordanian citizenship until 1967. After the occupation and annexation of the area they received permanent Israeli residency which, crucially, is not full citizenship. These Palestinians are not allowed to vote or be elected to the Israeli parliament and their children do not become citizens of Israel. As a result they do not hold the citizenship of any country. However, they do receive social benefits like full Israeli citizens (though these benefits are often of a lower quality).

Palestinians who live in the OPT areas not annexed to Israel did not receive Israeli residency status and remain until this day subjects of the Israeli government under the administration of the Palestinian Authority. These Palestinians have no rights in Israel, though they often seek employment in Israeli cities and settlements. Many of the residents of outlying communities around Jerusalem carry green IDs or Orange IDs, indicating that they are not citizens of Israel. If caught on “Israeli soil” (including annexed East Jerusalem, which in reality can mean down the street from where they live) their presence there is considered illegal and they are likely to be arrested or deported.

Before the construction of the Wall of Separation, Israel was already making constant efforts to establish a “reverse magnet” for Palestinians with Israeli residency. This was achieved through a combination of providing incentives to those who wished to leave and also through placing numerous obstacles in front of Palestinians who wished to remain in Jerusalem (Kimhi, 2006, p.23).

According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), Palestinians in the Jerusalem metropolitan area are divided in two along the annexation line, without any regard for the actual identification papers that they carry. The Palestinian population in the “Jerusalem Governorate”[1] is estimated to be 240,000 in the annexed area, and another 150,000 in the outlying communities which were not annexed to Israel. The Wall leaves about 160,000 of these Palestinians in the IWA, and 230,000 in the OWA. By comparison, the entirety of the Wall in the rest of the West Bank leaves 60,500 Palestinians in the areas between the Wall and the Green Line (OCHA, 2006 p.3).

In order to minimize confusion, several terms should be explained. The Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) refers to the lands which were occupied by Israel in 1967 and which are populated mainly by Palestinians. Namely, the West Bank and Gaza. For the remainder of the document the term IWA will refer to the parts of Jerusalem surrounded by the Wall of Separation (Inside Wall Area) and the term OWA will refer to the parts of Jerusalem left outside the Wall (Out of Wall Area). It is important to remember that while the entire OWA lies in the OPT, the IWA is divided among Jerusalem which is legally Israeli and lands which were illegally annexed to Israel in 1967 (United Nations, 1967).

The idea of building a wall in the West Bank to separate Israelis from Palestinians was first proposed by the Israeli Prime Minister Ytzhak Rabin in 1992 (Dickey & Dennis, 1995). On July 18th, 2001, the Israeli cabinet approved a plan to construct a “separation barrier” between Israel and the West Bank, after being urged to make a quick decision following a suicide bombing on a nightclub on the Tel Aviv promenade on July 2nd that claimed 22 victims. The bombing created the political opportunity for the Israeli Kneset to move forward with the idea. However, numerous political and human-rights organizations have criticized the Wall and argued that it is a one-sided attempt to earmark Israel's future borders, ensuring that as much land - and as many settlements - as possible fall within these new borders. The flip side of this is that it also keeps as many Palestinians as possible outside of the Wall. (Physicians for Human Rights, 2005, B'tselem 2005(a), Bimkom, 2006 (a) and Bimkom, 2006 (b)).

Even some Israelis, from Ramot (a settlement near Jerusalem) in particular, have objected to the Wall claiming that it disrupts their life style, the view from their homes and the local natural reserves (Farouz Anat, 2006).

Later in 2001 the Ministerial Committee on Security Affairs decided to construct a wall around the city of Jerusalem following the December 1^st suicide bombing in the centre of Jerusalem. It was decided that the Jerusalem barrier would be built on the city's municipal limits. This decision implied that the Wall would include East Jerusalem, which was illegally annexed in 1967. In the summer of 2002 construction began on two sections of the Wall in the north and in the south of Jerusalem. Both sections extended for about 10 km. On September 11^th, 2002 the Israeli cabinet approved the "Jerusalem Envelope" plan - e.g. surrounding the city with walls from the south, east and the north. A year later, in September 2003, the government approved the building of three more sections of the Wall which together extend for 45 km. In February 2005, the government made some changes in the Wall’s route in the West Bank due to a high court decision.

The government approved the E1 plan, which entailed including the Ma'ale Adumim enclave (see below) inside the Wall, but it did not authorize the actual construction of that part. Rather, it consulted with Israeli legal experts before beginning the construction (Physicians for Human Rights, 2005, B'tselem 2005(a), Bimkom, 2006 (a) and Bimkom, 2006 (b)). This plan is especially dangerous because of the future impact it will have on the Jerusalem residents. It will connect Jerusalem with one of the largest settlements in the west bank, Ma'ale Adumim, a town of 30,000 Israeli settlers, and annex a vast area of approximately 15,800 acres of the West Bank which lies between Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim. This area contains about 5,500 Palestinians who will be trapped in an enclave (Ibid).

The effect of the E1 plan is that the Wall will penetrate 14 km into the West Bank, 45% of the West Bank’s width at that point (OCHA, 2006, p.2).

This Wall's major implication is its effect on the roads connecting Bethlehem and Ramallah. More generally, the Wall has extensive repercussions on the north and south of the West Bank (Bimkom, 2006 (a)). This enclave will seriously undermine any prospects for an independent Palestinian state, because it effectively divides the West Bank in half.

In January 2006 the Israeli defense minister at the time, Shaul Mofaz, decided to resume the construction of the Wall in Jerusalem in the sections where its construction was ruled illegal by the Israeli High Court. He argued that the Wall is “temporary,” though the movement of Palestinians was restricted in these areas just as it was in other areas (Harel, 2006).

The Jerusalem barrier is approximately 90 kilometers long (Cohen, 2005(b)). In built-up urban areas, separation has been achieved via a concrete wall. In rural areas an electronic fence has been erected. Most of the Wall in Jerusalem is six to eight meters high (Aronson, 2006, p.4).

By and large, the Jerusalem Wall follows the 1967 annexation border, with two major exceptions: the Ma'ale Adumim enclave (still not constructed) which stretches deep into the West Bank, and the exclusion of two Palestinian neighborhoods which were annexed in 1967: Kafr A'keb and the Shua'fat refugee camp. The enclaves are a result of two walls, one separating the area from Jerusalem and the other separating it from the West Bank, mostly for the benefit of the settlers on the other side. The Ma'ale Adumim enclave will encircle the Palestinian area of a-Za'ayem where Palestinian residents live, who are mostly of Bedouin origin. This enclave will join two other enclaves which are already mostly built. The second enclave is Abu-Dis, Azarieh and Sawahre A-Sharkieh which have been encircled in the area to the east of the old city. The third enclave contains Anata, Ras-khamis and Shua'fat refugee camp, north-east of the old city (Physicians for Human Rights, 2005, B'tselem 2005(a), Bimkom, 2006 (a) and Bimkom, 2006 (b)).

The Wall creates an enclave from Saffa to Beit Surik, enclosing 16 villages with a combined population of 53,100 (United Nations, 2004, p.6).

In the south, the planned Wall also threatens the village of Nahalin and other villages nearby. The current plans are to connect the Wall on the annexation line with another wall which is intended to protect the Jewish settlements. This will create another enclave, containing several Palestinian villages, and about 20,000 residents, as well as several settlements with about 40,000 residents. The Wall will then prevent access to the Palestinian urban center in Bethlehem (Bimkom, 2006(b)). Settlers in the area have already announced their objection to being caught up in this enclave, despite the fact that they will probably have the ability to drive through the gates in the Wall while the Palestinians will have to undergo long security checks and will be blocked from access to valuable sources of employment, trade and services (Physicians for Human Rights, 2005, B'tselem 2005(a), Bimkom, 2006 (a), Bimkom, 2006 (b) and Elgazi, 2005).

The Wall also follows road no. 443 on both sides – a road that connects northern Jerusalem with Tel-Aviv and the rest of Israel. The road has a checkpoint in it making it hard for Palestinians to use it, and the Wall already makes it impossible to join the road in areas not controlled by Israel (Rubinstein, 2006).

The Everyday Effects of the Wall

The Wall of Separation imposes severe restrictions on the free movement of Palestinians. It prevents Palestinians with Israeli residency from being able to move freely into West Jerusalem and the rest of Israel, and it prevents Palestinians in Jerusalem from maintaining free contact with Palestinians in the rest of the West Bank (World Bank, 2006(a)). This limitation of movement stands in violation of international law and other covenants signed by Israel. Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed in 1948 and ratified by Israel, states that: (United Nations, 1948)

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Though Israel builds passes in the Wall where soldiers perform security checks and admit people according to their papers and authorizations, Kimhi notes that there are numerous problems with these passages. The security checks are prolonged and intrusive. They create resentment among the Palestinians and long lines before the passages, delaying the Palestinians on their way to work, studies, shopping or on their way to receive medical treatment (Kimhi, 2006, p.15-16).

There is an inherent tradeoff between the effectiveness of checkpoints in detecting weapons and the ease of passage through them. Unless large amounts of money are spent to speed the checking process in the checkpoints, Israel must choose between making the checkpoints ineffective or causing resentment and suffering among the Palestinian population. The policy in practice tends to fluctuate between these two extremes, and thus causes periodic and unexpected obstacles to Palestinians. The anger which accumulates as a result, might lead to an increase in the number of Palestinians who wish to cross the checkpoint with harmful intent (Ibid).

According to the UN Office for Coordinating Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 230,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem who are left in the OWA (OCHA, 2006, p.2), and are directly or indirectly affected by the Wall.

All the Palestinian neighborhoods that are now in enclaves and others which are directly restricted by the Wall (but not in enclaves) from Jerusalem are home to about 100,000 people. These residents already suffer from the effects of the artificial break from Jerusalem: their cultural, occupational, health and educational center (Physicians for Human Rights, 2005, B'tselem 2005(a), Bimkom, 2006 (a) and Bimkom, 2006 (b)).

The Wall has about 60 gates along it, but about two-thirds of them are built exclusively for Israeli settlers, and Palestinians are prohibited from passing through them. The Israeli government did not declare how many gates are planned in total, where they will be, and who will have access to them (OCHA, 2006, p.4 and United Nations, 2004, p.6). In Jerusalem, however, there are twelve official gates in the Wall. Only four of which are open to Palestinians, and the rest are reserved for the settlers’ use only, despite the fact that the Settlers are living in East Jerusalem illegally (Aronoson, 2006, p.4).

To the Israeli public, it is clear that the Wall is intended to create a divide between the ethnic groups. The construction of the Wall is intended to separate Jews from Palestinians (even though in practice it mostly separates Palestinians from Palestinians). Because the Wall is justified by “security needs,” the discourse effectively sees Palestinians as inherently dangerous. According to this perspective, merely being a Palestinian poses a threat to the security of Jews nearby (Kimhi, 2006, p. 131-132, 141-142).

The Wall is therefore a denial of the political and sociological reasons for Palestinians resistance. It replaces the political discourse with an ethnic discourse which marginalizes the Palestinians, frames them as a natural hazard and encircles them in a wall to keep them at bay.

The Wall is also presented in the Israeli discourse as an act of fortification. After almost forty years of occupation, the Palestinians are perceived by many Israelis as furious, vengeful and dangerous. The Wall is supposed to keep them at bay. However, the fortification discourse might give the impression that Israel is surrounding itself with a wall. In reality, Israel is surrounding the Palestinians with a wall. The proper term is not fortification, but incarceration – because the Wall is built around Palestinian communities in the West Bank.

However, Israeli officials refuse to use incarceration terminology or even to suggest that the Palestinians are being “punished” by the Wall (though Israeli officials often argue that the Palestinians as a collective “deserve punishment”). This is due to the fact that many Israeli officials attempt to mask the hardships that the Wall imposes on the Palestinians (Noiman and Biger, 2006).

Jerusalem, because of the annexation, appears to be a counter-example for the above. The Wall surrounds Jerusalem (in fact, it is called the “Jerusalem Envelope” by the authorities), and on the maps appears more like a fortification line against Ramallah and Bethlehem than a Wall closing in on the Palestinians.

However, the Wall is still built on occupied land, in order to incorporate the annexed areas into Israel. Jerusalem has grown so large - with all the settlements surrounding it- that the Jerusalem Wall cuts deeply into the West Bank. With the inclusion of the E1 plan, the Jerusalem Wall becomes a barrier between the northern and the southern West Bank, leaving only a narrow passage east of Ma’ale Adumim in the Jericho area. Viewed from this angle, it becomes clear that the Jerusalem Wall is part of the process of incarceration, not of fortification.

Many organizations have already discussed the illegality of the confiscation of land from the Palestinian territories. The International Court in The Hague ruled that international law prohibits Israel from building the Wall on occupied territory (International Court, 2004). Nevertheless, the most recent route of the Wall is built in the West Bank. Only 20% of the Wall’s route corresponds with the Green Line, the rest is built in the West Bank. About 10.7% of the West Bank is trapped between the Wall and the Green Line – 154,320 acres. Out of that, 141,974 dunam (92%) are in Jerusalem (OCHA, 2006, p.3).

The Wall also traps many Palestinians without residency in the IWA. These Palestinians must obtain a permit just to reach (or stay in) their own homes. They are not allowed into Israel, and cannot even go to the rest of the West Bank without passing through an Israeli checkpoint and presenting a permit. Those Palestinians who lose their permit or are denied one are deported from their homes into the IWA permanently (Ibid). This creates a situation, such as in Al Walaja village, where a Palestinian can be sitting in his own living room and be 'illegally present in Jerusalem without a permit' at the same time.

According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the construction of the Wall of Separation in Jerusalem has involved the confiscation of 3,360 acres, and the displacement of 1,150 households comprising of 5,920 people (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005(b), p.37).

The most direct damage caused by the Wall is from the land confiscation. Of the Palestinians who participated in the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, 28% of OWA Palestinians reported that they suffered directly from land confiscation for the construction of the Wall (Ibid, p. 76-77).

While Israel has already decided to privatize the main checkpoints between Israel, Gaza and the West Bank, it is still not clear if the checkpoints in the Jerusalem Wall will be privatized or run by the military (Zo Haderekh, 2004).

Part of the reason for the privatization is that the military wishes to avoid any bad press resulting from its soldiers mistreating the Palestinians at the checkpoints. However, allowing a private company to manage the checkpoint does not guarantee any improvement in conditions for the Palestinians who will need to cross the checkpoints on a daily basis.

Only 10% of the people surveyed by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies reported that they expect that a private company will ease some of the sufferings caused by the Wall. A vast majority (54% in total, 71% in OWA) said that the passages are not a solution to the problems caused by the Wall, therefore, the question of whether the passages are run by the army or by a private company is secondary (Kimhi, 2006, p. 15-16, 80-81).

However, though the passages may not be the solution, their mode of operation is crucial to the livelihood of all of Jerusalemites. There is an essential difference between a wall which delays one’s movement and a wall which prevents it altogether. Furthermore, the longer the lines grow in the checkpoints, the longer the delays are and the more humiliating and invasive the security checks become – the more it is likely that adverse the affects will come from the Wall. Leaving the responsibility of managing the Wall in the hands of a private company could easily cause a swift deterioration in the social, economic and political situation in Jerusalem if the company will seek profit more than it will care about the welfare of the people who are under its jurisdiction. (Ibid, p.128-130).

Though not stated openly, the Wall has another important function in the eyes of Israeli policymakers as it is built around the Jewish settlements which surround Jerusalem and are built on occupied land. The settlements of Atarot, Gilo, Givat Ze’ev, Giv’on Hakhadasha, Har Adar, Har Khoma, Kfar Adumim, Ma’ale Adumim, Mishor Adumim, Neve Ya’akov, Pisgat Ze’ev, Ramot Alon and Talpiot Mizrakh are all included in the IWA, and are surrounded by the Wall. They are thus connected with West Jerusalem, despite the fact that they are built on land which was illegally annexed to Israel (Ibid, p.21, 132-134).

A recent report by the Bt’selem organization examined the Wall’s route in certain areas, and confirmed the conclusion that the Wall was not built according to the specifications of satisfying 'security needs' but to protect and annex the illegal settlements in the OPT. The report focuses on specific locations; one of them is northern Jerusalem, where the Wall surrounds the Neve Ya’akov settlement in order to incorporate it into Israeli-controlled Jerusalem (B’tselem, 2005(b).

The residents of Abu Dis (a large Jerusalem suburb left outside of the Wall) appealed to the Israeli High Court in March 2006. The residents argued that the Wall turns Abu-Dis and Sawakhreh into enclaves. About 41% of Abu-Dis’ land will be separated from Abu-Dis by the Wall. Also, the residents argued that the planner of the Wall’s route in their area, Dani Terzal, lives in Kfar Adumim, a settlement that he decided to leave inside the Wall. They claimed that the Wall’s route was guided by a conflict of interests and not by true security reasons, no decision has so far been taken by the High Court regarding this appeal (Hass, 2006).

The Israeli journalist Danny Rubinstein claims that the Wall serves no security purpose whatsoever– but is built to make life more comfortable for the settlements, to provide jobs for construction companies and to create the illusion of security for the Jewish residents of Jerusalem (Rubinstein, 2006).

Chapter 4: Recent Shifts in the Labor Movements in Israel and the OPT

Since the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967, Israel has maintained a policy of non-development in the occupied territories. The Palestinian economy depends to a large extent on the income of Palestinians who work inside Israel. (Arnon, Luski, Spivak and Weinblatt, 1997).

Successive policies of limiting Palestinian workers, curfews, closures (since 1991) and importing labor immigrants to replace Palestinian workers were blows to the Palestinian domestic income and have created a large increase in unemployment (Farsakh, 2002).

Unwilling to allow the Palestinian workers to return to work in Israel, the state has begun implementing new policies of disenfranchising Israeli citizens - lowering them to the status of labor immigrants - in order to enable employers to continue paying the low wages that they have become accustomed to for non-Israeli workers (Adut and Hever, 2006).

The result of these policies has been the deepening of social gaps among Israelis to levels greater than anywhere in the West (Swriski and Conor-Atias, 2005).

Although the entire Israeli market is very stratified and suffers from high levels of inequality, the Jerusalem case has many unique aspects of this. Palestinians traditionally form the lowest rank in the labor market, competing only with the poorest Jewish migrants for the jobs with low prestige and income.

Israel's exploitation of cheap Palestinian labor from Jerusalem has mainly been focused on employing male manual laborers. Until today, only 10.1% of Palestinian women in East Jerusalem participate in the official workforce (as of 2004). This is also due to the traditional structure of the Palestinian families. Yet it is important to remember that Palestinian women nevertheless perform essential work - in an area that receives minimal government services, an inadequate education system in particular – most important of which is the raising of children (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005 (b), p. 84).

Furthermore, the implementation of the Wisconsin Plan labor reform (see Chapter 5, below) is rapidly changing this and forces Palestinian women into wage labor, without providing alternative methods to fulfill household responsibilities.

The education figures give us a clue as to the class aspects of the national conflict inside Jerusalem and the unequal distribution of income. The Palestinian bureau of Statistics provides many figures on the Palestinian Authority Jerusalem Govenorate, which extends somewhat beyond the annexed parts.

Though illiteracy among East Jerusalem Palestinians has fallen, it is still much higher than the Israeli average. It stands at 5.7% among all people of 15or older, compared with 4.6% in Israel altogether (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005(a), p.21 and Israeli Foreign Ministry, 2004).

Less than 1% of all Palestinians in the age range of 6-35 have never attended school, whereas among their grand-parents generation (ages 65+) 40.2% never attended school. This major shift took place in the fifties and sixties during the period of Jordanian rule and it continued, albeit more slowly, during the Israel occupation and annexation period (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005(a), p.57).

Over a quarter (28.3%) of all young Palestinians of the age range 20-24 have less than 9 years of schooling. The rate of Palestinians with under 9 years of schooling drops further with each higher age group, until it reaches over 80% among the 55-64 age group, who are the oldest people still in the work force. Men, who comprise the majority of the East Jerusalem Palestinian workforce, suffer from even higher rates of incomplete education. These men are the source of low-status, manual and unskilled jobs for Jerusalem (Ibid).

The Wall creates a further obstacle to education in East Jerusalem. About 15,000 Palestinian pupils live in the OWA and have the right to study in IWA schools. The Wall makes their daily commute to school harder, longer and more dangerous, and this will have even more adverse affects on the education gaps of East Jerusalem Palestinians (Kimhi, 2006, p. 140-142).

The education system in East Jerusalem will be examined in further detail in a future publication in this series.

The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies stated that 15,500 workers (about 8.5% of the Jerusalem workforce) worked in unskilled jobs in 2002-2003. Of these, 50% were Jews, meaning that Palestinians were almost 50% of the unskilled labor force, even though they are only 31% of the Jerusalem population. Furthermore, of 27,100 workers (about 15% of the Jerusalem workforce) that were listed as skilled “blue-collar” workers, over 57% of these were Palestinian (Hoshen, 2005).

These figures show that Jerusalem Palestinians occupy mainly the lower-rung jobs in Jerusalem, yet even these figures do not reflect the important internal divisions among the low-status jobs. For example, security guards are almost exclusively Jewish – mainly immigrants from the former Soviet Union countries and from Ethiopia. Though these jobs provide low level pay - and though the security guards are often exploited by their employers - Palestinians are never hired for these jobs, and thus these jobs offer a higher social status than manual jobs. There is also a certain air of importance to security guards, especially in a tense city such as Jerusalem which has known many violent outbursts.

Manual jobs which are considered “dirty,” such as construction labor hired on a daily basis, are predominantly held by Palestinians and afford a lower occupational status than security jobs. There is a strong association in Israel between the words “manual” and “dirty” and “Arab,” and this association has a symbolic importance in disempowering and humiliating the Palestinians. Even certain construction-related professions which have a higher status in other countries, are still considered non-professional by Israelis (Kraus, 2000, p. 525-551).

Despite the fact that East Jerusalem Palestinians usually hold low-paying and low-prestige jobs, the Palestinian economy in the OPT has become dependent on their income nonetheless, as a result of many years in which Israel prevented the independent economic development of the OPT. In fact, of all the areas of the OPT, Jerusalem has the highest average wage (mainly because of the proximity to Israel). While the average daily wage in Gaza was US$ 13.8 just prior to the Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 and the average daily wage in the West Bank at the same time was US $16.4, the average daily wage in Jerusalem at the same time was US $27.2. However, it is still important to remember that the average daily wage in Israel in 2005 was US $56.8 (Arnon, Luski, Spivak, and Weinblatt, 1997, Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and Palestine Monetary Authority, 2005 and Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2006(a)).

According to the World Bank, if the Wall lowers the number of Palestinians from East Jerusalem working in Israel, the result will be catastrophic to the entire OPT – causing a steep increase in poverty and unemployment with a decrease in income. The World Bank predicted that by 2008, per capita GDP in the OPT will either be US $878 or US $1090, depending on how many workers are allowed to continue working in Israel. The official unemployment rate could either fall to 19% if workers can continue to be employed in Israel or jump to 31% if they are not. Poverty could fall to 58% or jump to 70% (World Bank, 2004(a), p. 3).

The Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and the Palestine Monetary Authority estimated that the number of Palestinian workers in Israel in the third quarter of 2005 was 60,000. About half of them had “Israeli residency,” meaning that they have most likely came from Jerusalem. These workers received a median daily wage of NIS 134.6 (US $30.87), compared with the median daily wage of NIS 69.2 (US $15.67) in the West Bank and NIS 61.5 (US $14.1) in the Gaza Strip (Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and Palestine Monetary Authority, 2005, p. 13, and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2006).

Though these estimates were made for all of the Palestinian workers from the OPT who work in Israel and not specifically those from East Jerusalem, it is important to remember that East Jerusalem Palestinians are among the Palestinians who have the best access to the Israeli job market, and thus contribute a great deal to the Palestinian economy. This is important as the West Bank suffers from high unemployment, and the official unemployment rate in the West Bank for 2005 was 20.3% (Ibid, p.14-15).

The Wall threatens to change that permanently, and it is extremely doubtful that jobs can be created fast enough to provide alternative employment to the East Jerusalem Palestinians who have lost their jobs in Israel.

The Wall is designed to limit movement. Whether or not it is effective in preventing the movement of armed Palestinians on their way to attack Jerusalem is highly debatable, but it is certainly effective in making it harder for unarmed civilians to perform daily tasks such as going to work, to school, to the hospital or visiting family.

Palestinians have reported that because they must walk to the nearest checkpoint and then wait until they are allowed through it, distances between destinations have grown considerably. A twenty-minute walk has become an hour’s walk, and numerous have people complained that they can no longer pray at the Al-Aqsa mosque, cannot attend schools, cannot visit their families and cannot go to the hospital when they are in need of treatment. (Kimhi, 2006, p. 53-54).

The wall was even erected in the middle of a schoolyard in Anata, turning the school building itself into part of the Wall and lengthening the pupils' way to school considerably (Cohen, 2005(a)).

The World Bank conducted a survey among East Jerusalem students and found that the average rating they gave to describe their 'travel to campus' was “difficult” (World Bank 2004(b), p. 6-7).

The recent decision to extend the Wall to include Ma’ale Adumim and the surrounding area makes entrance into Jerusalem exceedingly difficult. In January 2006 the Israeli army prevented Palestinians from using 8 out of the 12 roads entering Jerusalem and forced them to undergo extensive security checks (OCHA, 2006, p.2).

Health Services Deteriorating

The organization Physicians for Human Rights published an extensive report on the effects of the Wall in Jerusalem on the health of Palestinian residents of the area. We will not detail the findings of the report here, but the main arguments in the report are (Physicians for Human Rights, 2005):

- Treatment of chronic patients, of elderly people and pregnant women is delayed.

- Palestinians from the OPT find it hard to reach hospitals in the city.

- Ambulances are delayed in the checkpoints and the entrances to East Jerusalem, even in urgent cases.

- Hospitals are experiencing financial crisis.

The Shua’fat refugee camp and Dahiyat A-Salam are the two most adversely affected areas. Though they are a part of Jerusalem and their residents carry Israeli residency cards (for the most part), these areas are predominantly populated by Palestinians, and the Wall was built to keep them outside of Jerusalem (Kimhi, 2006, p. 24-26).

The level of damage to these areas cannot be accurately assessed. The residents of the Shua’fat refugee camp are so frustrated from the situation that 97% of them did not cooperate with the survey of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies and did not report how the Wall affects their lives (Ibid).

Recent changes to the Wall’s route leave the Beit Iska village surrounded by the Wall and by the settler road no. 443 on three sides. The state has promised that the village will have access to the West Bank through tunnels and underground passages which have not yet been built (OCHA, 2006, p. 6-7).

The village of Al-Walajeh, mostly populated by refugees from Israel, is going to be surrounded by the Wall on all sides. The village will lose its agricultural lands because of the Wall. The southern side of the village is already blocked by a road which Palestinians are not allowed to use. Israel promised an underground passage to connect the Al-Walajeh village to the rest West Bank (Ibid).

Al-Walajeh village has been subject to a series of land confiscations, house demolitions and “flying checkpoints” (temporary unexpected checkpoints). The confiscation of lands at the outskirts of the village effectively blocks all movement to and from Al-Walajeh. In 2004 Israel declared its intention to construct a settlement: “Giv’at Yael,” which is intended to absorb 55,000 settlers. The sinister factor here is that, although the village still exists, the maps released by the government show that the planned settlement area includes much of the populated residential areas of the current village. (Arij and LRC, 2006).

Sheikh Sa’ad, a suburb of 2,500 people on the outskirts of Jerusalem was also left outside the Wall. The neighborhood only has one access road, which was blocked by a permanent road-block (concrete cubes with rubble on top of them). The only way in or out of the village is by foot, even if it is in emergency and a resident needs an ambulance. Though Israel promised an access road to Bethlehem, that road has not yet been built. The neighborhood has no clinic or high-school, and over half of the residents have abandoned their houses in the neighborhood as a result (Levy, 2005).

Consumption patterns demonstrate that both East and West Jerusalem, as well as the surrounding cities, are a metropolitan commercial center for the Jerusalem Palestinians.

In 2000, between 16% and 25% of OWA Jerusalem Palestinians reported that they buy their goods in the IWA. In 2004, consumption patterns were already noticeably different because of the Wall. In A-Ram, cut from the IWA, shopping in the IWA fell to 5%. Residents of Kafr A’keb and Samiramis divide their shopping between their own neighborhoods and Palestinian cities such as Bethlehem and Ramallah. The share of these residents who are able to shop in the IWA fell by three quarters – from 4% in 2000 to 1% in 2004. Residents of the Shua’fat refugee camp and Dahiyat A-Salam suffer limitations to their movement and 93% now purchase their goods within their own neighborhoods (Hoshen, 2005).

By forcing Jerusalem Palestinians to radically change their shopping patterns, the options available to them diminish and so does their quality of life. We will assume that people make choices to buy the goods which are the most accessible, suitable for their needs and cheap. Palestinians who must now buy in the IWA, such as the Old City of Jerusalem, pay higher prices for their goods than they used to pay in OWA or in nearby Palestinians cities.

Over 51% of the Palestinians from the OWA reported that the Wall has created a sharp increase in their cost of living (Kimhi, 2006, p. 76-77).

Even before the completion of the Wall of Separation in Jerusalem, merchants and shopkeepers have already noted a steep decline in business. The Old City and Salah-A-Din Street, both bustling centers of commerce, have already begun to suffer from the Wall and have less customers than they were used to. Shopkeepers have attested to the fact that they find it increasingly difficult to pay the over head costs and taxes for their shops because they have so few customers (Ibid, p. 24-25).

Though there are no estimates on the losses to the East-Jerusalem economy because of the reduced trade volume, we can get a broader understanding of the economic slowdown by examining the diminished income of households. Due to the fact that many households own a shop and rely on it as a source of income, the figures on the slow in trade are in fact hidden within the figures that follow on reduced household incomes which will be discussed next (Ibid, p.140-142).

The two striking examples of the Israeli policy to minimize the number of Palestinians on Israeli territory are the Shua’fat refugee camp and Dahiyat A-Salam. Though Israel annexed these areas in 1967 and has repeatedly claimed that the new Jerusalem borders are permanent and will not be changed, it only gave residency status to the residents of these areas, rather than providing them with Israeli citizenship. As if trying to correct the “demographic mistake” of the annexation, the Wall has been stretched to the west of these neighborhoods, cutting them off from the rest of Jerusalem. Though the residents of these neighborhoods, about 65,000 today, still carry Israeli residency papers, the value of these papers is much lower when a physical wall makes movement into the IWA difficult or sometimes impossible (Kimhi, 2006, p. 15-28).

As a result, the Shua’fat refugee camp and Dahiyat A-Salam are the two areas most adversely affected by the Wall. About 21% of the residents reported land confiscations, 14% suffered physical injury or health problems, 36% reported a rise in their cost of living, 11% reported a change of residence and 6% reported an increased population density (, 2005). Also, residents of these areas had to find new sources of income. The number of providers per family has increased dramatically – indicating a higher reliance on child labor. However, the ratio of families who have no provider increased from 8% in 2000 to 18% in 2004 (Ibid).

So far, the effects of the Wall in Jerusalem have been discussed in relation to Jerusalem itself and the surrounding communities such as the isolated suburbs and the Palestinian cities of Ramallah and Bethlehem. However, the Wall has far-reaching effects which go far beyond the limits of the Jerusalem area. These numerous effects vary greatly and cannot be described here, but one example can be given from the village of Yatta.

Though Yatta is located south of Hebron, close to the southern end of the West Bank and about 35 kilometers outside Jerusalem, it has still been profoundly affected by the Wall in Jerusalem. Many of the people of Yatta who used to find employment in Jerusalem (despite the long journey from their homes) have now lost all form of income. They have instead turned to an alternative source of income – mining for metal scraps in the Yatta garbage dump. Children who are 14 years old work up tp ten hours every day or more, gathering about 60 kilograms of scrap metal, and earning about US $6.5 in a day’s work (Sadaa Media, 2006).

The Wall adversely affects the income of Palestinian families in East Jerusalem in many ways, but the most detrimental affect is through hurting employment.

The surveys conducted by the Jerusalem Center for Israel Studies and presented in Kimhi’s book clearly indicate that East Jerusalem Palestinians see employment as the most important problem caused by the Wall of Separation. Over 52% of all the participants in the survey stated that employment was their biggest concern due to the construction of the Wall (Kimhi,, 2006, p.37).

Over 94% of the Palestinians left outside of the Wall and 77% of the Palestinians left inside the Wall have already reported some difficulties in their accessibility to their workplace as a result of the Wall. Over 53% and over 25%, respectively, reported the highest degree of difficulties that the survey offered (Hoshen, 2005). Over 70% of the residents of the Shua’fat refugee camp and of Dahiyat A-Salam, who are mostly Palestinians holding Israeli IDs and living outside the Wall, reported the highest difficulty rating for reaching their workplace. Over 60% of the residents of Kafr A’keb and A-Ram reported the same (Ibid).

The survey conducted by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies showed that there was a reduction in income for Jerusalem Palestinians. The percentage of Palestinians who have no income at all doubled (in the communities surrounding Jerusalem they quadrupled). The number of families who depend on a monthly income of less than NIS 200