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The Economy of the Occupation, Part Six
The Question of Sanctions and
a Boycott against Israel
by Shir Hever
“It is in fact astonishing that the divestment campaign should
have generated so much controversy, given that its primary
demand is simply that a country that is showered with official
and unofficial American assistance […] merely acknowledge
and implement the rule of law.”
—Saree Makdisi1
At first glance, the Israeli economy
is stronger than ever. Israeli economists
are exhilarated, and claim that
the Israeli market is one of the largest
and fastest-growing importing/exporting
economies in the world. But economic
analysis must go further, and
unveil the implications of the Israeli
economy’s dependence on international
trade. Now more than ever, Israel is
vulnerable to economic
sanctions.
This is the international
community’s
opportunity to force
Israel to respect the
human and national
rights of the Palestinians, and to stop
many of the abuses that have become
its central policies.
This article will focus on the role of
economic sanctions, and will not deal
with either military or cultural and political
sanctions.
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Table of Contents
1. Background on Sanctions
A. What Are Sanctions?
B. When Were Sanctions Used?
C. What Makes for a Successful Sanctions Campaign?
2. The Call for a Boycott
A. Recent Calls for a Boycott and for Sanctions
3. Israel’s Strength
A. Foreign Currency Surplus
B. The Arms Trade
C. The Arab Boycott
4. Israel’s Vulnerability
A. A Comparison with the South Africa Boycott
B. Growing Reliance on Imports
C. Diminishing Effects of Foreign Aid
D. Support from Within
E. The Arms Trade
F. Trade with Europe
5. The Effect and Significance of Sanctions
A. The Domestic Economy and the Lower Classes
B. Complicity with the Occupation
C. The Psychological Impact
D. Different Forms of Sanctions
Endnotes
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1. Background on Sanctions
A. What Are Sanctions?
The official definition of sanctions is:
“Economic or military coercive measures,
usually adopted by several nations
acting in concert, in order to force a nation
violating international law to desist
or yield to adjudication.”2
Sanctions discriminate against countries,
and should not be taken lightly.
When sanctions target an entire country,
innocent citizens
(and in Israel’s
case, innocent subjects)
are bound to
be affected. Sanctions
also require
a great deal of coordination
and cooperation; an effective
sanctions campaign can take a long
time to launch. If the political situation
changes, adapting the sanctions to the
new situation can take time as well.3
For these reasons, human rights’ organizations
are often equivocal about
boycotting and sanctions, and worry
that they are a form of collective punishment.
Proponents of sanctions
against Israel must arm themselves not
only with arguments against supporters
of Israel, but also with answers for human
rights’ activists who doubt whether
sanctions are justified.
Let us remember, however, that
sanctions are a relatively non-violent
form of pressure which may help protect
Palestinian rights in this violent
and bloody conflict. The reasons for
sanctions against Israel
will not be discussed
here at length. Further
material on why such
sanctions are justified
may be found in
the following sources,
among others:
1. Barghouti, Omar, 2004, “Boycott
as Resistance: The Moral Dimension,”
The Electronic Intifada,
28.12.04, http://electronicintifada.
net/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.
cgi/10/3462
2. Taraki, Lisa, 2002, “In Defense of
Sanctions Against Israel,” Counterpunch,
10.5.02, http://www.counterpunch.
org/taraki0510.html
3. Stop the Wall, 2005, The Call for
Boycott, Sanctions, and Divestment
against Israeli Apartheid, Stop the
Wall, http://www.stopthewall.org/
downloads/pdf/boycott%20factsheet%20updated.pdf
4. All-Majdal, 2005, “BDS – Boycott,
Divestment, Sanctions,” No. 26,
Summer 2005, Bethlehem. The issue
was dedicated to the question of the
boycott.
5. News from Within, 2006, “The
Case for Boycott,” Vol. XXII, No. 1,
January 2006, Jerusalem. The issue
was dedicated to the question of the
boycott.
B. When were Sanctions Used?
Unfortunately, sanctions
have not always
been used to promote
human rights: often
they have lead to great
suffering.
For example, the US
sanctions on Iraq (1990-2003) have
come under severe criticism for affecting
the civilian population and bringing
on a humanitarian crisis. Amnesty
International organized a world-wide
campaign against the sanctions, which
are estimated to have led to the death
of hundreds of thousands.
The best-known sanctions for human
rights’ purposes were those against the
Apartheid regime in South Africa, imposed
between 1986 and 1992. These
sanctions will be discussed below.5
C. What Makes for a Successful
Sanctions Campaign?
The goal of sanctions is to put pressure
on governments who knowingly commit
human rights’ violations or war atrocities.
Sanctions make it difficult for the
targeted government to raise funds and
to import weapons and raw materials
for arms production.
Many governments
that persecute
or openly
attack civilian populations
can do so
through the support
of businessmen who
can make a profit
from the conflict. Sanctions limit the
cash available to the targeted governments.
Consequently there are fewer
profits for businesses
to make.6
In addition, sanctions
have a strong
political effect. They
force the targeted
government to try to defend its actions
to the international community, thus
raising valuable debate. Through this
debate, violations can become widely
known and the political pressure on the
government in question may increase.
A sanctions campaign can become the
flagship in a larger campaign to defend
the rights of a persecuted people.
Oft-quoted UN research on sanctions
by David Cortright, and George Lopez
suggests that sanctions can bring on
a “rally around the flag,” but may also
cause a political backlash. Cortright,
President of the Fourth Freedom Forum
and a professor of political science,
and Lopez, Senior Fellow at the Joan B.
Kroc Institute for International Peace
Studies and a professor of political science
as well, published their research
in 2000.7
Finally, the
political effects of
sanctions can empower
resistance
groups within the
targeted country.
By giving the oppressed
international
support, the
international community also protects
the political resistance movement within
the targeted state. The targeted government
is made
to realize that the
conflict cannot be
decided simply by
force of arms or
unilateral actions,
since their victims
have a political weapon. This can lead
to a situation of more evenly balanced
powers, and can serve to promote negotiation
and compromise.8
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2. The Call for a Boycott
A. Recent Calls for a Boycott and
for Sanctions
One of the effects of economic globalization
is the proliferation of sanctions
as a means of non-violent pressure
against countries violating human
rights. The United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) has imposed sanctions
only twice between 1945-1990, and 12
times from 1991-1999. However, the
justification and effectiveness of these
sanctions remain
questionable.9
Calls for a boycott,
divestment and
sanctions against
Israel in response
to the occupation
have been made
by various groups
(Palestinian, international and Israeli)
throughout the history of the occupation.
Recently, there was a rise in international
awareness of the subject, and
several recent statements deserve special
notice.10
In July 2004 the Presbyterian
Church’s General Assembly passed
a resolution for selective divestment
from companies that profit from the occupation.
In February 2005, the World
Council of Churches, combining 340
churches worldwide issued a similar
resolution.11
In August 2005, the Presbyterian
Church U.S.A. announced that it will
divest from four companies that are
known for selling equipment frequently
used by the Israeli army, companies
which consequently profit from the occupation.
These companies – Caterpillar,
Motorola, ITT Industries and United
Technologies – were selected from
a broad list of companies
that provide
equipment to the
Israeli army. In order
to appear more
even-handed, the
church also decided
to divest from Citigroup,
because of its
alleged connections
to Islamic charity groups that provide
help to families of suicide bombers.12
In March 2005, the student assembly
at the University of Michigan voted on
and published a resolution calling on
the University of Michigan to withdraw
funds from companies that support the
Israeli occupation. The resolution stated
that the University of Michigan invested
over US $11 million in military
companies whose products or services
directly support the occupation.13
In April 2005, Israeli professor Ilan
Pappe from the Haifa University published
a call for an
academic boycott
on Israeli universities
that support the
occupation.14 An academic
boycott imposed
by the British
Association of University
Professors
in April targeted two Israeli universities
for “collaborating with the crimes of the
occupation.” The boycott was rescinded
a month later due to immense pressure
applied by Israeli scholars.15
In June 2005, The Israeli Committee
Against House Demolitions (ICAHD)
issued a statement supporting selective
divestment and a boycott in order
to put moral and economic pressure on
Israel to end the occupation. ICAHD’s
call for sanctions was intended to make
Israeli policymakers, military officers
and businessmen accountable for their
violations of international law. ICAHD
especially noted three reasons for the
sanctions: massive house demolitions
of Palestinian homes; violation of the
“Association Agreement” with the European
Union which stipulates that the
origin of goods made in the settlements
must be made known to European buyers,
and the violation of the “Arms Control
Act” which decrees that US-made
weapons must not be used against unarmed
civilians.16
In July 2005, some two hundred Palestinian
civil society organizations put
together a call for a boycott and sanctions
against Israel. A hundred and seventy
one NGOs have
already signed the
petition as of writing
of these lines.
The statement of
the call was:
We, representatives
of
Palestinian civil society, call
upon international civil society
organizations and people of
conscience all over the world to
impose broad boycotts and implement
divestment initiatives
against Israel similar to those
applied to South Africa in the
Apartheid era. We appeal to
you to pressure your respective
states to impose embargoes and
sanctions against Israel. We also
invite conscientious Israelis to
support this Call, for the sake of
justice and genuine peace.17
In January 2006, an article titled
“Boycott Israel” was published in Global
Agenda Magazine. Mazin Qumsiyeh,
the author, is a human-rights activist
in the US and a staunch supporter of
the Palestinian struggle for independence.
The magazine was distributed in
the World Economic Forum in Davos,
where the executive chairman consequently
issued a formal apology. Supporters
of Israel attempted to suppress
the article and managed to get it deleted
from the magazine’s website, but it had
already reached a wide audience.18
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3. Israel’s Strength
Sanctions are not always successful at
achieving political results. Robert Pape,
a professor of political
science, claims that only
5% of economic sanctions
are effective.19
The sanctions on
South Africa, for example,
are generally considered to have
been ineffective, and to have played
only a minor role in the abolition of the
Apartheid regime there. South Africa’s
wealth of natural resources provided
the government with an ample supply
of alternative raw materials, and its
economy was thus able to withstand the
pressures.20
Israel has a strong economy, and is
a large exporter. It is the world’s biggest
exporter of fertilizers, polished
diamonds and industrial oils. It exports
57% of the total world exports of fertilizers,
34% of the total exports of polished
diamonds, 26% of the total exports
of industrial oils and 12% of the
total weapons sales.21
The question therefore arises, would
sanctions put effective pressure on Israel
at all?
A. Foreign Currency Surplus
Israel’s international trade position is
currently quite strong. After decades of
borrowing money and
dependency on foreign
aid, in 2002 Israel became
a lending market
and has since remained
one. The accumulated
foreign aid that Israel
received from the US and Germany
gave Israel a powerful base of foreign
currency which strengthened its economy.
22
In 2005, Israel lent over US $20.8
billion to countries and companies
around the world. Most of the loans
were given by private banks and other
financial businesses.23
One indication of Israel’s strengthening
position in the global economy
is the increase in the reserves held by
the Central Bank of Israel (CBI); these
have seen a marked rise since 1996. In
2005, the governor of the CBI stated
that he believes that the Israeli market
is very strong, as demonstrated by the
exchange.24
Another factor is Israel’s dependence
on exports. If Israel was forced to rely
only on the reserves held by the CBI
(without revenue from exports), it could
continue importing only for a limited
time. One indication of Israel’s ability
to withstand sanctions is the length of
time over which the CBI reserves could
fund imports. This is a tradeoff between
the size of the CBI reserves, and the level
of imports that Israel has become accustomed
to.
As graph 2 shows, over the years, the
number of days for which the CBI could
support imports has increased. The major factor contributing to this increase
was a 1996 U.S grant of US $9 billion.
As a result, in 1998 Israel had the highest
effective reserves ever – enough for
194 days of imports. Since then the reserves
are gradually eroding again.25
Another contribution to the flow of
foreign currency into Israel was the increased
humanitarian assistance to the
OPT. Starting in 1994, international
donors began funneling humanitarian
assistance to the Palestinians in an effort
to stave off the
humanitarian crisis
in the OPT. Israel imposes
a series of taxes
and tariffs on this aid,
which, along with outright
confiscations, allow
it to appropriate large portions of
these funds.26
The increase in effective reserves
took place despite the fact that the total
expenditure on imports has increased,
as shown in graph 3. Graph 3 also demonstrates
that exports are gradually
catching up to imports, and that Israel’s
trade deficit is therefore on the decline.27
According to Israel’s Central Bureau
of Statistics, exports sharply increased
in 2004, a further indication of Israel’s
strong position in the world market.
While this data is reported to be grossly
exaggerated, there are new indications
that in 2005 exports continue to increase,
especially exports to Europe.28
B. The Arms Trade
Israel is one of the biggest arms producers,
importers and exporters in the
world. In 2001, Israel was the 10th biggest
arms exporter in the world, and was
able to export 75% of its total arms production
(the remainder was for domestic
use). That year, Israel provided 10%
of the total arms exports in the world.
In the past decade, Israel sold various
military systems to over 57 countries.29
In arms sales to developing countries,
however, Israel
is the 4th biggest seller.
In 2004, Israel’s
sale of armaments to
developing countries
amounted to US $1.2
billion, falling below
only the US, Russia and the UK.30
Israel’s exports improved after September
11, as Israel pursued a foreign
policy which conflates its suppression
of the Palestinian resistance with the
US “War on Terrorism.” This foreign
policy had some success, as Israeli military
companies reinforced their reputation
as “experts” in fighting terrorism
and substantially increased their export
profits.31
C. The Arab Boycott
The Arab Boycott on Israel constituted
the first and most well-known sanctions
against Israel: its apparent failure
suggests that future sanctions may also
fail.
Arab countries have boycotted Israel
even before the state was officially declared.
The boycott was initiated to protest
the overtaking of Palestinian lands
by the Zionist movement, which the
Arab nations perceived as yet another
colonial movement. Once the state was
declared, the boycott prohibited direct
trade with Israel and was also directed
at companies that traded with Israel.32
During the first decades of Israel’s
existence and up to the
late 80s and early 90s,
the effects of this boycott
on Israel were relatively
marginal. Firstly, the
world was less globalized
then, and Israel was content
to maintain trade
relations with a limited
number of nations. Secondly,
at the time national ideals were
far more important to most Israelis
than any remote prospects of attaining
wealth through international trade.
Austerity was viewed as a patriotic sacrifice,
and the Israeli economy was still
centered on agriculture and industry,
rather than on trade.33
In 1977, the US Congress passed a
bill prohibiting US companies from cooperating
with the Arab boycott. Many
other countries joined the US opposition
to the boycott.34
Since 1993 and the dawn of the Oslo
peace process, the boycott was gradually
eliminated as many countries stopped
abiding by it. In July 2001, several Arab
countries attempted to reinstate the
boycott in response to the massive Israeli
attacks against the Palestinian
population during the second Intifada,
but this attempt met with little success.35
The final blow to the Arab Boycott
seems imminent. As Saudi Arabia
prepares to join the World Bank Organization
(WTO), it is required to lift
sanctions from Israel. Thus one of the
countries which implemented the Arab
Boycott on Israel most
strictly will withdraw it.
Under US pressure, Persian
Gulf countries have
also announced that
they will withdraw the
boycott.36 Israeli economists
estimate that between
1950 and 1993 the
boycott cost the Israeli
economy no more than US $45-$49 billion.
37
The failure of the Arab boycott raises
important questions. Are boycott attempts
against Israel destined to fail?
Will the WHO serve to defend Israel
from sanctions?
The facts and figures shown above may
lead one to believe that sanctions or a
boycott against Israel cannot be effective.
However, the situation is not as
one-sided as it might appear at first
glance.
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4. Israel’s Vulnerability
A. A Comparison with the South
Africa Boycott
The boycott of South Africa is considered
to have had only minor effects, and
is cited as a reason why
a boycott of Israel might
also prove ineffective.
Nevertheless, some important
differences exist
between Israel today and
South Africa in the 70s
and 80s.38
South Africa had the advantage of a
wealth of natural resources, especially
coal, which allowed it to find substitutes
for lost imports. Israel’s industry,
on the other hand, focuses on processing
raw materials rather than producing
them. Polished diamonds, fertilizers,
industrial oils and weapons all
require raw materials, many of which
must be imported. Raw materials, energy
resources and unpolished diamonds
comprise the majority of Israel’s imports.
Raw-material imports were 71%
in 2003, 72% in 2004 and 74% in 2005
(as of September).39
The surplus produced by the Israeli
economy for export, then, depends on
imported raw materials. Slowing or
hindering the flow of raw
materials to Israel will
therefore produce an immediate
effect on Israel’s
strongest and wealthiest
industries. Trade sanctions
of any kind on Israel
will have a simultaneous
effect on imports
and exports. A major source of profit to
wealthy Israelis, as well as their access
to imported luxuries, will be targeted at
the same time. 40
The world economy itself has
changed dramatically in recent years.
As mentioned earlier, globalization has
had a profound impact on Israel, which
is now one of the most globalized countries
in the world, with a large share of
its economy connected with world trade
(see below).41
A crucial lesson of the South Africa
boycott is the importance of non-governmental
organizations and private
businesses in imposing sanctions. Despite
the fact that many countries supported
the sanctions, the refusal of private
people to buy South African goods
so long as Apartheid lasted had an even
more profound effect. Multinational
banks and other companies withdrew
their business from South Africa, fearing
that dealing with that regime will
damage their public relations. Although
these companies didn’t operate out of
moral considerations, the moral decisions
of private citizens allowed them to
mobilize their financial clout and have
a powerful impact.42
B. Growing Reliance on Imports
One of the effects of globalization is a
growing reliance on imports. Israel is
a prime examples of this phenomena.
Imports per Israeli citizen increased
dramatically over the years. Per-capita
imports have increased from US $481
in 1970, to US $5,038 in 2003, an rise
of over 947%. This is a sign of Israel’s
prosperity, and is largely due to massive
foreign aid. It is also a sign that Israelis
(especially those of the upper classes)
have become used to high standards of
living.43
Israel is deeply involved in international
trade. Considering its minute
size, Israel is indeed a highly globalized
country. Its position as a powerful exporter
is quickly improving. In terms of
exports per-capita, Israel is the 8th biggest
per-capita exporter in the world,
exporting US $5,437 per capita in 2004
(compared to US $4,600 in 2003, when
it was 9th in the world). However, it is
also the 10th biggest per-capita importer
in the world. It imported US $6,400
per capita in 2004 (compared with US
$5,300 in 2003, when it was also 10th
place in imports).44
Furthermore, tourism is very important
to the Israeli economy. On average,
in 2005, a tourist netted Israel with an
income of US $1,000 in direct income,
and another US $1,000 in indirect income.
Every half-a-million tourists increase
the GDP by 1% and employment
by 20,000 jobs. If people around the
world will decide to limit their visits to
Israel in protest of the policies of occupation, tourism revenues will decline
sharply.45
In 2005, 1.92 million tourists entered
Israel, and provided an income of about
US $4 billion to Israel. The income
from tourism is expected to increase to
US $4.4 billion in 2006.46
The Israeli elite and high society give
Israel the reputation of a
wealthy country. According
to UN ranking, Israel
is the 23rd country in the
world in terms of quality
of life. However, the
socio-economic gaps in
Israel are extreme. Only the top earners
and capital owners in Israel (see
Chapter 5.a) are actually able to enjoy
imported goods to a large extent.47
C. Diminishing Effects of Foreign Aid
Israel has enjoyed a steady flow of foreign
aid ever since it was founded. It
receives donations from Jewish communities
around the world, Holocaust
reparations from Germany (which were
often appropriated by the state rather
than disbursed to the actual survivors)
and direct aid from the United States.48
This aid has certainly contributed a
great deal to Israel’s foreign currency
surplus in the first place, but it is gradually
less influential in keeping the Israeli
economy afloat.
For starters, foreign aid
from the United States
is gradually diminishing,
and more and more of it
is directed towards military
rather than civilian
aid. US aid to Israel was an average of
US $3 billion every year since 1973, but
the sums are gradually eroding.49 The
most recent figures are presented in table
1.
There is also a possibility that the US
will suspend some of the aid to Israel
because of the need to deal with the
damage of the hurricanes afflicting it.51
The economic significance of this is
that a large and growing part of the Israeli
economy is supported not by foreign
aid but by exports to the world.
Consequently Israel can now be subjected
to international economic pressure.
Costs of the Occupation
In order to colonize the OPT, Israel
has pursued a policy of extensive subsidies
to Israeli (Jewish) citizens who
choose to live in the illegal settlements
in the OPT. The settlements, colonies
established on Palestinian land, are
surrounded by the indigenous Palestinians.
The settlers are therefore furnished
with extensive security installations
that are staffed by soldiers armed
with a variety of weapons. The costs,
paid by the Israeli government, amount
to some of the government’s highest expenses.
52
Graph 5 demonstrates that the costs
of the occupation rise every year by a
steep curve. Since 1992 the annual cost
of the occupation is higher than the foreign
aid that Israel receives from the
US. Since 1995, the “security” costs of
the occupation alone surpass the foreign
aid that Israel receives from the
US.
D. Support from Within
In their research for the UN, Cortright
and Lopez suggest that while sanctions
empower resistance groups within the
targeted nation, the effectiveness of
sanctions greatly depends upon the
support they receive from civil society
organizations there.53
The claim that sanctions require internal
support has been used frequently
as an argument against sanctions. Israeli
activists who oppose sanctions claim
that the vast majority of Israelis (even
many of those who define
themselves as “leftists”)
are vehemently
resistant to sanctions,
and therefore a sanction
campaign cannot
be effective. Indeed,
both the international
and the internal support for the crimes
committed by Israel is very large.54
Graph 5
However, it is crucial to remember
that the Palestinians living under the
Israeli occupation are part of the population
of the “targeted country,” and effectively
part of Israel’s economic system.
If we count the Palestinians living inside
Israel along with those in the OPT,
Palestinians already form the majority
of the population under Israel’s control.
The vast support that the call for sanctions
generated among Palestinian civil
society organizations demonstrates
that there is indeed a very stable basis
of support for international sanctions
coming from within the targeted area.55
We should keep in
mind that the Palestinians
are also expected
to pay a price for the
boycott. A boycott on
Israel will certainly
have adverse effects on
the Palestinian population,
at least in the short run. Some of
these are:
-Israel might retaliate against the Palestinians.
Israel is already confiscating
foreign currency sent to the Palestinians,56 and might increase confiscations
if foreign currency grows scarce due to
a boycott.
-The demand for Palestinian labor in
Israel might suffer.
-Israel will likely import less from the
Palestinians.
-Israel may cut down its exports of second-
grade goods to the Palestinians if a
boycott comes into effect, thus leaving
the Palestinians wanting.57
Nonetheles, the price they may be
forced to pay hasn’t deterred the Palestinians
from calling for the boycott.
E. The Arms Trade
There are also signs of growing international
awareness of the human-rights
violations committed by Israel.
Israel’s insistence on selling weapons
to the highest bidder without regard to
the possible ramifications has led even
its staunchest ally to doubt its arms-
sales policies. The US
has implemented a series
of limitations on its
arms-trade with Israel
in response to Israeli
arm sales to regimes
that violate human
rights.58
One colorful example:
the DSEi is an international
trade show
for military equipment in the UK, and
one of the largest arms-trade shows in
the world. In September 2005, 1202
companies exhibited their products in
the show. The Israeli delegation was
kicked out of the show after advertising
items that are illegal in the UK, such as
leg-cuffs and paralyzing electric weapons.
59
The time is ripe, then, for well-organized
campaigns to pressure governments
to stop selling arms to Israel, and
to stop buying weapons from Israel.
F. Trade with Europe
The issue of European trade relations
with Israel will be discussed more thoroughly
in a future publication, but some
important points should be noted here.
The European Union is Israel’s biggest
trading partner. Imports from EU
countries accounted for over 28% of Israel’s
imports, and exports to EU countries
accounted for 36% of Israel’s exports.
60
Israel enjoys a preferential
trade agreement
with Europe, which
makes it especially
profitable to Israeli
companies to export to
Europe. However, these
trade benefits are in violation
of the European
Commission’s own
laws, as Israel is selling
goods and products
from the OPT and fails to mark these
properly. In 1999, the MATTIN group
for human rights launched a joint campaign
with European NGOs to enforce
European Commission laws and withdraw
preferential status from Israeli
goods in Europe. Approximately US $2
billion of Israel’s US $7 billion exports
to the EU come from the occupied territories.
Therefore nearly a third of Israel’s
exports to the EU receive illegal
preferential treatment.61
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5. The Effects and Significance of Sanctions
A. The Domestic Economy and the
Lower Classes
It is not the case that all Israeli citizens
are violating international law or actively
attacking the Palestinians. Sanctions
should be considered carefully, so as
to minimize the targeting
of innocents.
Sanctions against
Israel will force it to
rely more heavily on
its domestic economy,
at least until
political advancements
will justify
alleviating the sanctions.
Because the domestic economy is
associated with the lower-classes of the
Israeli society, international sanctions,
divestment and boycotts will actually
affect the higher-classes in Israel the
most.
If we examine the expenses of the
fifth of the population at the low end of
the earnings scale, we find they spend
7% of their income on fruit and vegetables,
compared with only 3% by the
tenth of the population with the highest
earnings. Meanwhile, 35% of the expenses
of that bottom fifth are spent on
housing, compared to only 25% by the
top tenth.62
On the other hand, imports remain
the realm of the highest earners. The
top 10% of earners in Israel spend
about 9% of all their expenses on trips
abroad, over 102 times the ratio of expenses
spent on trips abroad by the
bottom forty percent of the population
put together.63
This goes to
show that the economic
elite in Israel
is far more vulnerable
to international
sanctions, at the
same time that it
holds the power to
improve the Palestinians’ situation.64
The only ways that Israel’s wealthy
could maintain their luxurious lifestyle
under a boycott would be to disconnect
from Israel or to influence Israeli policies
and make the boycott irrelevant.
B. Complicity with the Occupation
Another important consideration regarding
sanctions is the issue of moral
complicity. Many people might view a
boycott on Israeli goods (or even only
on goods from the settlements) as an
extreme measure. Others may consider
a boycott an outside interference in
what is essentially a local conflict between
Israel and the Palestinians.
However, one should also take into
consideration the consequences of buying
Israeli goods. The
profits made by Israeli
companies contribute
to the taxes
collected by the Israeli
government
and to the purchase
of arms. Companies
who produce goods
on stolen Palestinian land increase in
their business volume with every purchase.
These purchases thus contribute
to the incentive to grab more land from
the Palestinians and to increase the
population in the settlements.
Supporting the Israeli economy is a
political statement that should not be
taken lightly. It involves taking at least
a measure of responsibility for human-
rights’ violations committed by Israel.
C. The Psychological Impact
Although this publication
focuses on the economic
aspects of sanctions, one
must not discount the
significance of the psychological
effects of sanctions,
which may be even
more important.
It is not realistic to
expect widespread
sanctions on Israel
in the near future,
yet even small and
targeted campaigns can
have far-reaching results. The sanctions
keep the occupation in the political discourse,
and make
Israelis feel uneasy
abroad. Israeli soldiers,
settlers, and officials
should feel that
their actions against
the Palestinians label
them as pariahs
in the international
community – that they must distance
themselves from the crimes committed
against human rights and international
law if they are to be received in the
world as civilized and respected people.
In addition, many Israelis prefer
to claim ignorance of international-
law violations committed by Israel.
Sanctions serve as an educating force
– educating both Israelis and the international
community, and forcing Israelis
to take responsibility for what their
government is doing.
D. Different Forms of Sanctions
There are many different forms of sanctions.
Some may choose to distance
themselves from the Israeli economy
entirely and refuse any business contacts
with Israel, while others might opt
for a targeted boycott aimed at a short-
term goal.
Some sanctions, such as an academic
boycott, have a symbolic function.
Such sanctions have a powerful ability
to produce fruitful debate. The importance
of this debate is especially apparent
now, as the last attempt at an academic
boycott caused a flood of Israel
supporters trying to stifle all discussion
of the occupation.65 The call for an academic
boycott on Israeli universities
specifically targets
human-rights violations
committed by
these universities
(violations which
are too numerous to
list here). This call
protests the effective
academic siege
that Israel imposes on the Palestinian
universities by preventing Palestinian
scholars from visiting international
conferences, or sending and receiving
parcels.66
Israeli scholars cannot ignore an academic
boycott, and their social standing
in Israeli society may enable them to
alleviate the limitations on Palestinian
scholars, and influence public opinion.
Other sanctions are more directly
economic, such as a boycott of Israeli
agricultural products. These sanctions
are more likely to have a direct effect on
the Israeli government, which is deeply
influenced by the agricultural lobby.
Such sanctions are likely to encounter
massive opposition from Zionists.67
However, the need for such sanctions
remains. A boycott of Israeli products
will lead to scarcity in foreign currency
and to a slowing of military imports to
Israel. The boycott would also force Israel
to properly identify the goods originating
from the OPT.
Campaigns to pressure governments
to cease buying or selling arms to Israel
can also have important effects.
Although NGOs are becoming more
important in the international
arena,
governments still
control vast sums of
money and have a
strong incentive to
enforce international
law.68 International
reluctance to
buy Israeli arms or to sell arms to Israel
will encourage Israel to find non-violent
ways of dealing with the Palestinians.
back to top
Endnotes
(1) Makdisi, Saree, 2003, “The Israel Divestment
Campaign and the Question of Palestine in America,”
Palestine America, Vol. 102, no. 4, Fall 2003, p. 878.
(2) Definition by Merriam Webster. 2002, Fourth
Edition.
(3) Drezner, Daniel W. 1999, The Sanctions Paradox, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 11.
(4) Amnesty International, Iraq: People Come
First, http://web.amnesty.org/pages/irq-index-
eng, Bovard, James, 2004, “Iraqi Sanctions and
American Intentions: Blameless Carnage? Part 1,”
Freedom Daily, The Future of Freedom Foundation,
January 2004, http://www.fff.org/freedom/
fd0401c.asp.
(5) Barber, James, 1999, South Africa in the
Twentieth Century, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford
and Massachusetts, p. 161-256.
(6) For a detailed discussion of the capital owners
and businessmen who profited from Israeli
military policies throughout the years, see Bichler,
Shimshon and Nitzan, Jonathan, 2002, The Global
Political Economy of Israel, Pluto Press, London,
p. 108-136.
(7) Cortright, David and Lopez, George, 2000, Assessing
UN Strategies in the 1990s, Boulder, Colorado.
(8) DAC (Development Assistance Committee),
2001, The DAC Guidelines; Helping Prevent Violent
Conflict, Organisation for Co-operation and
Development (OECD).
(9) Shah, Babar, 2001, Changing Nature of UN
Sanctions, A Case Study of Afghanistan, http://
www.issi.org.pk/strategic_studies_htm/2001/
no_1/article/1a.htm.
(10) Makdisi, Saree, 2003, p. 890-891.
(11) Leibowitz, Shamai, 2005, “Israel: A Call for
Divestment,” The Nation, 3.16.05.
(12) Goodstein, Laurie, 2005, Threat to Divest Is
Church Tool in Israeli Fight, 6.8.05.
(13) The resolution was reprinted in Naber, Nadine,
2005, “Smear Tactics at U-M,” Against the Current,
Vol. 118, September/October 2005, p. 8-9.
(14) Pappe, Ilan, 2005, “To Boldly Go,” Guardian
Unlimited, 20.4.05.
(15) Traubman, Tamara, 2005, “British Professors
Work to Renew the Boycott on Israel,” Haaretz,
25.9.05.
(16) Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions
(ICAHD), 2005, A Statement of Sanctions,
5.6.05, and Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions
(ICAHD), 2005, Sanctions Against the
Israeli Occupation: It’s Time, June 2005.
(17) Badil, 2005, Palestinian Civil Society Calls
for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions against Israel
Until it Complies with International Law and
Universal Principles of Human Rights, http://
www.badil.org/Boycott-Statement.htm.
(18) Qumsiyeh, Mazin, 2006, “Boycott Israel,”
Global Agenda, January 2006. The
article is still available in http://www.w3.org/
TR/html4/loose.dtd, see also Moore, Matt, 2006,
“World Economic Forum Chief Apologizes After
Magazine Calls for Israel Boycott,” North County
Times, January 27th, 2006, http://www.nctimes.
com/articles/2006/01/28/business/news/20_
04_241_27_06.txt.
(19) Pape, Robert, 1997, “Why Economic Sanctions
Do Not Work?,” International Security, Vol.
22, no. 2, Fall 1997, p. 90-136.
(20) Levy, Philip L., 1999, Sanctions on South
Africa: What Did They Do?, Economic Growth
Center, Yale University, Discussion Paper No. 796,
February 1999, p. 2-14.
(21) Ynet, 2005, “Israel Rose to the 8th Place in Per
Capita World Exports,” Ynet, 8.11.05. See also Barzilai,
Amnon, 2004, “The Rebels and I,” Haaretz,
15.9.04.
(22) Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, various
years, http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/shnaton/
text_search_heb_new.html?CYear=2005&Vol=56&input=%e4%fa%e7%e9%e9%e1%e5%e9%e5%
fa+%ec%e7%e5%f5+%ec%e0%f8%f5. About foreign
aid to Israel, see Hever, Shir, 2005, Foreign
Aid to the Occupied Palestinian Territories and
Israel, The Alternative Information Center, February 2006.
(23) Klein, Zeev, 2005, “Israel’s External Debt in
the First Half of 2005 Was US $73.9 Billion – A
Reduction of 0.5%,” Globes, 7-8.9.05.
(24) Globes, 2005, “Fischer: “The Exchange Rate is
Great for Us; The Power of the Market Stems from
the Russian Immigration,” Globes, 14-15.9.05.
(25) ICBS, various years, and Zuriel-Harari, Keren,
2005, “Plan Growth Regardless of the Disengagement,”
Globes, 14-15.8.05.
(26) Deen, Thalif, 2002, “Israel Taxes Humanitarian
Aid to Palestinians - U.N.,” Common Dreams
News Center, 26.9.05, and Hever, Shir, 2006, Foreign
Aid to the OPT and Israel.
(27) ICBS, various years.
(28) Koren, Ora, 2004, “Exporters: Essential Turn
n Exports in 2004; Will Reach US $21.4 Billion,”
Haaretz, 4.5.04, Koren, Orna, 2004, “Embarrassment
in the CBI: Conflicting Data on Exports Increase
in First Quarter of 2004,” Haaretz, 19.5.04,
and Manor, Hadas, 2005, “Exports to the European
Union Increased by 11% at the Half Year,”
Globes, 14-15.8.05.
(29) Turner, Mandy, 2002, Arming the Occupation:
Israel and the Arms Trade, CAAT Report,
http://www.caat.org.uk/information/publications/
countries/israel-1002.php and Barzilai, Amnon,
2004, “The Rebels and I,” Haaretz, 15.9.04.
(30) Amit, Eitan, 2005, “Israel – The Biggest
Weapons Exporter in the World in 2004,” Globes,
31.8.05-1.9.05.
(31) Barzilai, Amnon, 2004, “The Exports Institute:
Security Companies Will Export US $4 Billion
By the End of the Decade,” Haaretz, 30.1.04, and
Turner, Mandy, 2002, Arming the Occupation:
Israel and the Arms Trade, CAAT Report, http://
www.caat.org.uk/information/publications/countries/
israel-1002.php.
(32) Solidarity With Israel, Timeline of Modern
Israeli History 1924-1964, http://www.solidaritywithisrael.
org/history/part2.cfm.
(33) Filk, Dani, 2004, “Israel Model 2000: Neo-
Liberal Post-Fordism,” in Ram, Uri and Filk, Dani
(eds), The Power of Property: Israeli Society in
the Global Age, Van-Leer Institute, Jerusalem, p.
16-33; and Shalev, Michael, 2004, “Did Globalization
and Liberalization ‘Normalize’ Israeli Political
Economy?,” ibid, p. 84-115.
(34) Solidarity With Israel, Timeline of Modern
Israeli History 1924-1964.
(35) Ibid.
(36) Hasi, Elyahu, 2005, “Saudi Arabia Is on Its
Way to Join the Trade Organization; The Boycott
on Israel Will Be Eased,” Globes, 11-12.9.05, and
Perri, Smadar, 2005, “Gulf-Principalities: We Will
Withdraw the Economic Boycott on Israel,” Globes,
25-26.9.05.
(37) Gillerman, Danny, 1993, p. 18-19.
(38) Levy, Philip L., 1999, p. 2-14.
(39) ICBS, 2005, Statistical Monthly, http://
www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/?MIval=cw_usr_view_
SHTML&ID=398.
(40) Ynet, 2005, “Israel Rose to the 8th Place in
Per Capita World Exports,” Ynet, 8.11.05. See also
Barzilai, Amnon, 2004, 15.9.04.
(41) Ynet, 2005, “Israel Rose to the 8th Place in Per
Capita World Exports,” Ynet, 8.11.05. Israel”s own
treasurer said in 2004 that the Israeli government
has all but lost control of the economy, and cannot
decide on a policy without considering its international
effects. Ynet, 8.11.05, and Cohen, Nitzan,
“Netanyahu in the Herzeliya convention: “governments
in the age of global economy no longer have
the freedom of action”, Haaretz, 15.12.04.
(42) Rodman, Kenneth A., 1994, “Public and Private
Sanctions Against South Africa,” Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. 109, No. 2, p. 314.
(43) ICBS, Statistical Yearbook, various years.
http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader.
(44) Ynet, 2005, 8.11.05.
(45) Bassok, Moti, 2005, “A Growth of 4.9% in the
First Half of 2005, an Increase of 8.6% in Goods
and Services Exports,” TheMarker, 17.8.05.
(46) Globes, 2006, “Have You Read Globes?,”
Globes, 19-20.1.06, Rosenblum, Irit, 2006, “Expectations:
Tourism Will Net US $4.4 Billion in
2006,” DeMarker, January 24th, 2006.
(47) Klein, Zeev, 2005, “The Per Capita Yield in Israel
– 25th Place in the World,” Globes, 19-20.9.05.
See more about Inequality in Israel in Hever, Shir,
2005, Divide and Conquer – Inequality and
Discrimination, Alternative Information Center,
September 2005.
(48) Hever, Shir, 2005, Foreign Aid to the OPT
and Israel, Alternative Information Center, February 2006.
(49) Clyde, R. Mark, 2002, “Israel: U.S Foreign
Assistance,” Issue Brief for Congress; Received
Through the CRS Web, October 17, 2002, Foreign
Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, pp. 1-8.
(50) Dagoni, Ran, 2005, “Worry That the Aid to
Israel Will Be Harmed in 2006-2007 by the Katrina
Damages,” Globes, 11-12.9.05. The estimates
are those of the IMF. See Ministry of Industry,
Trade & Labor, 2005, “April News,” http://www.
moit.gov.il/NR/exeres/80D8C7C7-04F9-423A-
BC51-B4F591AFA101.htm, and Dagoni, Ran, 2005,
“IMF sees 3.9% growth for Israel in 2006,” Globes
Online, 21.9.05, http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/
globes/docview.asp?did=1000014497&fid=1382.
(51) Dagoni, Ran, 2005, 11-12.9.05.
(52) Hever, Shir, 2005, The Settlements – Economic
Cost to Israel, Alternative Information Center,
July 2005.
(53) Cortright, David and Lopez, George, 2000.
(54) Makdisi, Saree, 2003, p. 880.
(55) Badil, 2005.
(56) Aix Group, 2004, Economic Roadmap; Israeli-
Palestinian Perspective on Permanent Status, January 2004, Aix en Provence in Jerusalem,
and Deen, Thalif, 2002.
(57) Sourani, Razi, 2004, Economic Consequences
as a Result of Israel’s Withdrawal from Gaza,
First Draft.
(58) Schiff, Zeev, 2005, “The Security Crisis with
the US Intensifies: US Demands Tightening Weapons
Export Controls and Escalates Sanctions,”
Haaretz, 12.6.05.
(59) DSEi Website, http://www.dsei.co.uk/exhibitor/
exhibitor-list.aspx, and Koren, Ora, 2005,
“An Israeli Company Offers Leg-Cuffs and an Electric
Shocker – and the British Close the Booth,”
TheMarker, 20.9.05.
(60) ICBS, 2004, Statistical Yearbook, http://
www1.cbs.gov.il/reader. See also Mattin Group,
2005, The Irregular Application of the EC-Israel
Association Agreement, the Heart of the Problem,
its Consequences and Risks, and a Good Solution,
brief for discussion.
(61) Mattin Group, 2005.
(62) ICBS, 2005, Household Expenditure Survey
2003, March 2005, Jerusalem.
(63) Ibid.
(64) For an analysis of the rise to power of Israel’s
wealthy and globalized elite, see Ram, Uri, 2005,
The Globalization of Israel, McWorld in Tel-Aviv,
McJihad in Jerusalem, Resling, Tel-Aviv.
(65) Makdisi, Saree, 2003, p. 881.
(66) Barghouti Omar, 2004, “Boycott as an Act
of Moral Resistance,” Counterpunch, 22.12.04,
http://www.counterpunch.org/barghouti12222004.
html.
(67) Oxfam Belgium has been forced to withdraw
its call for a boycott under pressure in 2003. See
The Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Antisemitism,
2003-2004, “Belgium,” http://www.tau.
ac.il/Anti-Semitism/asw2003-4/belgium.htm.
(68) Rodman, Kenneth A., 1994, “Public and
Private Sanctions Against South Africa,” Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 109, No. 2, p. 314.[2]
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