Moshe Dayan (Ha?aretz interview, July 31, 1963)

Ronen Shamir (Israeli researcher and ?expert? on Bedouin in the Naqab, 1996)

Throughout the Middle East, there have been conscious and calculated attempts by various governments to bring an end to the nomadic and semi-nomadic lifestyles of the Bedouin populations. The general trend is to integrate them into ?modern? society by settling them in a permanent location to become agriculturists or if possible work as wage labourers. In all such cases the state, who views forms of pastoralism as backward, uncivilised, difficult to monitor and control, and unproductive in terms of the level of contribution to the state economy, plays the decisive role in creating the policies which lead to their sedentarization. At the same time, as is the case with the State of Israel, the policy of sedentarization serves as an important role in fulfilling other state objectives.


In this particular case, the policies aimed at sedentarizing and transferring the Naqab Bedouin to planned townships (and then registering their lands as state property) is fuelled by the Zionist goal of, among others, Ben Gurion: ?We shall bloom the desolate land and convert the spacious Naqab into a source of force and power, a blessing to the State of Israel.? If not obvious, it should be noted that this Zionist aim of making the desert bloom is a policy that applies only to Israel?s Jewish population. In order for this aim to be realised, however, it was first necessary to dispossess the existing Bedouin population of their lands.


Unlike the Bedouin in other Middle Eastern countries, the Naqab Bedouin were almost fully sedentarized when the Israeli government began implementing its own sedentarization policies. Thus, as expressed by Ghazi Falah (1989) in his article ?Israeli State Policy Toward Bedouin Sedentarization in the Negev,? these programs were not, as they were elsewhere, aimed at settling a nomadic community but rather at the eviction of the Bedouin from their lands and the mass transfer of Bedouin to state planned and controlled townships. ?Involuntary resettlement and forced migration have become a characteristic of Israeli government policy toward the Bedouin, [especially] when the final results appear to have been voluntary? (Falah 1989).


The Naqab (Negev in Hebrew) has been viewed by Zionists as empty space, uninhabited and thirsty for Jewish development and ?land redemption.? The Bedouin, if acknowledged, are seen as a small obstacle to overcome, as expressed by Ariel Sharon, whilst Minister of Interior, after his visit to the Naqab: ?I believe we can find a solution with the Palestinians, but we are not clever enough. Look at the Negev, for example, it?s open ? it?s clear. It?s true that there are still some goats and sheep there, but I will deal with that? (Interview Channel 2, 4/9/98). And indeed Sharon and other Israeli institutions have been dealing with ?that.?


Today all of the ?open space? in the Naqab (i.e. every Dunam of land of the Bedouin) is controlled and monitored by various governmental ministries and agencies, particularly and most importantly the Green Patrol (the para-military enforcement agency in charge of protecting ?green areas?), to ensure that its ?environmental integrity? is not threatened. The ideology of environmentalism is used as a screen to hide the policies of ethnic cleansing which include mass transfer, house demolition, verbal abuse and threats, the wounding and killing of Bedouin, destruction of crops, the slaying and confiscation of their herds, and the creation of an overall situation where the Bedouin have been forced to live in constant fear. Today the indigenous Bedouin community, by far the most neglected segment of Israeli society, faces the threat of total cultural destruction and complete separation from their land.

At the beginning of the 20th century the Bedouin of the Naqab had already begun a process of sedentarization, engaging more in agriculture than mere grazing, farms were followed by Bedouin villages such as Jamama (near present day kibbutz Ruhama in the north Naqab) were founded. In 1947 it is estimated that roughly 65,000-95,000 Bedouin from 96 different tribes lived in the region. Contrary to popular Zionist belief, the Bedouin had established by this time an intricate system of land ownership, grazing rights, and water access. The movement of the Naqab Bedouin was usually concentrated within a 10-20 mile radius and much of the population was settled and engaged in agriculture.


Whilst there were many changes in Bedouin life since the beginning of Ottoman rule and throughout both that and British rule, fundamentally they were permitted to move freely, and their grazing and water rights were respected. Many Bedouin in fact reflect on these times with nostalgia: ?The British were good to us, they were the best government in the world. They were always true to their word, and we were at liberty to do as we liked...The whole country was ours then, and nobody bothered about permits for work...or even for the sale of animals? (Marx 1967).


During the 1948 war, everything changed dramatically for the Bedouin; their lives were engulfed by terror with the onset of the new Zionist state. The fighting forced the Bedouin to flee the region; those who remained were expelled to Jordan and Gaza. Entire tribes were left fragmented by the new cease-fire lines. Eleven tribes were systematically removed (between the area of Beer Sheva and the Gaza Strip) for ?security reasons,? and the nineteen remaining tribes were forced into a concentrated closed area known as ?Ezor HaSayig? in Hebrew, and "Montaga As-Siyaj" in Arabic. This area was declared as closed, enabling the military governor to impose strict controls on movement across its borders. The Bedouin were allowed to leave this zone only with special permits; Beer Sheva was closed for a number of years after 1948, and although there were different relationships with different tribes, it was not until the mid 1950s that all the Bedouin were able to travel to Beer Sheva on market day to sell and buy goods. As late as 1959, Bedouin were expelled to Jordan and Egypt, a policy that was stopped only after the intervention of the United Nations (Jiryis 1976).


By the end of 1951, only 11,000 Bedouin remained in the Naqab and were restricted to some 10% of the area previously occupied by them. Immediately after the war an Israeli military administration was imposed (which lasted until 1966) on all of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel and most of the Naqab was declared state land and a closed military zone.


During the military rule period, Israel?s record of intimidation, violence, and collective punishments against the Naqab Bedouin was bountiful. According to Ghazi Falah in his article, ?The Spatial Pattern of Bedouin Sedentarization in Israel? (1984), there have been several cases of massacres and expulsion of Bedouin after the establishment of the state. Furthermore, it is argued that, ?more than any other group, the Naqab Bedouin suffered the full and unrestrained harshness of military rule? (Jiryis 1976). Nonetheless, as will be shown below, the Bedouin today say that even the previous military government was less damaging and threatening than the policies implemented through the actions of the Green Patrol today.


The official Zionist narrative, however, does not include the relationship, which existed between the Bedouin and their land and furthermore emphasises the rootless character of the Bedouin?s attitude toward to the land. ?One aspect of this official story emphasises the emptiness of the Naqab, while another aspect discovers the Bedouin nomads as part of nature. Both aspects ultimately converge into a single trajectory: an empty space that awaits Jewish liberation, and a nomadic culture that awaits civilisation? (Shamir 1996). The vision of the empty desert is so only because the state emptied it, though this fact is certainly not part of the Zionist belief system. In fact, the Zionist version which insists that the Naqab was empty and uninhabited easily created the following laws and regulations of land confiscation and dispossession.


The most dangerous aspect of the land expropriation following the initial wave of expulsion is that it was (and continues to be) done through legal channels and is therefore an ?acceptable? and ?modern? way of cleansing the space in the Naqab. In 1950, the Transfer of Property Law made the government custodian over the property of ?absentee owners.? Then, in 1953 under the Land Acquisition Law, which was modelled after the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 and which did not officially recognise Bedouin landholdings, the state of Israel expropriated 93 percent of the Naqab (Jakubowska 1992). It is important to note that it was only after the creation of the state of Israel that the old Ottoman land categories became powerful and effective means for expropriating land. No compensation was offered for these confiscated lands, as the land was required for ?positive development needs.? Consequently, thousands of Bedouin who were not occupying their lands ? as a direct result of their forced transfer to the reservation ? lost all of their rights (legally! and 'justly'!) to their land. In the meantime, the lands became a new home for the Jewish agricultural settlements. It is also important to note that as these new Jewish Kibbutzim and Moshavim emerged, the Naqab Bedouin were not permitted to work as labourers in these new settlements during the first decade of the State of Israel, for the jobs were reserved for the new Jewish immigrants (Marx 1967).


After the acquisition of Bedouin land in the Naqab and at the end of the military rule in 1966, some Bedouin attempted to reclaim or return to their lands. According to Falah (1987), the Bedouin used the following four arguments as proof of their ownership of the land: (1) that they worked and cultivated the lands for a long period and were in possession of official tax as well as traditional documents; (2) the Turkish government purchased approximately 2,000 dunams from the ?Azazmah tribe in 1900 to build the town of Beer Sheva, thereby proving the Bedouin claims to the land; (3) the fact that the Israeli authorities recognised the purchasing claims of individual Jews in the Naqab before 1948; and (4) that the Israeli authorities recognise Bedouin land ownership, but only when they agree to sell it to the state.


In 1976 the Rabin-led Labour government attempted to work out a deal with the Bedouin which amounted to, in their opinion, nothing less than ?aggravated robbery? (Jerusalem Post 1978). The deal was that the government would recognise 12.5 percent of their land claims and agree to pay compensation for the remaining land which would be shifted to the full control of the state. The remaining 50 percent would be expropriated (Jerusalem Post 1978). The 1977 election of the Likud government stopped indefinitely these negotiations. Though the Bedouin continue to struggle through various legal channels to regain their right to the land, no Bedouin has ever won a land claim to any of the 3,000 lawsuits filed over the past two decades (Kelley 1998). In an interview with journalist Gideon Eshet (1979), Israel Land Administration official Amos Muqadi detailed Israel?s intent: ?The policy aims to sever the ties between the Bedouin and the land, and... every legal means available is utilised to this end.?


Another major land confiscation occurred in 1980. Due to the ever-increasing military needs of Israel, the Israeli Army insisted on establishing new airfields and military bases in the Naqab to replace those which were closed in the Sinai after the signing of the peace treaty with Egypt. The Law of Requisition of Lands conveniently authorised the expropriation of 82,000 dunams of land in the Bedouin Naqab Reserve. The Association for the Support and Defence of Bedouin Rights in Israel also points out that the compensation offered for these lands is estimated to be 2-15% of that given to the Jewish settlers removed from the Sinai during the same period. Furthermore, the above stated land denied the Bedouin the right of appeal in the court system.


Today the Bedouin in Israel constitute approximately 12 percent of the Palestinian Arab population in Israel. About 140,000 are residing in the Naqab and about 35,000 in the Galilee. The policies of Israel directed toward the Bedouin (in both regions), designed to eradicate potential political collectively thereby nullifying the Bedouin as a ?security threat? to the state, have consequently, as explained below, opened a floodgate of social, economic, and cultural ills.

The first stage of the Israeli sedentarization policy described above explained the transfer of the Bedouin population to reservations in the northern Naqab. The second phase, which continues today, consists of the forced transfer and relocation of the Bedouin to planned townships. The reasons given for the transfer to reservations were for security concerns; the transfer to townships has been under the guiding principle of sedentarizing the population in a ?civilised,? ?organised,? and ?modern? fashion so that the state can better provide them the necessary services. Nonetheless, this second phase of sedentarization is led by the same Zionist goal: the dispossession of the Bedouin. It is furthermore upheld by false and misleading environmental rhetoric, which claims that the desert must be free of (only Bedouin!) human inhabitants as the only way to ensure the environmental integrity of the region. Of course Jewish settlement is promoted and encouraged and somehow never responsible for excessive resource consumption or environmental degradation, despite the fact that the Jewish Moshavim and Kibbutzim consume more than twice as much water, for example, in high-tech industrial agricultural schemes than that of the Bedouin who are mostly engaged in low-tech, low-resource use agriculture methods. Furthermore, it was revealed in an interview with Doron Akiva, a ranger for the Nature and National Parks Protection Authority who patrols the Naqab, that the rangers, including those working for the Green Patrol, have no ?environmental? power or power otherwise to stop or influence Jewish growth in the Naqab. That is, they hold supreme authority to cleanse the desert of Bedouin (for environmental purposes!) but hold no influence in the decision-making process to construct new Jewish settlements.


The policies of planned townships began to be implemented in the late 1960s. Thus far seven of these ?development towns,? located in the north of the Naqab near Beer Sheva, have been created by the government: Tel Sheva, Rahat, Segev Shalom, Aroer, Ksaifa, Lagiya, and Hura. Ironically, after the end of military rule, most of the Bedouin had organised themselves (spontaneously) into various community settlements in the areas in which they were confined. Nonetheless, this was viewed as a threat to future Jewish development; therefore, the state insisted upon resettling them elsewhere. According to the Association for the Support and Defence of Bedouin Rights in Israel, ?Israel is the only country [in the Middle East] that has developed a one-track urbanisation program. The Israeli-planned urban townships have no provision for maintaining livestock or engaging in agriculture and [further represent] the complete destruction of the traditional Bedouin lifestyle. In addition, they do not offer the Bedouin any alternative basis. None of the townships provide any source of employment...?


Furthermore, the land, though allocated to the Bedouin, is still considered by law to belong to the Jews and therefore, by law, cannot be given by them to another non-Jewish group, namely Palestinian Arabs. The Bedouin therefore are merely afforded the right to lease the land for extended periods. The Bedouin have had no voice in the design of these townships, nor, in the majority of cases, did they initially have the privilege of political leadership. Until 2000 five of the seven towns were unable to elect their own mayors and indeed had Jewish appointees of the Israeli government ?because, says the government, the Bedouin are incapable of governing themselves in a modern way? (Kelley 1998). This has, however, been rectified and at last the citizens in these towns are allowed the privilege to elect their own town leaders.


All of the planned townships (developed on land confiscated from the Bedouin) have resulted in failure. Unemployment is rampant and there is a severe lack of basic infrastructure and many areas of the townships lack basic services; indeed until the early 1980s the industrial area of Rahat was not connected to the electricity system. In addition Rahat is the only township with a bank. According to the former mayor of Rahat, Juma?a Al-Qsasi, ?Rahat - which serves two and a half time as many people as the Jewish town of Ofakim - gets less than half the Jewish settlement?s budget? (Kelley 1998). The statistics speak for themselves, of the seven planned townships six are the six poorest towns in Israel whist the seventh (Rahat) is still within the twenty poorest towns.


Moreover, accustomed to the spaciousness of open tents and endless desert views, the Bedouin have been left suffocating in cement dwelling with few windows, deprived of their privacy, their dignity, and their known way of life. They cannot keep their herds, for there is no space; and women in particular feel invaded by the close proximity of other families. According to Kelley (1998), ?Even by 1988, in a survey of 160 families in Rahat (widely considered by Israeli administrators to be the most successful of the seven Bedouin towns) all but five families stated that they would leave [and return to their lands] if they had the option.? Understandably, after twenty-some years of the state?s transfer attempts, nearly half of the Bedouin population of the Naqab has resisted being uprooted from their land (Shamir 1996).


In addition to the issue of space the change in lifestyle has had serious impacts on the society. Women who previously had an important role within the family, notably tending to the herds, a key aspect of Bedouin income and living, no longer have any role. As they are unable to go out to work they are stuck inside the home for the majority of the time. The young people of the towns have also suffered. Due to the lack of facilities, employment opportunities (Ksaifa, for example has an unemployment rate of 22%, the highest in Israel [Arab Association for Human Rights]) and severance with traditional ties of Bedouin lifestyle, coupled with the economic situation, the youth have often turned to crime and drug usage and festered a sense of disassociation from society in general, a very dangerous situation to be in. It is common when in the unrecognised villages, to hear the inhabitants state that one of the reasons they will not move to these townships is due to the fact that they wish for their children to maintain a tradition of responsibility alongside an understanding of their community. They feel that with the existence of this erosion of traditional values within these towns it would be an injustice to their children to relocate to the settlement towns.


In the meantime, the Israeli government (beginning with Labour and continuing today) developed a policy of encouraging Jewish settlement in the Naqab, viewing it as the next stage of Jewish growth and development. In 1976, as reported by the Association for the Support and Defence of Bedouin Rights in Israel, the government developed a Master Plan which placed priority on Jewish settlement in the Naqab, including an industrial development zone which would absorb most of the Bedouin reservation, an airport in the middle of a heavily-populated Bedouin region, and 100 new Jewish settlements based on intensive and high-tech agriculture. Thus, the Zionist vision was to be completed: the Naqab, though theoretically empty before 1948, was in fact to be truly empty, and the new Jewish settlements could be cheaply built by the concentrated and exploited labour of the Bedouin. The new Jewish settlements and Bedouin townships, developed during the same period, share nothing in terms of resource allocation, economy, and services.


Because the Zionist vision could not be complete in the absence of a total transfer of Bedouin to these townships, in the 1980s the Israeli government began to implement the 1965 Law of Planning and Construction as a means of preventing the expansion of the ?unrecognised? villages of the Bedouin. This law requires that one receives a permit to build or modify any structure, and these permits are only given in the various planned townships. It furthermore provides a provision that any house constructed without a permit can be demolished under the law; thus ?all houses built by Bedouin are regarded as illegal and remain subject to demolition, whether they are built on state or private land? (Falah 1987). According to the 1986 Markovitz government report, there were approximately 6,000 such houses in the Naqab. That figure has obviously increased in the intervening years, alongside the natural increase in Bedouin population. Today it can safely be declared that 70 000 people are living in the Naqab under

The government sues hundreds of Bedouin each year for building illegally; upon conviction of building without a permit, the Bedouin are then ordered to demolish their own houses. If they do not obey the orders, they risk heavy fines and possible imprisonment. The government will then demolish the house and charge the homeowner for the costs. Over and over again the court judges uphold all house demolition orders stating that invasion of the ?open space? and of the state land cannot be tolerated under any circumstances; thus, in the eyes of the court, ?Bedouin can either become invaders and subversive lawbreakers, or...nomads who wish to be civilised by responding to ?state requests?? (Shamir 1996). The Bedouin are trapped: under the above stated law they are turned into criminals invading the open space and state lands, yet the original lands from which they were deported have been appropriated; they are denied the possibility of developing the existing lands in their possession, and their refusal to move to the planned townships again turn them into lawbreaking citizens challenging the order and authority of the state.


Whilst the government has been implementing the policy of forcing the Bedouins into concentrated townships it has been simultaneously encouraging Jewish settlement to the Naqab. A complicated system of tax breaks has been implemented to both encourage settlement to the area and support the poorer Jewish towns in the region, such as Ofaqim and Dimona, in order to maintain their economic situation and thus their population. A general tax break for the whole of the Naqab was offered from July 2001. In July 2003 this was reduced, due to the economic situation in Israel, and now only covers certain cities/areas within the Naqab. Only during the brief period when all of the Naqab received a cut did all the Bedouin benefit. After the reduction only two of the seven recognised Bedouin settlement towns received these tax breaks, these are Tel Sheva and Aroer. The others five, despite being poorer than their neighbouring Jewish towns, and amongst the poorest towns in the whole of Israel, do not receive tax breaks whilst the Jewish towns of Netivot, Ofaqim and Dimona, to name a few, have retained their tax benefit. This shows that this tax break is not related to the economic situation of the towns but a strategic instrument in securing and encouraging Jewish settlement to the Naqab.

Not only do various laws and regulations keep the Zionist vision of cleansing the desert alive, but also the ever-present and engulfing para-military group, the Green Patrol, does more than its share in what they describe as protecting the nature. In practice, however, the Green Patrol has less to do with safeguarding the flora and fauna and more to do with expelling, intimidating, harassing, and policing the Bedouin. The sophisticated and dangerous aspect about the seemingly limitless power of this agency is that it operates (in all of Israel) under the banner of conserving the environmental welfare of Israel?s greatest treasures. As a result of this myth of its operational function, the Green Patrol receives full support and encouragement from of course all Israeli governments, ministries, and the general population. The Green Patrol is therefore successfully able not only to terrorise the Bedouin, but to also facilitate the process of ethnic cleansing in the Naqab.


The Green Patrol was established in 1976 with the aim of controlling and protecting the state lands from invaders. It acts through a co-ordinating committee with the Israeli Army, the Israeli Lands Authority ?who together own 93% of the state lands ? and a number of governmental ministries, including the interior ministry and the ministry of security. As explained in a brochure published by the then-called Nature Reserve Authority, the Green Patrol was established to take control of and defend the open areas. Translation: to control and aid in the transfer of the Bedouin in the Naqab.


A short look at the budget of the Green Patrol, who as stated ?acts on behalf of the Nature Reserve Authority and in full co-ordination with the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund,? should leave no doubt that it is first and foremost a Zionist para-military agency designed to enforce ethnic cleansing in the Naqab and not a guard in defence of nature. The largest budget allocation stems from the Ministry of Security, 24.28%; followed by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Water Authority; and next the Jewish National Fund (JNF), the Jewish Agency and the Ministry of Interior. Note: the main purpose of the quasi-state organisation, the JNF, is to acquire land rights for the purpose of settling Jews; their lands cannot be leased to non-Jews.


Since the time of its establishment, the Green Patrol has roamed freely in the Naqab ordering house demolitions, confiscating herds, harassing and threatening the Bedouin, and simply acting as constant reminders to the Bedouin that their lives are in danger in the Jewish open space. According to one Bedouin man, Salman Abu Jlidan, from the Azazmah tribe, ?We call the Green Patrol the black patrol. From its establishment until now they have strangled us. Its purpose is to remove us from the land, to kill our herds, and to finish our way of life... They employ all of the ways to move us; they even kill our children.?


Nuri al-Okbi, director of the Association for the Support and Defence of Bedouin Rights in Israel, points out that it is not the first time that Bedouin have been killed by the ?protectors of nature:? ?The Green Patrol simply replaced the military government, except that it is more violent and terrorist-oriented. A notable instance occurred in 1980, when the Green Patrol and the police (with whom they work in full co-operation) erected a roadblock. A car driven by a Bedouin returning from Beer Sheva saw the barrier and decided to turn around to avoid confrontation. The Patrol shot at the car, killing the mother of a two month old child sitting nearby.? (Many similar stories have been documented which unveil the ruthlessness of the Patrol. One such case is that of a Bedouin man who was said to have been stealing in the supermarket. Then head of the Patrol, Alon Galeeli, was called and came with a rifle to the market and shot him dead.) How either of these two incidents reflect the defence of nature is difficult to imagine. When asked if the Green Patrol does indeed have any environmental ethics, most Bedouin laugh and then explain, correctly so, that they are the Bedouin, they are the nature, and that they can protect themselves. Nuri al-Okbi reiterated his answer to this question in 2003 with a simple and succinct ?No!? due to all the above reasons.


Nuri and Salman also expressed the destructive nature of the Green Patrol when they routinely confiscate their herds (mainly goats, sheep, and less frequently camels). The Green Patrol is responsible for ensuring that Bedouin do not have any head of herd more than they are allotted, according to limits established by a co-ordinating committee of various Israeli ministries. Salman explained that in 1981 they confiscated 235 of his goats (all of which were black goats and described by the Green Patrol as the plague which swept over Israel destroying the lands). In return, he was given 10 NIS for each goat (about $2.50 or the price of a chicken) - nine years later. Seven years ago the Patrol confiscated another 37 heads of his herd and forced him to sign documents in Hebrew which he could not read. When he went to reclaim his herds, they were sold in front of him to a man in Hebron. Furthermore, if or when the Patrol returns the herds, the fine to get them out of the holding tank is sometimes more expensive than the herd itself. The continual confiscation of herds along with the payment of large fines has resulted in the Bedouin financing the terror and injustice, which the Green Patrol imposes upon their very existence.


The Green Patrol in fact boasts of their successes. According to official statistic between 1976 and 1986 the Green Patrol filed 750 lawsuits against (what they have termed) invaders; returned 350,000 dunams to the JNF; removed invaders from over 3,000,000 dunams and returned the land to the state; limited the quantity of goat herds from 200,000 to 70,000; filed 4,600 lawsuits for violating the law of agricultural settlement; and filed 1000 lawsuits against illegal building. They furthermore admit that there were only 14 complaints issued against them; however, 12 of the files were closed and of the remaining two, the Green Patrol was found not in violation of any law.


Other acts against the Bedouin include the spraying of toxic chemicals on their fields and in the places of Bedouin habitation. This act in and of itself contradicts the Green Patrol?s ?protection of nature? raison d?etre, as toxic chemicals greatly endanger and do not defend natural ecosystems.? In February, 2003, as in the season before it, three airplanes sprayed the crops and killed a large number of dunams of wheat. Previously the Green Patrol destroyed the Bedouin lands with tractors to destroy the ground. These intensified measures do not have only the same effect of destroying crops and livelihood, but now poison the soil and cause respiratory and other medical problems for the local population. In 2002 in Tel Sheva (one of the seven settlement towns), during a three month period, nearly thirty women miscarried within the first three months of pregnancy. Nuri Al-Okbi believes that this is a direct result of the chemicals used in the close proximity to the town. This would seem a very strange course of action, indeed, for a body dedicated to the protection of the environment, if it were not known that obviously the protection of the environment is far from the priorities of the Green Patrol. Nuri al-Okbi proclaims that this government violence has surpassed all limits, he describes the treatment of the Bedouins, citizens of Israel, as treated as if they are state enemies.


In recent years the Green Patrol has increased the numbers of demolitions dramatically. Issuing eviction orders to entire villages at a time and spraying increasingly larger amounts of farmland. In 2002 there were 23 cases of building demolition in the Naqab, by early September 2003 there were already 53 demolition clocked up (Council for the unrecognised villages in the Negev). The majority of these demolitions are homes but the figures include shops and even a Mosque. Eviction orders to entire villages, such as Wadi Na?am have been handed out over the summer of 2003 and the numbers of demolitions are expected to increase at an expedited rate.


Perhaps if there is any credibility at all to the Green Patrol?s mandate of ?protecting the environment,? the fundamental conflict between the Patrol (and most Israeli environmentalists) and the Bedouin stems from the fact that the Bedouin, as the historical keepers and true protectors of the Naqab, cannot imagine protecting a land without people; whereas, the Israeli environmental ethic (if this situation can so be termed) is one of old-school conservationists which fences a particular area, seals it from human habitation and renders its sole purpose as a tourist attraction. And indeed, the Israeli pattern of high-tech industrial development needs very much to concern itself with environmental protection, though its real battle in terms of saving its environment should be waged against the high and increasing level of Israeli consumption; corporate control over the land to use, abuse, and exploit resources at an non-renewable rate; the production of deadly and highly-dangerous nuclear weapons in Dimona; the overflowing and poisonous landfills which threaten the integrity of the limited supply of groundwater; the unprecedented rate of settlement expansion which destroys the forest and consume yet more and more resources; the continued expansion of military zones, weaponry, and all of the toxic waste affiliated with the military institution; and the general overall unsustainable growth of the economy which remains dependent upon non-renewable resources to fuel it.


If indeed, protecting the nature in the Naqab was foremost in both Israeli Government and the Green Patrol?s agenda then the situation of Ramat Hovav would have to be questioned. Ramat Hovav is a Hazardous Chemical Waste Disposal Unit located south of Beer Sheva. Its activities have resulted is concern form Green Peace, and its practices have led to serious illness for both the Bedouin living in the region and their herd, not to mention the effect on the local flora. Bedouins from the El-Azazme tribe, living in Wadi Na?am, close to where Ramat Hovav has been built, have had significant problems with sickness, notably vomiting and headaches, since the establishment of Ramat Hovav.


If the Green Patrol were truly concerned about environmental degradation, they should focus their attention on the above-mentioned environmental catastrophes. Instead, the sole purpose of the Green Patrol is to instil fear in the Bedouin and ensure their immediate transfer from the Naqab. It is clear that the protection of nature stands only as a smokescreen to further dispossess the Bedouin.

Another key and subtler way in which the government is forcing the Bedouin to relocate from the unrecognised villages to the Bedouin settlement towns is through denial of water resources. Water points are rare in the Naqab, and the Israeli Water Company (IWC) controls those that do exist. Wells not controlled by the IWC are routinely destroyed, resulting in the only obtainable water sources for the Bedouin being unhygienic and insufficient plastic containers, hooked up to water points far from their places of residence. In the village of Wadi Na?am, for example, there is only one water pipe, provided by the IWC, to supply 2 000 people. Whilst their Jewish neighbours benefit from subsidised water rates for agriculture and plentiful supplies to fill swimming pools and irrigate lawns (amounts large enough to cultivate European looking settlements within the dessert), the Bedouins are forced to rely on small sources which are either illegal or expensive. In addition, when they are allocated water they are given no agricultural quotas and are charged according to domestic rates, which are twelve times the agricultural rates the Jewish farmers are charged. Thus, whilst the Jewish neighbourhood of Omer uses 151 cubic metres of water per day the unrecognised villages average 24 cubic metres (Survey: Ministry of Health Southern Region, 1999, p.5). The aim of this policy is to force the Bedouin to concede their attempts to continue life in the desert and resign themselves to life in one of the seven recognised towns.

The Sharon Plan indicates intensified plans to colonise the south, through the governments intensions to build thirty new Jewish settlements, most of which will be situated in the Naqab. This plan to Juadify the Naqab has led to enhanced policies against the Bedouin inhabitants there, both physical and more worryingly through the law.


Leading the enhanced legal assault on the inhabitants in the south comes an amendment to the Expulsion of Intruders Law. The original law, first enacted in 1981, was designed to permit the expulsion of ?illegal? inhabitants from ?public land? and the demolition of homes built on these lands without permits. The amendment passed its first reading in November 2002, but due to the change of government did not come into force until June 2003 (it?s still not in force, it only passed first reading).


The primary target of this amendment is the Palestinian Bedouins in the Naqab living in unrecognised villages. Its objective is to remove ?cumbersome? bureaucratic obstacles and to facilitate speedier process of expulsions and house demolitions. The amendment concentrates great power in the hands of ILA including powers of inspection, the issuing of expulsion orders and carrying out of demolition orders. The amendment fails to secure any proper governmental overview for the operations of the ILA, and secures highly limited jurisdictional protection.

The suggested amendment of the law also provides authority for the ILA to issue demolition orders for houses on ?public lands? if they are unable to locate the owners. This replaces prior obligations to pursue such actions following delivery of the expulsion or demolition order to the affected persons. This opens up the very real possibility of the issuance of expulsion and demolition orders which cannot be contested as the intended recipient is unaware of their existence. The suggested amendment of the law also adds penalties for trespassing, which provides for up to 6 months imprisonment for whoever builds on state land and 2 years imprisonment for continuing to live on state land after a demolition has been carried out.


While the amended Expulsion of Intruders Law is in theory at least non discriminatory, it has never been applied within Jewish settlements, where illegal building on state land usually relates to the expansion of existing settlements. The iniquitous application of the law is guaranteed to be used singularly against the Bedouin inhabitants of the Naqab. The governmental decision allocates the budgets for the different bodies involved in the application of the law, and has been explicitly presented as a general plan of handling the issue of the Bedouins in the Naqab in a more efficient manner. The programme budget is about 1.1 million dollars, with a large part of the money being earmarked specifically for dealing with the Bedouins of the Naqab.


In April 2003, the government issued a decision designed to ?encourage the dispersion of the Bedouin in the Naqab into permanent townships, through improving services and infrastructures in the recognised villages, and correspondingly, strictly protecting the state?s rights in the Naqab lands and increasing enforcement of the law.? This attempt to mask the Israeli government?s intention to corral the Bedouin of the Naqab into the townships-cum-slums as concern for the welfare of the inhabitants of the Naqab should be treated sceptically. The governmental decision clearly negatively impacts on the lives of the Naqab Bedouin in a number of significant ways.

The program includes insufficient budgets for development in local councils, infrastructure, education, health, transportation and industry. Based on past experience, the seven new Naqab towns will reproduce the impoverished conditions found in the seven existing townships created by Israel for the Bedouin in the Naqab.


Thirty ranches for individual farmers are to be established in the Naqab, between Kibbutz Tlalim and Mitzpe Ramon. In the lands from which the Bedouin will have been 'cleared'. The plan was prepared by the Ramat Hanegev Regional Council and has been authorized by the Minister of Agriculture. The ranches, which will be established after the national master plan is officially changed, will grow olives and grapes. The Adam Teva Vedin (Mankind, Nature and Justice) environmental organization objects to the plan, claiming it will result in a broad distribution of small settlements.


On 18th January 2004 the Physical elements of the plan began to appear with the caravans of Givot Bar. Overnight between fifteen and twenty caravans were placed on land belonging to the Al-Okbi tribe, close to the Bedouin town of Rahat. The plan for the new settlement was started eighteen months prior to the event and the final decision was taken on the 18th of January. The Government officially recognized the settlement on the 19th January.


The future for the Bedouins in the Negev does not look good. The loss of land, the destruction of houses, the end of a traditional way of life and the commencement of life within a ghetto rife with social and economical ills is what the government is promising for the Bedouins in their plan to ?resolve the Bedouin issue.?


The Bedouin community is a part of the Palestinian people and share with it the fate of expulsion and harassment by the Zionist enterprise from its lands. The ongoing ethnic cleansing of the Negev is just the last chapter in a story that began with the creation of the State of Israel in 1948.

? The Alternative Information Center