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News from Within Vol. XXI
No. 6
September/October 2005
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Women Under Occupation:
Paths Of Resistance
a publication of
The Alternative Information Center
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Magazine |
click to enlarge
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| language |
English |
| pages |
40
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| editors: |
Bryan Atinsky, Nassar Ibrahim |
| covers |
front
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volume number
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XXI, No.6 September / October 2005
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price / subscribe
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5 NIS per copy / subscribe
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Issue Contents:
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- Trafficking in Women in Israel: The Problem and the Solution by Lisa Richlen
- Five Women of Palestine by Nassar Ibrahim
- Born of Challenge and Steadfastness by Issam ?Abd al-Hadi
- Sudan and the Conflict in Darfur by Yaqub Hilal
- Everybody Must Get Stoned: International Activists in Hebron by Joe Carr
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Letter to Internationals from the Jewish Settlers in Hebron by Noam Arnon and David Wilder
- The 1929 Hebron Massacre Revisited: A Reply to the Settlers
by Diane Roe
- The Economy of the Occupation: Divide and Conquer?Inequality
and Discrimination
by Shir Heve
- COLUMN: Michael Warschawski
Two Women?One Voice
- Hope and Disenchantment in Rafahby Ben Granby
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Two months have passed since the removal of the Jewish settlements and redeployment of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip. Yet, the Israeli occupation of Gaza is far from over. Since the ?disengagement,? the movement of Palestinian citizens and goods through both the Egyptian and Israeli borders has continued to be controlled by the Israeli authorities, and traffic has been almost totally halted. The Gaza Community Mental Health Programme contends that hundreds of Palestinian citizens have been stuck for several weeks on the Egyptian side of the Rafah crossing and have been forced to sleep at the border without basic facilities. Gaza has become little more than an immense de facto prison for 1.4 million Palestinians. The situation has become so noticeable that James Wolfensohn, acting as envoy for the Quartet, has criticized Israel?s refusal to relinquish its control over borders. In response, the Israeli government has negotiated a deal with Egyptian authorities to open the Rafah border crossing for civilian traffic by the end of November, with joint control by the Egyptians and Palestinians. Nevertheless, the transport of all Palestinian goods to and from Gaza will continue to be controlled by Israeli authorities at a new terminal built on the Israeli-Egyptian border.
Meanwhile, the Israeli government and military?s main focus of operations has shifted to the occupied West Bank. During the month of September, Israeli forces arrested hundreds of Palestinians and continued their ongoing policy of assassinations, including the 29 September killing of Samar Sa?adi, head of the Jenin branch of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. Significantly, following the death of Sa?adi, Zachariah Zbeidi, the Brigade?s commander in the northern region, called for an end to the their several month long cease-fire (?Calling the Shots in Jenin? by Max Watson, News from Within Vol. XXI, No.3, 4-7). The Martyrs Brigade then took responsibility for the 16 October drive-by killing of three Jewish settlers in the Gush Etzion settlements. This attack has been used by the Israeli authorities to initiate closures throughout the West Bank and to formally disallow Palestinian licensed vehicles use of the settlement road system. It looks at present that this cycle of violence has been shifted into a higher gear, with the killing of Islamic Jihad militant Luay Sa?adi, leading to the retaliatory bombing of the market in Hadera, with 50 wounded and five dead. Interestingly, Ha?aretz correspondent Danny Rubenstein points out the Israeli authorities? frequent tendency to ?exaggerate the importance of the person targeted? as being a ?senior figure? of such and such militant organization in order to gain legitimacy for the attack (?Justification for a Terror Attack,? 27 October).
At present, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz has cynically used the market bombing as an excuse for Israel?s ?return? to a policy of ?targeted killings,? though it has, in fact, never stopped. And, while the Israeli government maintains that the assassination policy has been implemented with the purpose of reducing attacks against Israeli targets, even senior correspondents in the establishment media are aware of the faultiness of this justification. Nahum Barnea, the senior political analyst for Yedioth Ahronoth, Israel?s largest circulation daily, states that in response to increased assassinations of Palestinian targets by the Israeli military, ?in the immediate term, the number of attacks might well rise: as we learned Wednesday at the Hadera market, Islamic Jihad knows how to exact revenge.? While Barnea does hold that there is a chance for a mid term reduction in attacks, he admits that ?in the long term, however, targeted assassinations won?t change much. [...] A new generation of terrorists will replace assassinated ones, no less murderous than its predecessors.? (?Lessons of Hadera,? 27 October).
Moreover, as Palestinian farmers continue to be squeezed economically, the situation is likely to become more volatile. The month of October, which marks the beginning of the olive harvest, is a crucial time for Palestinian farmers in the occupied West Bank. Farmers tend to rely on the olive tree as a staple crop, with one quarter of the Palestinian agricultural sector dedicated to olive production.2 This year?s olive harvest, however, will be more difficult to complete and will likely result in a smaller than usual yield, according to the Israeli human rights organization B?Tselem. This is due to several factors, including large-scale damage to olive groves by Israeli authorities during construction of the Segregation Wall, and the severe restrictions on Palestinian farmers? access to their groves to the west of the Wall and near illegal Jewish settlements and outposts, making routine maintenance throughout the year a near impossibility. While the Israeli military maintains that the restrictions on the Palestinian farmers are an essential security issue implemented to protect the settlers, the Israeli courts have been critical of this justification. According to B?Tselem, Israel Supreme Court Justice Dorit Beinisch stated that the government?s response to the court ?did not provide any evidential basis attesting to its claim of a connection between the closure of the territory and potential attacks against Jewish settlements and illegal outposts in the area.?1
Israel has evacuated the Gaza settlements, but it is continuing to consolidate its control over the Palestinian population? impeding movement both in and out of Gaza and within the Bank West, maintaining a policy of assassi-nations, and suffocating the economy. While the world now looks to Gaza and Mahmoud Abbas with expectant eyes, the Occupation quietly tightens its hold.
Notes:
[1] B'Tselem - The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories
[2] CAABU :: The Council for Arab-British Understanding
The Disengagement Plan: The Subtle Continuation of the Occupation
Dr. Majed Nassar |
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Consecutive Israeli governments recognized they had no interest in keeping Gaza and its Palestinian population under direct control, especially in the post-Oslo era. The atmosphere was ripe, d?tente was at its peak and Rabin, Peres and Arafat had won the Nobel Peace Prize. The question that we should therefore be asking is: Why didn?t Israel withdraw from Gaza and evacuate the settlements in the period between 1995 and September 2000?
In fact, after the signing of the Oslo agreements, Israel continued tightening its grip over the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), particularly in Jerusalem and the West Bank. In 1996, when Netanyahu became the Prime Minister of Israel, a new strategy for the Middle East was drawn up in Washington by the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. The Institute set up a study group on ?A New Israeli Strategy Toward 2000.? The group prepared a significant report entitled ?A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm.? Some of the authors are presently or have been advisors of US President George W. Bush. Among them are Richard Perle, Douglas Feith and David Wurmser. This report contains some interesting points:
- The Israeli Government under Netanyahu was advised to back away from the concept of ?comprehensive peace? with its neighbors. A new approach to peace was presented, in which the ?land for peace? formula?perceived by many as placing Israel in the position of cultural, economic, political, diplomatic and military retreat?should be changed into ?peace for peace,? and ?peace through strength and self-reliance? formulas.
- Israel was advised to ?change the nature of its relation with the Palestinians, including ?the right of hot pursuit? for self-defense into all Palestinian areas and nurturing alternatives to Arafat.?
- ?We in Israel cannot play innocents abroad in a world that is not innocent. Peace depends on the character and behavior of our foes. We live in a dangerous neighborhood, with fragile states and bitter rivalries. Displaying moral ambivalence between the effort to build a Jewish state and the desire to annihilate it by trading ?land for peace? will not secure ?peace now.? Our claim to the land ?to which we have clung for hope for 2000 years?is legitimate and noble. It is not within our own power, no matter how much we concede, to make peace unilaterally. Only the unconditional acceptance by Arabs of our rights, especially in their territorial dimension, ?peace for peace,? is a solid basis for the future.?
The period before the beginning of the Intifada in September 2000 was characterized by several significant elements: the tunnel incident in 1996 (which nearly developed into a fully-fledged Intifada), the partitioning of Hebron into H1 and H2, the building of new settlements and numerous ?Jewsonly? bypass, as well as the fruitless negotiations. In light of the new policies mentioned above, this was clearly no coincidence. At the same time, the Israeli government continued to systematically undermine the authority of Arafat , of the Palestinian Authority (PA). In 1999, Ehud Barak, who had publicly vocalizedhis opposition to the Oslo Accords, became prime minister of Israel and was faced with the legacy of his party?s backing of Oslo.
While the Intifada of 1987 began as a demand for a solution to the twenty-yearold Israeli military occupation of Palestinian land, the Intifada of September 2000 broke out in rejection of Barak?s imposed solution. Barak failed to stop the uprising and after twenty months in office, the Israeli public elected General Sharon, who promised to quell the Intifada in one hundred days!
A plan for building the Segregation Wall was already being developed by Barak?s government before the present Intifada; it has always been the aim of the Labor government to separate the Palestinians from the Israelis. Although the Likud traditionally rejected this policy, Sharon?s government is currently continuing it. The death of President Arafat took the teeth out of the Israeli argument that there is ?no Palestinian partner? for peace negotiations. The Israeli government had previously bound its objection to dialogue with the Palestinians to the ?terrorist? President Arafat. When a demand was made for the Palestinians to hold elections, Mahmoud Abbas was chosen as the new president of the PA.
Despite all national and international efforts, however, the movement towards resuming peace negotiations has led nowhere. Apparently, the Israeli government was not interested in serious dialogue, even in a period of relative calm. Israel rejected all initiatives including the Arab initiative of Beirut, the Tenet plan and the Mitchell plan?it is only recently that Israel was forced to declare some form of acceptance of the Road Map, which came after the Israeli government had drafted fourteen objections against it. All plans and initiatives stipulate clearly that Israel is obligated to stop building new settlements, freeze the existing ones and dismantle all unauthorized outposts. To counter these conditions?whilst superficially still accepting the Road Map?Sharon initiated the unilateral disengagement plan.
A plan for building the Segregation Wall was already being developed by Barak?s government before the present Intifada
Sharon initiated a campaign inside and outside of Israel to market the disengagement plan. Behind the show of a struggle between Sharon and the settlers?a charade par excellence? Sharon sold his initiative as his contribution to peace and, of course, as a ?painful concession.? The more of a media commotion arising out of this unilateral disengagement the better; Sharon could settle the score later by opposing further withdrawel from the West Bank. The louder Sharon and his settlers cried over the removal of a few settlements in the Gaza Strip, the more valid his rejection of the continued removal of the settlements from the West Bank.
Sharon was not concerned about any security arrangements. Although there were disagreements regarding the security situation after the withdrawal, the overall analysis from the former chief of intelligence of Shin Bet, the Israeli counter-intelligence and and internal security service stated in Ha?aretz on 10 June 2005 that "The Withdrawel Will not Rekindle Terror":
?The threat of Qassam launches at Israel from the Gaza Strip will not be any greater after the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] leave Gaza, and that in fact, Israel will have greater freedom for military action if needed, because once the settlements and the IDF are out of Gaza, the number of Israeli targets in the Strip will be much smaller.?
Sharon considers his unilateral withdrawal from Gaza to be a part of his obligation towards the Road Map. Any discussion of the possibility of future moves will now be linked to demands upon the PA to act; all the rest is just cosmetics. Sharon will continue to call disengagement a ?unilateral step.? By doing so, he escapes possible obligations vis-?-vis the PA and the international community. However, Sharon has gone further, demanding that the PA abide by Israel?s conditions and understanding of security; for example, Sharon demands that the PA arrest the usual suspects and disarm the resistance movements. Sharon has made his demands a precondition for any further talks about withdrawal from the West Bank. Even the four settlements which were slated for disengagement will now be subject to protracted discussions until Sharon decides the Palestinians have fulfilled Israel?s demands. Meanwhile, Israel will continue to expand and build further settlements and bypass roads, in addition to the Segregation Wall. It is clear that Sharon will continue to postpone the timetable for the final status negotiations for as long as possible.
Sharon is determined to build as many obstacles in the West Bank as possible, and to emphasize the so-called facts on the ground, consequently making a return to the pre-1967 border impossible
Sharon realizes that a unilateral withdrawal would also allow Israel to keep its control over Gaza?s borders: land, sea and air. Sharon knows that a unilateral withdrawal without providing for entrance or exit will make Gaza the biggest prison in history. Sharon is now able to deport any inconvenient person from the West Bank to Gaza without instigating a vocal public objection.
Sharon feels the pressure from the international community and from the people?s movements. Numerous calls for boycott, sanctions and divestment from all parts of the world are gaining momentum, causing his official support to dwindle. Sharon realizes that he is losing time. The Bush administration is eager to reach a final peace agreement before Bush?s term is over. Europe is also pushing for an end to the conflict. The UN is willing but impotent vis-?-vis the Bush administration. The Quartet is a cosmetic body that is also bound to the sole decision of the Bush administration. Sharon is determined to build as many obstacles in the West Bank as possible, and to emphasize the so-called facts on the ground, consequently making a return to the pre-1967 border impossible. The unilateral disengagement plan is a safety net for Sharon. It is his way out of the obligations of the Road Map. He understands that it is politically expedient at this moment to be seen complying with the Road Map, in order to delay Israel?s need to fulfill its substantial obligations according to international law. Past Israeli governments used the same tactic and succeeded in avoiding compliance with the Tenet and Mitchell plans. If the international community falls into Sharon?s trap, he will have gained a significant timeframe in which to colonize the West Bank without any serious deterrent.
When this happens, the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza will be the last withdrawal of the Israeli military. The rest will be simple military redeployments to whatever extent the Wall will allow and there will be no possibility of a Palestinian state in the future. Borrowing the words of Sharon?s advisor, Dov Weisglass, the Palestinians can then wait for a deal until they turn into Finns.
Column:
The UN Report on Hariri's Assassination: The Fall of Professionalism Under the Pressure of Political Objectives
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A few days ago, Detlev Mehlis, head of the UN investigation into the 14 February assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, submitted his report to the UN Security Council (UNSC). The world media, analysts, and politicians have been preoccupied with this issue to such an extent that it should arouse skepticism. The assassination of Hariri was not the first of its kind, neither in Lebanon nor elsewhere. So, why all this fuss?
While the Mehlis report was purported to contain a high degree of objectivity and professionalism, it has been used instead merely to serve the political interests of the US government.
Upon publication of the report, US President George W Bush immediately called upon the UNSC to impose sanctions on Syria. John Bolton, the American delegate to the UN, declared that the ?time of truth has come for Syria.?
The Mehlis report has therefore become just one more pretext to press American interests in the region. President Bush has publicly declared that the UNSC must take strong action against Syria, in order to compel it to change its policy. By his declaration, President Bush and his administration mean that Syria should cease its intervention in Iraq, or in other words, Syria must act to protect the American occupation of Iraq. The second American condition on Syria is to put an end to its intervention in Lebanese affairs.
This means acquiescence to the American-Israeli conditions for a political settlement. This will lead to a disengagement between the Syrian and Lebanese tracks, in order to circumvent Syria and put it under US pressure.
In our view, whether the Mehlis report accurately reflects the facts of the assassination is of secondary importance. Either way, it is now being used as a tool by Bush?s administration as a diversion from its role in creating a disastrous situation in the Middle East.
The political, humanitarian, and security disaster in Iraq clearly shows the grave situation of the Bush administration. In an effort to avoid the international public perception that the resistance against American policy in Iraq stems largely from local opposition, the US is doing what it can to put the blame on external forces. Additionally, the United States, its European allies, and Israel are working to escalate the situation in the region. This, they believe, will produce a justification that can be used to halt the impending collapse of the American strategy in the Middle East. It will also serve to justify continuation of the so-called War Against Terrorism.
Syria is in an unenviable position. The United States, Britain, and France are calling upon Syria, on behalf of the UNSC, for full cooperation with the international investigation. This will lead to Syria?s subjugation to an endless list of American conditions. These conditions include supporting the American policy in Iraq, striking Palestinian resistance in Damascus, halting support for Hizbullah in Lebanon, supporting the political
?The situation is reminiscent of pre-invasion Iraq, with the gradual increase of conditions, peppered with false accusations and lies to eventually justify invasion?
process between Israelis and Palestinians and undertaking comprehensive reforms that will meet the American demands. As far as the Americans are concerned, if Syria does not respond 100 percent to the American conditions, it will be labeled as being uncooperative with the investigation. The US will then use this as a pretence to escalate the imposition of sanctions against Syria.
The situation is reminiscent of pre-invasion Iraq, with the gradual increase of conditions, peppered with false accusations and lies to eventually justify invasion. What counts now for the US is the political goal of making Syria acquiesce to American demands or toppling the regime and replacing it with a more compliant leadership. Since we are encountering a new cycle of the American political assault, the question that needs to be posed is, will Arab regimes remain indifferent and negligent to what is happening, or will they wake up and protect Arab interests from the American policy implemented in Iraq?
Yes, all progressive and democratic powers of the world must fulfill their obligations, and confront this American aggression. This should rank among the top priorities of these forces.
Nassar Ibrahim is a Palestinian writer and journalist.
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