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News from Within Vol. XXII No. 3 March 2006

 Coercions and Exclusions
 

a publication of
The Alternative Information Center

Letter from the Editors:
A Carte Blanche for Israel

In the run-up to the national elections in Israel, set to take place on 28 March, the American and British governments have given Kadima, the Israeli ruling political party, a pre-electoral gift, while at the same time removing one more element of what little international oversight there had been in the conflict.

On 14 March, the US and UK removed monitors from the Jericho prison. The monitors had been installed as part of an arrangement brokered in 2002, which had ended an Israeli siege on the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem and the al-Muqata’a compound in Ramallah (where then Palestinian PM Yasser Arafat was confined).

Explaining his government’s decision to remove the monitors from the prison, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw stated in the House of Commons on 14 March that: “It is the prime responsibility of the Palestinian Authority to ensure the personal security of the United States and United Kingdom monitors. Over the last months it has become increasingly clear that the Palestinian Authority is unable to do this.”

Yet, when asked by other MPs to elaborate on these security concerns, Straw failed to lay out any specifics. Moreover, while supposedly showing concern for the security of the US and UK monitors at the prison—and even if there was no explicit collaboration with Israel—the British and American governments must have been aware that in removing the monitors, they were increasing the likelihood of an Israeli military operation on the prison, heightening the tensions in the region and consequently endangering the safety of all internationals in the OPT.

A few days before the monitors were removed, Dov Weisglass, senior advisor to Acting Israeli PM Ehud Olmert, had informed the US and UK that if the monitors were removed, Israel would act to seize Ahmed Sa’adat, the Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), along with several other individuals at the Jericho prison.

Sa’adat and four other prisoners held in Jericho had been incarcerated by the PA for their alleged involvement in the October 2001 assassination of Israeli military general Rehavam Ze’evi, then tourism minister in the Israeli government, by members of the PFLP. The PFLP stated that the killing was meant as retaliation for the August 2001 assassination of then leader of the PFLP, Abu Ali Mustafa, by Israel.

Though the Israeli and international media have been generally referring to Ze’evi as “tourism minister,” when discussing the prison operation, he was actually one of the most radical anti-Palestinian politicians in Israel, who called for harsh measures against the Palestinian population. In 1988, Ze’evi, established the Moledet political party, the main platform of which centered on the transfer of Palestinians from Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip to neighboring Arab countries.

While Sa’adat was arrested and imprisoned by the PA in 2002, no evidence was brought forth by the Israeli government for their accusations that he was personally involved with the assassination of Ze’evi. In an interview with the Jerusalem Post published on 16 March, former security adviser to the European Union’s special envoy to the Middle East, Alastair Crooke, stated that though Sa’adat was imprisoned by the PA under the Ramallah agreement, he was never actually tried in court for his alleged ordering of Ze’evi’s assassination. Though “Arafat insisted that evidence be produced and that [Sa’adat] stand trial in Palestine, […] Israel was not prepared to give evidence to the Palestinians or to Arafat,” declared Crooke.

As Israel had promised, within minutes of the departure of the British prison monitors, the Israeli military surrounded the Jericho prison. While Israel, the US and UK all continue to assert that there was no coordination over the raid, American diplomatic sources did confirm that: “Israel briefed the US on its plan to raid the Jericho prison a short time before the [Israeli military] forces reached the area and kept the Americans updated on the progress of the raid” (Nathan Guttman, Jerusalem Post, 14 March 2006).

These moves by Acting PM Ehud Olmert follow in a long history of Israeli pre-election military operations, implemented at least in part to bolster the position of the ruling faction. Some other examples include Menachem Begin’s authorization of the 1981 destruction of the nearly completed “Osirak” Iraqi nuclear reactor by the Israeli air force and, more recently, the 1996 bombardment of southern Lebanon during Operation Grapes of Wrath, authorized by then PM Shimon Peres.

Moreover, Israel has warned that the Jericho prison operation was exemplary of the ‘new’ policy towards the Palestinians (yet actually, only a more overt version of Israel’s longstanding policy). French radio RFI reported a high-ranking Israeli offi cial stating that the Jericho operation should be seen as a blueprint of what the relation between the Israel and the Palestinian Authority will be in the future, as long as the PA continues to be led by Hamas.

On 19 March, Alex Fishman, senior military and security correspondent for Israel’s largest distribution daily, Yideoth Aharonoth, explains Israel’s new confidence—in the wake the tacit green-light given by the US and UK, following the Hamas takeover of the Palestinian government, for large scale military actions by Israel—in moving towards a more overtly aggressive policy vis-àvis the Palestinians, dropping any pretence of political considerations. Fishman writes, “Military officials admit the new situation is more convenient for the army. This change will affect first of all the scope of operational activity and judgment. If the army would like to assassinate someone, it will. If it would see fit to bomb, it will. If military officials wish to invade Gaza, they will do that too. The army now feels the constraints it has been facing have been removed. The Jericho operation signals that Israel is […] willing to ‘break the rules’ should it see fit.”

Following the Jericho operation, acting PM Olmert has now shorn up the likelihood of a significant electoral victory for his party— while the other political parties merely vie for the possibility of playing second fi ddle to Kadima in a coalition—and concretely demonstrated that Israel can act aggressively towards the Palestinians without worry of a significant international critique. We are now entering a highly volatile period, with a strong probability that the coalition which will form out of the upcoming elections, be it Kadima/Labor or Kadima/Likud, will feel even less constraint on its actions against the Palestinian people. The United States, Britain and other countries who remain silent while Israel implements its aggressive policies of occupation and annexation, will have to bear some responsibility for the suffering to come, for their inaction will result in nothing less than a carte blanche for Israel.

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The Next Palestinian Government: External Pressures and Internal Wagers

by Nassar Ibrahim

Nearly a month after the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections, the sparks that accompanied the campaigning and the election results have begun to slowly burn out. The issue now is no longer about slogans and speeches. This is why all the parties who were shocked at the results have begun to gradually accept reality and the challenges, tasks, questions and balances of power it entails.

The reactions and positions taken in the wake of the shock of these elections have begun to subside with only natural residual tremors remaining. Now, things are moving towards recalculations and defining positions in light of the new realities and facts on the ground.

In any case, Palestinians are now motivated into watching the developments and behavior of political players and the various regional powers at play.

The moment the results were announced and it became clear that Hamas had won the majority of PLC seats, the political pressures and maneuvers in the Palestinian arena were put into motion in an attempt to influence the form and content of the next Palestinian government.

Hence, we should look into the various positions of the powers in an attempt to understand the motives of each party and determine their dimensions and goals.

From the beginning, Israel announced that any Hamas-led Palestinian Authority would be considered a terrorist Authority, which it would not associate with and would isolate. In justifying its position, Israel proposed its conditions: recognizing Israel’s right to exist, halting “terrorist” operations, disarming Hamas and recognizing signed agreements between the PA and Israel.

In seeking to translate its position clearly and decisively on the ground, Israel escalated its military assaults and siege on the Palestinians, and prevented the transfer of tax revenues to the PA. This is in addition to banning Hamas PLC members from freely moving about. All of these measures were carried out in tandem with an Israeli media campaign and diplomatic moves aimed at besieging Hamas and pushing it into a corner.

The attitude of the United States was not much different than that of Israel. The US basically adopted Israel’s positions and made its own declaration that despite the election victory, Hamas is a terrorist organization that should not be dealt with.

In this context, the US took many quick tactical steps. It threatened to halt financial aid to the PA (going as far as to reclaim $50 million previously transferred to the Authority). At the same time, it pressured the European Union to take the same position. The US then endorsed its positions with a political campaign represented in US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice’s Middle East tour aimed at convincing the Arab states to put pressure on Hamas.

As for the EU, their positions showed hesitancy at times, ambiguity at others and division at yet other times. These incongruities stemmed from some of the EU’s overlapping polices and positions with Israel and the United States on the one hand and their contradiction with each other on the other.

The EU found it difficult to take punitive measures in dealing with the outcome of the Palestinian democratic process or justifying such measures against the Palestinian people because of their electoral choice. Still, it felt it could put conscious and systematic political and economic pressure to ‘moderate’ the positions of the Hamas-led PA. In this regard, some EU countries showed calculated flexibility in dealing with Hamas. The most pronounced example of this was France’s position, which encouraged the Russian move to receive a Hamas delegation in Moscow. At the same time, the Arab countries found themselves in a state of confusion as they tried to determine their stances and political behavior.

This confusion can be attributed to their fear of popular internal reactions should they adopt the US-Israeli position. This would not only embarrass them but blow their cover, especially in light of the state of popular polarization and enmity against the US’s policies in the region.

Moreover, most of these regimes feel it is not in their best interests for revolutionary political Islam to gain increased popular political backing, due to Arab governments promoting unpopular policy vis-à-vis the US-Israeli conditions.

Therefore, the official political stance of the Arab regimes was more or less to “give Hamas a chance,” which was exactly the response of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to the US position stated by Secretary of State Rice in her most recent tour of the region.

As for the Lebanon/Syria/Iran axis, it saw a radical turning point in Hamas’ victory that reinforced the role and effectiveness of the rejectionist nature of the axis, which has been subject to violent political pressures. The Palestinian factor is a key determinant in the regional conflict and whoever is able to win over the public can have influence in setting in motion the forces of resistance in the conflict.

For now, the large share of these factors and policies are coming from outside of Palestine, yet they are pushing and pulling on the internal Palestinian stage and influencing outcomes, affecting especially the relationship between the Hamas and Fatah movements.

At the moment, Fatah is facing very sensitive and dangerous challenges and choices arising especially from the consequences of losing the PA to Hamas. This also entails the contradictions, and perhaps even organizational and political struggles, between power centers within Fatah itself. On the other hand, Fatah realizes that Hamas’ victory is the flipside of its own political, social and economic failure.

This situation thus puts Fatah at a critical crossroads: if it decides to choose a position of opposition and refuses to join a national unity government led by Hamas, this means that Fatah will objectively and practically look as if it has chosen to join the camp of those (Israeli, American, European and Arab) powers pressuring Hamas.

Here, we must emphasize that the ultimate reason for the various pressures from these parties on Hamas is not due to it being a religious Islamic movement. Rather, its goal is to ‘tame’ Hamas and lower its political upper limit to coincide with the Israeli-American conditions, thereby smoothing out the rhythm of the Palestinian arena permanently.

In light of this point, Fatah’s insistence on putting itself in the position of opposition and refusing to participate in a national unity government will look as if Fatah has transformed itself into a Palestinian tool and internal warhead in confronting the Hamas platform. This will raise important questions about the nature of its national role in the minds of the Palestinian people.

In addition, there is the predicament of the relationship between the PLC and the Palestinian government, both of which are dominated by Hamas, and the Palestinian presidency, headed by Fatah. This will inevitably result in contradictions and crises, which will push the internal and external Palestinian situation into a state of paralysis and stagnation. In the same context, there is the issue of the PLO and its relationship with the PA and the government, and the tensions and contradictions this entails.

Fatah also faces the problem of losing its ability to control the PA institutions, which will give Hamas the opportunity to tighten its grip on these institutions and alter their structure.

However, if Fatah opts for joining the government, this would mean a vital change in the state of affairs before us.

Such a position would change the nature of any serious disassembling and reassembling the Palestinian political structure.

Fatah’s participation would indicate its initial willingness to relatively raise its political limits in order to reach a mutual meeting point with Hamas. Hamas will in turn find that it must moderate its own political boundaries in order to find a place of agreement with Fatah.

Such a reality would mean that Hamas would be in a situation where it must address political, social and economic obligations and a real and qualitative process.

Hamas understands well that there are serious differences between the Hamas that used to represent the opposition and the resistance and the Hamas that will now lead a national coalition government. It will now be put to the test on how capable it is of managing the contradictions, the institutions and leading the society. It is at the threshold of a new strategic stage in which it must prove the extent of its skills in flexibility and strategizing.

At the same time, it is facing major difficulties at the level of the movement between the upper limit of its political and resistance platform as a movement and its role in leading and implementing a joint platform with all the Palestinian political players.

In this context, Hamas is fully aware of the danger of being in the confrontational camp and the scope of the pressures it will be faced with. That is why, ever since their victory in the PLC elections, Hamas has been sending messages and signals such as: their willingness to enforce a long-term truce with Israel, willingness to honor the PA’s international and regional commitments and willingness for dialogue and negotiations.

Hamas has also shown a noticeable vitality at the diplomatic level through its quick moves at the international and regional level, in addition to intensive activity at the internal Palestinian level, based on its the willingness to hold dialogue in order to reach a platform of mutual conciliation.

In any case, all Palestinian political powers (Hamas, Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and all the other powers) are well aware that they stand before new challenges and that they must bear their national responsibilities because internal contradictions that sabotage the higher national interests of the Palestinian people (whether this is represented in protecting the rights of the people or meeting the basic economic and social needs) will be met with a harsh response by the Palestinian people.

The overall mood of the Palestinians at this stage is extremely sensitive towards outside pressures, which are incongruous with the desired internal policy, and are aimed at enforcing political and economic obligations on them as a form of punishment for their democratic option.

In this sense, the Palestinian public opinion is shifting more and more towards national unity, and any organization that undermines this national constant or takes a stance that might sabotage the internal equilibrium will be faced with public rage, especially if citizens feel that this or that political faction is determining its policies or stances under the pressure of outside conditions or dictates.

These are the main characteristics of the Palestinian scene at this stage. It seems that the days ahead will be full of different positions and maneuvers, but the question remains: will all of the parties and forces involved be able to overcome the logic of negative reactions and the policy of punishment and revenge, in order to move towards the realm of logical and rational thinking? Such thinking should be based on an evaluative reading of the situation, taking into consideration the failure of the fruitless political wagers, which are based on solutions or plans for solutions that suffer from serious flaws and which do not offer any serious or just solutions to such a thorny and complicated conflict. They should also realize the failure of solutions that are based on military actions, violence and destruction.

I emphasize this because the political and social decision expressed by Palestinian voters at the ballot boxes was not just a reaction but reflected a popular will. It symbolized the failure of policies, measures and wagers that have existed over the past decade and a half. This has lain upon all of us an obligation to search for a way out. We must find new solutions based on a real analysis of conditions for a just and comprehensive solution to the conflict. This must not be according to the logic of might and the defeat of the other by weakening it with an iron fist, force and economic sanctions.

I say this at the same time as Israel’s policies continue to escalate. We are at the threshold of new Israeli elections, in which Israeli forces will compete in light of Ariel Sharon’s lengthy coma. We just hope that Israel’s policies do not fall into a similar state of mindless inertia.

Nassar Ibrahim is a Palestinian writer and journalist. He is also the Editor of the Arabic quarterly journal Rouy’ya Ukhra, published by the AIC.

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Defensible Borders:
‘Settlers’ in the Contemporary Liberal Zionist Discourse

by Josh Benjamin Friedman

While the core of Israeli society remains divided over the violence that ensued during the Amona settlement withdrawal, many on the mainstream Israeli Left have applauded the tough government action against settlers who represent, in the words of one Ha’aretz editorialist “the antithesis of the state of Israel.” For Israeli liberals, the settlement movement is more than simply a segment of Israeli society with a sociopolitical agenda with which it disagrees, but the very antithesis of Israel’s history and values. Thus, to all appearances, at stake during the Gaza disengagement and again during the recent Amona withdrawal was more than simply the fate of the settlements, but the nature of the Jewish state itself.

Despite its prevalence among Israeli liberals, this discourse is somewhat misleading. First, and perhaps most importantly, it drastically misrepresents the Israeli settlerstate relationship on the ground. Official government institutions represent the cornerstone of Israel’s illegal settlement ventures—the linchpin on which the movement depends. Without government facilitation and accommodation—of which both Left and Right governments have played an essential part—as well as the ongoing protection of the Israeli military, Israel’s settlement project would be entirely unsustainable. In spite of this dynamic, however, a language of distancing from the settlers has indelibly marked the liberal Zionist discourse; throughout the dispute over Gaza and Amona, liberal press coverage of the settlers consistently described them as anti-democratic, evil, and insane. The reciprocal effect of this discourse is clear; with such a strong focus on settler violence, the role of the state in the settlement process has been substantially obfuscated.

This dynamic—whereby sharp disjuncture is presented where meaningful relationships exist—bears close resemblance to the observations of influential French theorist Michel Foucault regarding the social borders between “reason” and “insanity.” In Madness and Civilization, his seminal study on the history of insanity, Foucault describes Enlightenment Europe’s inveterate commitment to protect the boundaries of reason against the potentially contaminating presence of “unreason.”¹ No longer simply a virtue in Europe, reason now constituted the essence of human nature; madness—“unreason’s empirical form”— represented not only reason’s antithesis, but a foil over and against which it would be reproduced and reconstituted.² The threat that madness presented to Enlightenment values revolutionized social boundaries in European society; between reason and madness, finite borders were constructed which cloaked what was perhaps a more ambiguous and complicated relationship. Physical boundaries like the asylum, and conceptual borders such as the general use of madness as mode of criticism, operated to “remind each man of his truth.”³ In this context, as “confinement hid away unreason,” reason’s integrity was insolated and protected.

Madness and Civilization provides an important window into the contemporary liberal Israeli discourse on the settlers and their supporters. Where madness for Foucault had as much to do with the ambivalence over the stability of “reason” as it did with “madness” itself, condemnations of the settlers often have much to do with the ambivalence on the Zionist Left regarding the contemporary state of liberal Israeli identity. In the wake of the Lebanon War and two Intifada, the effect of the Occupation on the lives of the Palestinian people has proven difficult for liberal Zionists to ignore.⁴ The contradiction between the Left’s values of human rights and democracy on the one hand, and Israel’s actions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), (of which the Left is by no means innocent) on the other, has understandably produced a certain degree of cognitive dissonance.

It is this dissonance on the Zionist left, which the language of distancing attempts to manage. In order to discursively maintain Israel’s liberal essence, left-wing Zionists reconstitute the settlers as the polar opposite of legitimate Israeli society. Conflict between settlers and the nation-state is reframed as an ideological struggle, in which a western, liberal nation-state must discipline the evil, pre-modern, religious zealotry of the settlers, along with the violent racism of their more secular supporters. Settlers, who disrespect the law, must be punished by the nation-state, which is consequently transformed into the standard bearer of law and justice. By obfuscating the role of the Israeli government in the settlement of the OPT, liberal Israelis are able to manage the dissonance between their own national narratives and the political and economic events in which the Israeli state has played a crucial role.

Gaza

During the early evening of August 4, 2005, just 11 days before the scheduled Gaza withdrawal, Eden Natan-Zada, a 19 year old Israeli settler, boarded a No. 165 Egged bus with his IDF standard issue assault rifle. As the bus crossed into the town of Shafa ‘Amr, Natan-Zada opened fire on its Palestinian-Israeli passengers, killing four and injuring 12.⁵ His chosen target—non-Jewish citizens of Israel— caused Israelis of almost every political persuasion to condemn the attack in unconditional terms. Even rightist like the Yesha council—the group that represents the settlers in the OPT—were determined to dissociate themselves from the attacker, who clearly had identified with their anti-disengagement agenda.⁶ For many liberal Israelis, however, Natan-Zada was the direct outgrowth of the settlers’ morally depraved ideology.

For example, in an editorial entitled “Uprooting Evil,” Ha’aretz denounced the settlers as “racist,” “ugly” and “evil” and chastised them for arrogantly fl outing Israeli law in favor of “their one-dimensional interpretation of halakha (Jewish law).” To Yesha, the author argued, the entire land of Israel belongs only to the Jewish people, a belief justifying the murder and expulsion of all Arabs. Among the settlers, incitement allegedly abounds:

frothing from the weekly Torah portion commentaries distributed in synagogues, from public classes, yeshiva high schools and hesder yeshivas (whose students combine Torah study with army service) and in bar mitzvah and wedding sermons.

To the editors of Ha’aretz, these qualities allegedly put the settlement movement entirely outside the purview of Israeli society, which is characterized by its rationalism and morality. It is thus the nation- state, as the preeminent symbol of democracy and liberalism, which must discipline the settlement movement for its rejection of Israeli laws and values. The author concludes that the settlers must be “dealt with a strong hand” and forced to obey the Israeli government. In this way, the nation-state is transformed into an agent of moral cleansing, “uprooting” the “evil” settlers.⁷

These sentiments were repeated continuously in Ha’aretz’s coverage of the disengagement. In additional editorials, Ha’aretz journalists would expand on their message by situating the Gaza controversy in a global context. In an opinion piece entitled “The Downfall of Democracy,” for example, one Ha’aretz journalist declared that Israel’s task of cracking down on religious zealots not only validates Israel’s democracy but also locates Israel squarely within the ranks of liberal democracies around the world. By quashing the settlers, Israel discursively enters the global battle of “democratic societies throughout the world […] struggling against [religious] extremists.”⁸

Like the Ha’aretz journalists, liberal Zionist politicians described Natan-Zada’s actions as a product of the mainstream settlement movement. Yossi Sarid, former head of the left wing Meretz party, explicitly linked Natan- Zada’s violence to the Yesha council’s ideology: “they will talk about the ‘wild thorn’ in order to hide the fact it’s the flowerbed that has gone bad.” For Sarid, Israeli society is under attack by religious fanatics who detest Israel’s democratic process and its decision to pull out of Gaza. Israel is only safe, argued Sarid, when the religious right observes the day of rest and temporarily halts its protests, incitement, and violence. When the Sabbath ends, however “the land is again return[ed] to a chaotic, darkened state” as religious fanatics “walk in our midst.”⁹

In this way, Sarid not only places the settlers in dialectic opposition to a liberal Israel, he also attributes to them what Foucault described as “moral and physical contagions.” As Foucault recounts, the asylum represented more than a place of confinement; it was also a site from which disease was imagined to spread. Even from behind the walls of the asylum, unreason threatened to infect and contaminate all of French society.¹⁰ For Sarid, the settlers represent a force capable of corrupting Israel’s democracy through religious fanaticism and infecting it through settler violence. The settlers represent not only the opposite of Sarid’s version of Israeli, but a fetid agent capable of rotting the country from the inside.

Amona

Such sentiments reemerged during Ha’aretz’s coverage of the Israeli withdrawal from Amona—a small settlement outpost in the northern portion of the West Bank. Even before the withdrawal took place, coverage enhanced anticipation for a clash between settlers and soldiers. As it became increasingly clear that the Amona settlers and their supporters would resist violently, the language of separation that characterized the Gaza withdrawal was redeployed. The settlers were consistently placed on what Foucault referred to as “the exterior” of rational society. Ha’aretz commentator Zvi Bar’el, for example, not only describes the Amona dissidents’ ideology as “the antithesis of the State of Israel,” but compares the religious settler movement to Hamas. Settler violence is re-encoded as “terror attacks,” and, for Bar’el, the goal of the Amona radicals, like Hamas, is “the annulment of the nation- state.” In keeping with the analogy, then, these settlers cannot to do more than reach a “hudna” (cease-fire) with the Israeli government.¹¹

Bar’el’s claim that the settlers intend to destroy the state of Israel is not a neutral, or circumstantial accusation; the charge has a special place in Israeli national mythology, and has been imbued with a specific meta-language that has historically functioned to shore up internal divisions over and against an outside aggressor—traditionally the surrounding Arab countries and Palestinian movements like the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hamas. In classic Israeli narratives, such aggressors cannot be negotiated with precisely because their ultimate goal is the destruction of the state itself. Driving such movements, or so the argument goes, are not political, economic, and historical events and understandings, but rather an irrational and indelible hatred of Jews and an uncompromising religious claim to the whole of historic Palestine. Together with the authors’ implicit references to Hamas, (which after the Oslo process and the mainstreaming of Fatah, has come to epitomize this primordial “anti-Israel” position), the rhetoric starkly divides the state and the settlers.

In addition, the settler’s religious devotion, their “messianic ideology,” and hope for a divinely inspired kingdom—notions of social organization that the Enlightenment intended to replace—which, in the case of Amona, manifests itself in the form of settler “terrorism,” also represents a polemic attack against the rational capabilities of the religious settlers. The connotations associated with “terrorism”— namely its irrational, random, and religious qualities—have traditionally dominated popular understandings of the subject. In this way, the constructed line between the nation-state and religious fanaticism, and consequently between reason and insanity, is redrawn between the state of Israel and the Amona settlers.

Masking State Responsibility

Despite this language of distancing, the Israeli nation-state has always been essential to the maintenance and expansion of the settlement enterprise. Historically, every Israeli government has supported and extended Israeli control over the West Bank; indeed, the settlement project itself was initiated under the left wing Labor government following the 1967 war—a full decade before the Israeli Right took power. Aggressive settlement expansion continued during the left wing initiated Oslo Process, during which the settlements grew by over 100 percent; even the controversial settler access roads that cut through the West Bank were the brainchild of Yitzhak Rabin.

Even as liberal Israeli journalists waxed indignant about the violence of the Gaza and Amona settlers and their rejection of Israeli law, the Israeli government was actively extending its illegal settlement project in the OPT. Since the “ceasefire,” which has largely been read in the international community and Israeli society as a quieting of tensions between Israel and Palestine, the Israeli government has seized, confiscated, or occupied hundreds of thousands of dunam of land in the OPT.

Israel’s history of land seizures in the south Hebron hills offers instructive examples of the settler/state relationship in the West Bank, as it has generally evolved throughout the history of the occupation. After occupying the West Bank during the 1967 war, Israel officially claimed the south Hebron hills as “state property,” subsequently setting up army bases and military practice sites. These developments took an enormous toll on the region’s Palestinian farmers, who already suffered from a dearth of fertile land. The rural landscape of the south Hebron Hills is rocky and thus poorly suited for agricultural development. Palestinian residents have traditionally raised sheep and goats along the isolated pastures generally located in the region’s ravines, or wadis. With the development of Israel’s new military infrastructure, the Israeli military aggravated what were already exacting circumstances.

The military compounded the difficulty of these new conditions through a program of “quiet” transfer. From 1967 to 1999, the government pursued a dual policy of settlement and small scale expulsion of the south Hebron hill’s Palestinian communities. These actions gained public attention only after November of 1999, when the Israeli military carried out its first large scale population transfer. During the evictions, the military expelled from the area hundreds of Palestinians from various locations. In 2000, the Israeli Supreme Court ordered the military to halt its policies.

Since the Supreme Court ruling, the settler- state cooperation illustrates the role of official Israeli institutions in facilitating the expansion of settlement. The military’s commitment to protect Israel’s illegal settlers, even when violence is initiated by settlers, has allowed Israel to gain control over large swaths of Palestinian land. The greater Hebron region is home to some of the most belligerent and dogmatic Israeli settlers, who remain ardently commitment to settling the whole of the OPT. The settler population has continuously attacked and harassed the area’s Palestinian residents forcing, in some cases, entire communities to flee their homes.

In the case of South Hebron, recent incidents of violence against settlers have provided Israel with an opportunity to seize this territory. In January, the Israeli military issued a series of orders mandating the construction of a 25-kilometer fence south of Hebron, ostensibly to protect a settler road. The fence, which is slated to run parallel to the southern most border of the West Bank, would cut deep into Palestinian territory, at points stretching up to 2.5 kilometers past the Green Line—in roughly the same region Israel has been working to settle and confiscate for decades. The fence will enclose the settlements of Shim’a, Shani Lifnah, Susya, Ma’on, and Karmel, as well as the smaller outposts of Beitna Amarin, Daria, Nof Neshar and Avigayil. The action— which amount to a de facto annexation of roughly 80,300 dunam of Palestinian land—will create territorial continuity between the aforementioned settlements and Israel proper.

Given the history of Israel’s attempts to control the south Hebron Hills and the collective consequences of the enclosure— through which Israel would achieve its historic objectives in the area—it seems spurious that the proposed fence might be explained solely as a response to isolated instances of violence. According to a 2002 study published by the New Israel Fund, The Israeli Committee Against Home Demolitions and the Alternative Information Center, Israel “is eager to receive this area [South Hebron Hills] ‘Arab free’ and in order to do so, it is determined to expel all those Palestinians residing in small villages within the region.” Thus, while the Israeli military justified the seizure by reference to recent attacks against Israeli settlers, when read in its proper historical context, the proposed fence appears more as an extension of an ongoing political process of land expropriation.

The military recently gave the same “security” rational with regard to the controversial closure to Palestinians of the Jordan Valley—another region of the West Bank which historically has been highly valued by the Israeli government. As in South Hebron, attacks on settlers in the valley have provided the Israeli military with a pretense to extend Israeli hegemony for “security reasons,” when in fact there is a great deal of evidence that they maintain political motivations. In both cases, as with countless others, the military’s commitment to protect settler interests has provided it with a pretense to gain control over Palestinian territory.

Managing Conflict

It seems strange that amid this ongoing project of land seizures and the protection of settlements, in which hundreds of thousands of dunam of Palestinian land has fallen under Israeli control, that so much attention would be paid to withdrawals like Amona that have little if no effect on Israeli-Palestinian peace. Even with regard to the Gaza withdrawal, the removal of 7,000 settlers is little more than a drop in the bucket in comparison to the 480,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank.¹²

It is not simply that the liberal Israeli discourse fails to accurately represent the political and economic conditions on the ground; it in fact contributes to same the process of settlement expansion, which the Israeli Left claims to oppose. The media’s decision to focus only on small settlement withdrawals decreases the likelihood of a more extensive disengagement. Any Israeli action against settlers is generally hailed as an important step towards peace, even when it is unrelated or detrimental to it. Highlighting settlement withdrawal, rather than settlement expansion serves settlement interests, as it allows the Israeli government to point to its actions and speak of “painful concessions,” even as settlements continue to flourish. Indeed, since the disengagement, the settlement population has grown by over 12,000 people. In this way, the liberal Israeli discourse often contributes to the settlement process.

For the Israeli left, highlighting withdrawals like Amona has an important social function. There exists a great deal of tension between the liberal ideas expounded by the Israeli Left and the 39 year old occupation of Palestinians land which the mainstream Left has historically supported and facilitated. The Zionist Left in Israel is far from unaware of its own role in Palestinian oppression. Indeed, the contemporary liberal Israeli discourse must be read in its proper historical context: after the new historians shattered Israel’s official founding myths, and after the rise of post-Zionism and the concomitant “crisis in the wider [Israeli] society,” which it produced regarding Israel’s liberal narrative.¹³ In this context, contemporary polemics regarding the brutality of the settlers must be understood as shaky at best, particularly among those who articulate them.

The social borders between the Israeli state and the settlement movement, which were clearly articulated during the Gaza and Amona withdrawals, reveal how the mainstream Israeli Left has sought to manage its understanding of the Israeli state in tension with the political and economic reality of the Occupation. Through a discursive process of distancing the settlers from the Israeli mainstream, the historic role of the state in the rather illiberal project of occupation is masked and obfuscated.

Josh Friedman holds a B. A. in Religion from Wesleyan University.

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Notes

¹ Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization, trans. Richard Howard, (New York, NY: Random House, 1964).

² Ibid., Foucault, 70.

³ Ibid., Foucault, 13-17.

⁴ For a brief discussion of the effects of the Lebanon War and the first intifada on Israeli society see Zachary Lockman, “Original Sin,” in Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation, eds. Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (Boston: South End Press, 1989). For a discussion of the rise of the anti-war movement within Israel after the Lebanon War and the first Intifada, see also Reuven Kaminer “The Protest Movement Within Israel” in Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation, eds. Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 231-245.

⁵ Matthew Gutman, Yaakov Katz, and the Jerusalem Post Staff, “AWOL soldier opens fi re on bus, kills 4,” The Jerusalem Post, 5 August 2005.

⁶ Comments by Yesha representatives excoriating Natan-Zada were published widely both within and outside of Israel. See for example, Scott Wilson, “Jewish Settler Kills Four Israeli Arabs In Attack on Bus” The Washington Post, 5 August 2005.

⁷ “Uprooting Evil,” Ha’aretz, 7 August 2005.

⁸ “The Downfall of Democracy,” Ha’aretz, 4 September 2005.

⁹ Yossi Sarid, “Another Bad Apple,” Yedioth Ahronoth, 5 August 2005.

¹⁰ Foucault, Madness and Civilization, 199- 220.

¹¹ Zvi Bar’el, “Waiting for a Trauma,” Ha’aretz, 3 February 2006.

¹² Shir Hever, The Settlements—Economic Cost to Israel, Alternative Information Center, July 2005.

¹³ For the crisis in Israeli society produced by post Zionism, see Ilan Pappe, “Post-Zionism and its Popular Cultures” in Palestine, Israel, and the Politics of Popular Culture, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 77-95. For a brief discussion on the origins of the new historians see Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim “Introduction” in The War For Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948, eds. Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1-12. For a more in depth look at post-Zionism see Laurence Silberstein, The Post Zionism Debates: Knowledge and Power in Israeli Culture (New York: Routledge, 1998).

Behind the Walls: Separation Walls between Arabs and Jews in Mixed Cities and Neighborhoods in Israel

by the Arab Association for Human Rights

Full Version of this article here.

Background

The Palestinian Arab minority and the Jewish majority in the State of Israel live largely in separate areas. With the exception of the mixed cities, in which a significant Palestinian minority lives alongside a Jewish majority,¹ most of the Palestinian population lives in its own communities, as does the Jewish majority. This territorial separation is also seen within the mixed cities: most of the Palestinian minority lives in its own neighborhoods, which are distinct from the neighborhoods inhabited by the Jewish majority.

This separation is the result of historical developments before and after the establishment of the State of Israel. Today, however, it may be considered to originate from the manner of allocation of land owned or controlled by the state, which comprises 93 percent of all land in Israel. The manner of allocation of this land is the result of anticipatory planning decisions by the authorities. In state-owned or controlled land, the state acts deliberately to create such territorial separation, allocating separate land for development and construction for the two populations.²

An important question that arises in the context of the issue of the residential separation between the Jewish majority and the Palestinian minority, as in other fields such as education, is whether separation is contrary to the principle of equality. In the past, the prevailing view was that such separation per se was not discriminatory, based on the principle of “separate but equal.” However, since the ruling in the United States in Brown v Board of Education of Topeka,³ which established that the policy of separation between whites and blacks in education was “inherently unequal,” thinking on this matter has changed. This ruling has provided the foundation for a far-reaching revision of the attitude to separation between different groups within society, both in the United States and throughout the world. This approach is based on the perception that separation implies disrespect toward the excluded minority group, emphasizes differences between it and others, and perpetuates feelings of social inferiority.

The Three Separation Walls

In Israel, however, apart from the territorial separation between the Jewish majority and the Palestinian minority, and the question as to whether such separation infringes the principle of equality, recent years have seen the establishment of separation walls and fences between Arab and Jewish towns within the State of Israel, and, in other cases, between Arab and Jewish neighborhoods within the same city. This physical separation has been initiated by the Jewish majority and the Israeli establishment. Their aim is to separate the Jewish majority from the Palestinian minority, precluding even eye contact between the two populations.

1) The Earth Embankment between Jisr Al-Zarqa and Qisariya (Caesarea)—
    1-1.5 kilometers long and 4-5 meters high

Jisr Al-Zarqa is an Arab village on the Mediterranean coast in the northern Sharon region. For many years, the village has suffered from severe overcrowding and a lack of space for access roads and residential and public needs. Neglect by the various authorities has contributed to rising crime rates and drug problems.

Qisariya is an ancient port on the northern Sharon coast. In 1948, it was one of the fi rst towns where the Hagana undertook planned expulsions and the destruction of Palestinian homes. Today, the population of the town is entirely Jewish, of high socioeconomic status, and includes many very wealthy residents.

In November 2002, the residents of Jisr Al-Zarqa were surprised to discover that work had begun to construct an earth embankment designed to separate the two communities. The establishment of the embankment was undertaken and fi nanced by the Qisariya Development Company,⁴ without any lawful permit,⁵ without any coordination with the Jisr Al- Zarqa local council and without informing the residents.

The Qisariya Development Company referred to the embankment as an “acoustic embankment.” They claimed that it was established in order to alleviate the acoustic “hazards” faced by the residents of Qisariya due to noise caused by the residents of Jisr Al-Zarqa (the prayer calls of the muezzin, loud music, parties, shooting in the air during celebrations, and fi reworks).⁶ It was also alleged that the embankment would protect the residents of Qisariya against the “scourge” of thefts they faced as residents of Jisr Al- Zarqa “infi ltrated” Qisariya and stole objects from the yards of the local houses.7 It was also claimed that the proximity of the northern neighborhoods of Qisariya to the Arab village had led to falling property prices in this area.

The residents of Jisr Al-Zarqa refer to the embankment as a “racist barrier.” They feel that its purpose is to constrict them and encourage them to move elsewhere. A national park borders the village to the north, the embankment to the south, the main highway to the east and the sea to the west. Thus bound, the village now has no possibility to develop.

The embankment certainly constitutes a serious obstacle to the urban planning of the village, preventing the possibility of building a by-pass road as planned in the past. It also disfi gures a beautiful landscape, blocking views of the sea and of nature and causing distress and frustration to the residents of the southern neighborhood of the village.

2) The Wall between the Jawarish Neighborhood and the Gannei Dan Neighborhood in Ramle—
    4 meters high and approximately 2 kilometers long.

Ramle is a city on the inner coastal plain in the Central District of Israel, close to the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway. In 1948, Ramle became a mixed city when it was occupied by Israeli military forces, who expelled the majority of its Arab population. As of September 2003, the city had a population of 63,000, 80.5 percent of whom were Jews and 19.5 percent Arabs.

In 1950, several Arab families from the small town of Majdal were brought to an area adjacent to Ramle, where the State of Israel established the village of Jawarish. In 1965, Jawarish was annexed to Ramle. The neighborhood now has a population of some 2,000 Arabs. The average monthly income of the residents of Jawarish is signifi cantly below the national average;⁸ most of the residents work in the construction industry and in agriculture.

In the mid-1990s, during the period of mass immigration from the former Soviet Union, the Gannei Dan neighborhood was built close to Jawarish. This neighborhood has a population of approximately 2,000, including approximately 80 Arabs. Gannei Dan enjoys a high socioeconomic level.⁹

One of the main characteristics of the spatial profi le of the Ramle area is the physical separation between the Jewish neighborhood of Gannei Dan and the Arab neighborhood of Jawarish. During the construction of Gannei Dan, and as an integral part of the planning, a concrete wall was built, four meters high and approximately two kilometers long, separating the new neighborhood from Jawarish, and blocking both physical and eye contact. This wall was built and fi - nanced by the promoters who developed the Gannei Dan neighborhood.

Most of the residents of the Arab neighborhood were opposed to the separation and to the construction of this wall, particularly given its length and height. The opposition focused mainly on the insult they felt faced with the hostile attitude of their Jewish neighbors, which they felt regarded them as inferior, as well as the fact that the construction of the wall was imposed on them by their Jewish neighbors and the Israeli establishment.

The residents of the Jewish neighborhoods largely supported the establishment of the separation wall. They felt that separation was a simple and logical feature of the area. Some also claimed that Jewish residents would not move to the neighborhood unless the wall was constructed. This support reflected their claims that they “suffered” from the proximity to the Arab neighborhoods: the general inconvenience of living near Arabs, fear of criminals and drug addicts, concerns relating to the feud between two families in Jawarish involved in drug dealing (a feud that has cost 32 lives), and falling real estate prices due to the proximity to the Arab neighborhoods.¹⁰

3) The Wall between the Neighborhood of Pardes Snir in Lid (Lod) and Moshav Nir Zvi—
    4-meter high wall of concrete and bricks to be built along a length of approximately 1.5 kilometers.

The city of Lid is situated on the eastern edge of the coastal plain, close to the city of Ramle. In 1948, Lid became a mixed city. As of 2003, the city has a population of 74,000, of whom 72.5 percent are Jews and the rest Arabs. Most of the Arab population lives in poor neighborhoods that suffer from a lack of proper urban planning, poor sanitary conditions, and from high levels of crime and drug trafficking.

Pardes Snir is an Arab neighborhood on the western edge of Lid, with a population of approximately 3,000 (as of 2003). It has a reputation as a disadvantaged neighborhood that suffers from problems in almost all spheres of life due to longstanding neglect. Among other problems, the neighborhood suffers from the absence of a plan regulating construction in order to meet the most basic needs of the population. As a result, and due to the growing needs of the population, most of the construction in the neighborhood is unregulated, and Pardes Snir is developing organically without any planning and without the appropriate infrastructure.

Nir Zvi is a moshav (a cooperative Jewish agricultural community) adjacent to the neighborhood of Pardes Snir. It has a reputation as a prestigious, prosperous and well-maintained community whose Jewish residents come from the middle and upper classes.

On 21 July 2002, Government Decision No. 2264 was adopted. The explanatory comments to the decision, which relates to the rehabilitation of the city of Lid, state that it aims to address the problems faced by weak populations, including the Arab population of the city. However, the decision also included the following measure:

“The Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Housing and Construction will be charged with erecting an acoustic wall between the Pardes Snir neighborhood and Moshav Nir Zvi, and with presenting the Director- General of the Prime Minister’s Offi ce within 14 days with a work plan for the establishment of the said project.”

On 13 June 2003, Local Outline Plan No. GD/475/24 was submitted for approval. One of the goals of this plan was to establish provisions for the construction of a wall alongside the road between the neighborhood of Pardes Snir and the moshav of Nir Zvi. The plan proposed that a wall be erected along the road’s edge and of a height of four meters.

On 23 July 2003, Ludim Local Building and Planning Committee issued a building permit permitting the establishment of a wall between the neighborhood and the moshav. Construction of the wall duly began, but the work was halted in accordance with a temporary injunction issued by the court following an administrative appeal filed by several residents of the neighborhood.¹¹ As of today, approximately one-third of the wall has been constructed.

The residents of Moshav Nir Zvi claim that this is an “acoustic wall.” They also claim that they suffer from burglaries in their homes by drug addicts who come to the Pardes Snir neighborhood to buy drugs, as well as from agricultural losses.¹² A further claim is that apartment prices have dropped by approximately 40 percent due to the proximity to the Arab neighborhood. ¹³ Accordingly, the wall is “needed” in order to “protect” them.

A professional opinion prepared by Bimkom— Planners for Planning Rights regarding this separation wall—suggests that there were planning defects in the establishment of the wall. The opinion shows that, in this case, there is a gross lack of balance between the benefit accruing from the establishment of the wall for one population (the residents of Nir Zvi) and the damage to another, more disadvantaged population (the residents of the Pardes Snir neighborhood). In addition, the decision to establish the wall meets the needs of one group while ignoring those of the other. Furthermore, the wall will impair the quality of life of the residents of Pardes Snir, severely eroding their right to freedom of movement, as well as causing signifi cant aesthetic damage, and—by blocking the breeze—even affecting atmospheric conditions in the community. The wall will transform a local neighborhood road which currently forms an integral part of a living and dynamic urban fabric into a space of geographical, ethnic, racial, social and economic separation.

Discussion

In the three locations where walls have been established, the Jewish residents claim that the intention is to prevent noise hazards allegedly caused by the Arab residents. However, the circumstances in which the walls were established suggest that the use of the term “acoustic wall” is intended to disguise the true nature and purpose of these separations. The length and height of the walls clearly suggests that their true purpose is not “acoustic” separation, but total separation between the two populations, preventing all contact, both physical and visual.¹⁴

The decision by the government to finance the separation wall in Lid/Lod suggests that the establishment of walls and fences is not a response to local problems of noise and thefts, as the Jewish residents have attempted to suggest, but rather an important national issue relating to the preservation of the Jewish character of the state, in general, and the severing of contacts with the Palestinian minority in particular.

The separation walls also reflect the perception of the Palestinian minority by the Jewish majority as a “demographic threat.” Once the Palestinian minority has been defined as a “threat” to the Jewish and Zionist character of the state, the Jewish majority should separate itself from the Palestinians and prevent any contact with the minority population.

In fact, the establishment of walls and fences forms part of a broader trend toward racial separation between the two populations, including the ghettoization of the Palestinian minority. These processes of racial separation and ghettoization are manifested in physical terms both in the territorial separation between the two populations and in the constructions of high walls and fences preventing the natural urban development of the Arab communities. This is compounded by the difficulties faced by Arab residents who attempt to seek more suitable housing opportunities in Jewish communities— difficulties that are the product of racist motives. The net result is a depressing reality of Arab ghettoes surrounded by Jewish communities, and, in some cases, by separation walls and fences.

To date, only three locations have been documented where separation walls have been established. In this respect, it would be inaccurate to depict the separation walls as a common phenomenon in Israeli society. However, the Arab Association for Human Rights (HRA) believes that these walls may serve as a dangerous precedent for the establishment of additional walls and fences in the future. Suggestions have already been heard that a further high separation wall should be established between Pardes Snir neighborhood in Lid and the adjacent Jewish neighborhood of Gannei Aviv. In addition, and against the background of the Separation Barrier that has largely been completed within the Occupied Territories, the idea of the separation of the two populations—Jews and Palestinians, both in the Occupied Territories and inside Israel—seems to have become more popular among the Jewish majority. Accordingly, there is room for concern that in the future, elements within Israel will advocate the establishment of further fences and walls in various locations, thus exacerbating the trend to racial separation and ghettoization.

International human rights law regards racial separation as a gross violation of human rights. Thus, for example, the 9th and 10th paragraphs in the preamble to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965,¹⁵ note that the signatory countries are:

“Convinced that the existence of racial barriers is repugnant to the ideals of any human society, Alarmed by manifestations of racial discrimination still in evidence in some areas of the world and by governmental policies based on racial superiority or hatred, such as policies of apartheid, segregation or separation […]”

The establishment of walls and fences gravely impairs the right to equality and human dignity of the Palestinian minority, which is the weakest population group in Israel in political, economic and social terms, both because of the walls’ coercive manner of establishment and their inherent nature. By establishing such walls, the Jewish majority sends a clear message to the Palestinian minority that they are not welcome citizens and that there is no possibility for the two populations to live together. The walls and fences also severely and brutally prevent possibilities for future expansion and development of the Arab communities, since they constitute an irreversible physical obstacle to the different development of the area in the future, thus violating the right to planning and to open space.

The HRA’s Urgent Call to Action

The HRA believes that the establishment of the separation walls and fences is an unacceptable policy that carries grave consequences for relations between the Jewish majority and the Palestinian minority. The HRA believes that the establishment of these walls gravely violates the basic human rights of the Palestinian minority to equality and human dignity, and constitutes a violation of international law.

In accordance with international law, every state is obliged to act effectively to prevent the racial separation of different populations.¹⁶ However, the State of Israel is not only failing to prevent the establishment of such walls and fences, but is actually encouraging and assisting in these actions. Accordingly, the HRA urges the State of Israel to cease this violation of international law, to act immediately to demolish all the walls and fences already established, and to prevent the establishment of additional walls and fences in the future.

The HRA also calls on the international community committed to peace and human rights to take all possible and necessary steps to halt the growing legitimization of the phenomenon of racial separation in Israel. The HRA warns that this phenomenon is potentially explosive and could jeopardize any chance for proper relations and a normal joint life for both populations, particularly in the case of a national minority that will continue to exist and live within the state. In accordance with international law, every state is obliged to act effectively to prevent the racial separation of different populations. However, the State of Israel is not only failing to prevent the establishment of such walls and fences, but is actually encouraging and assisting in these actions.

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Notes

¹ The mixed cities include Haifa, Akka, Jaffa- Tel Aviv, Lid and Ramle.

² E. Benvenisti, “‘Separate but Equal’ in the Allocation of Land in Israel for Residential Uses,” Iyunie Mishpat 21(3), 769, p. 771 (in Hebrew).

³ 347 US 483, 495 (1954).

⁴ Letter from Aryeh Simchoni (head of the Hof HaCarmel regional council) to the members of the council of Jisr Al-Zarka dated February 26, 2003.

⁵ Letter from Yona David (district inspector, Building Inspection Unit, Ministry of the Interior— Haifa District Authority) to Rachel Shalem (engineer of the Hof HaCarmel committee) dated December 22, 2003.

⁶ Letter from Eli Tal (director of the Services and Assets Division in the Qesarya Development Company) to Ya`aqub Jubran (engineer of the Jisr Al-Zarka local council) dated December 5, 2002; letter from Leah Schneider (spokesperson of the Qesarya Development Company) to the HRA dated November 6, 2005.

⁷ Lili Galili, “Yesha Is Here,” Ha’aretz, December 18, 2003 (in Hebrew).

⁸ Average per capita income in Jawarish is NIS 848, compared to the national average of NIS 1,846.

⁹ Average per capita income in Gannei Dan is NIS 1,719.

¹⁰ Yuval Tamari, “Separation and Planning in a Mixed City: The Case of Western Ramle” (thesis toward an MA degree in Urban Planning) (in Hebrew); Yuval Tamari, “A Planning Survey in the Arab Neighborhoods of Ramle” (Bimkom—Planners for Planning Rights; Shatil— Support and Consultation Services for Social Change Organization Founded by the New Israel Fund; the Arab Center for Alternative Planning) (in Hebrew).

¹¹ Several legal proceedings have been instigated in various courts by the Human Rights Clinic at the Faculty of Law of Tel Aviv University, on behalf of several residents of the Pardes Snir neighborhood. The principal claims of the residents relate to legal defects in the process of issuing the building permit, as well as planning defects in the establishment of the wall.

¹² Larry Ben-David, “The Separation Wall within the Green Line,” Ma’ariv Online, March 3, 2003 (in Hebrew); Dalia Tal, “Why Should the Poor of Lid Build a Wall for the Rich of Nir Zvi,” Globes, June 26, 2003 (in Hebrew).

¹³ “Jews Can Leave Lid and Ramle; the Arabs Have Nowhere to Go,” Ha’aretz (exclusive to the internet edition), December 3, 2000 (in Hebrew).

¹⁴ This is confirmed by the comments of the secretary of Moshav Nir Zvi, Yaron Levy, regarding the separation wall between the moshav and Pardes Nir neighborhood in Lid. He stated that: “The authorities made it clear to us that they had no solution for the problems, so we suggested that we build a massive wall separating us, preventing passage and even eye contact.” Larry Ben-David, Note 12 above.

¹⁵ The convention became valid with regard to Israel on February 2, 1979, and has been signed to date by 170 countries.

¹⁶ Article 3 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965 states that: “States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature in territories under their jurisdiction.”

Ramadin:
Bleak Prospects in a Closed Military Zone

by Ahmad Jaradat and Justyna Pietralik

Al-Ramadin, a village of Palestinian refugees in the south of Hebron, is facing a second dispossession. As the construction of the Wall proceeds, the village is becoming another disjointed, shrunken territory, losing a sizeable chunk of its lands and being isolated from the rest of the West Bank by a series of checkpoints. The territorial fragmentation is compounded by the opaque administrative status of al-Ramadin—though the village lies to the north of the Green Line, Israel has, in effect, appropriated the municipal lands and declared the village a closed military zone.

The majority of al-Ramadin’s 3,500 residents are Bedouin refugees from nearby Be’er Sheva, and are registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).¹ During Jordanian rule, the villagers refused to be housed in an UNRWA refugee camp, choosing instead to live in tents and caves, hoping to return to their homes and lands. With the subsequent Israeli occupation of 1967, the villages became more permanent and a formal infrastructure was laid down. Inhabitants bought land from the nearby al-Dahireya, constructed roads, built schools and permanent housing. Due to their proximity to Israeli cities, the people depended on work inside Israel, and on animal husbandry and agriculture, despite the arid climate of the region,

At the beginning of the 1980s, swathes of land around the village were confiscated in order to create three new Israeli settlements. Ashkelot, a settlement to the north-west of the village, now lies uncomfortably close to al-Ramadin; to the east of the village extends the Tena settlement, and to the west, Sansana, established initially as a military base in 1998. The three settlements effectively surround the village of al-Ramadin, and the settler bypass road, which connects Ashkelot to Routes 31 and 60, cuts Ramadin off from the rest of the West Bank.

Preparations for the building of the Segregation Wall began roughly a year ago. Initial construction blueprints showed that al-Ramadin would be separated completely, sandwiched between the Wall and the Green Line. Due to protests, legal action and international pressure, however, a new Wall map was released in February 2005.² According to the new plan, the Wall has been rerouted to allow geographical contiguity between al-Ramadin and the rest of the West Bank, but large patches of the village’s agricultural lands and pastures, as well as the Awlad Arab Cemetary, will effectively belong to Israel. Although the exact plans of the Wall have not been revealed, the village stands to lose a substantial part of its land. Plans from May 2005 showed the construction of the Wall appropriating some 1000 dunum. ³ ”The Wall takes the land,” shrugs Anwar Zagarneh, an English teacher at the UNRWA school.

In addition, since May 2004, there have been four rounds of house demolitions and the destruction of wells in the village, and there are further pending demolition orders for more homes and wells.⁴ As the groundwork for the construction of the Wall was being laid out, the village was declared a closed military area. At the main entrance to the village, a checkpoint was set up, and control of access was further beefed up with the establishment of fl ying checkpoints⁵ on the road between the village and neighboring city al-Dahireya, a gateway to the other Palestinian cities in the West Bank. Only vehicles belonging to residents or in possession of special permits are allowed to enter the city. Those who leave the village through alternate ways, such as crossing through a series of valleys, expose themselves to signifi cant danger from both the soldiers and unpredictable weather conditions.

“They did not want another Bil’in,” ventured Ghalib Zagharna, a 32-year-old engineer active in local communities against the Wall. Although activists have held demonstrations against the Wall outside the village, stricter restrictions on access have made it virtually impossible for protesters to meet with residents. “What is happening now is kept away from the cameras,” said Asmi al-Shukhi, general coordinator of public committees in Palestine.

Basic Services Impacted

What is happening now, indeed, is likely just a bud of crises to come, with levels of basic services deteriorating gradually. The provision of healthcare has become more diffi cult, with closures and access restrictions, with the two clinics inside the village facing unpredictable staff delays. Each day, doctors and nurses from outside al-Ramadin spend hours at the checkpoint, waiting while their permits and identity cards are processed. Emergencies must be treated in al-Dahireya, which is only possible if no general closure of the village has been declared.

In December, Nafa Zagharna, 34, suffering from intense abdominal pain, was driven to the checkpoint by her brother. A general closure of al-Ramadin had been announced, however, and soldiers refused to let the car continue to al-Dahireya. While Mrs. Zagharna and her brother waited at the checkpoint, her appendix ruptured. A further two hours passed before the ambulance from al-Dahireya arrived.

The regime of closure and control is also affecting the provision of education in the village. At the UNRWA-funded school, most of the 35 staff members come from outside the village. Despite the constant intervention of the headmaster and the UNRWA coordinator, the daily routine of extended security checks varies little.

Anis Abu Shanab, a 28-year-old teacher, is one of the employees commuting from outside al-Ramadin. “Daily we are facing the same questions,” he says. “‘You are not from al-Ramadin. This is Israel, you need a special permit to go,’ they tell me. They take our I.D. cards, our teacher’s permits. The teachers and I are gathered at the checkpoint, in the presence of our headmaster. Sometimes the education ministry coordinator comes to facilitate our entrance. They let us go, but after one or two hours. The soldiers check ‘the issue’ every day.”

With classes delayed for uncertain lengths of time, the provision of education is a challenge. Higher education students face the same difficulties—stopped at the checkpoint for up to two hours, they find it difficult to follow classes; many drop out or transfer to a university with a more flexible learning arrangement. Kifaya Suliaman, 22, who had been studying at Hebron University transferred to the Al- Quds Open University, which doesn’t require its students to attend regular class at the campus. “A lot of students do the same thing,” she explains. “It’s difficult to follow the semester [otherwise].”

Work possibilities at the village offer little encouragement for the students, as the ramifications of the Wall construction and the closures on the means of subsistence will be severe. Access to land is crucial to this refugee community, most of whom practice a combination of shepherding and dry-land agriculture, relying on goats and sheep for food and income generation. ⁶ Large areas of land are necessary for the livestock grazing. The removal of arable land for the construction of the Wall, combined with the restrictions on vehicle entry, and thus the transportation of feed and other products, are forcing the villagers to sell off some of their livestock in order to feed the others.

Khalil Abu Qa’ud, head of a family of 45, says that for him, the choice is only between feeding his sheep and feeding his family. “I cannot afford the feed, I have to buy it from the market now,” he says. “I would need to buy tons of it, wheat, corn.” Abu Qakun used to own 700 dunum of land, some of which have been already been confiscated to lay down the rudiments of the Wall, and others which became inaccessible due to the proximity of the construction site. How much of the 700 dunum will remain his after the completion of the Wall is unclear.

With the confiscation of the land, the inhabitants have grown increasingly economically dependent on work inside Israel. ⁷ When the Segregation Wall is built, however, it will be nearly impossible for the villagers to cross the Green Line. Due to its ambiguous status, the restrictions on movement, and the abysmal infrastructure network—for five years there has not been running water or a steady supply of electricity to the area—donors are reluctant to invest in the area as well.

A Fragmented Social Network

With links to other cities difficult and, at times, impossible to negotiate, the social fabric of the community is breaking apart. Securing the special permit required to enter is problematic, even for extended family members from other villages. “Our social life is damaged, completely” comments Ghalil Zagharna, an engineer active in the local committees against the Wall. “If someone dies, for example, the extended family cannot come to give condolences, pay respects.” Residents also complain that it has become more difficult for men to marry, as families from other cities do not want their daughters moving to the village.⁸

Restrictions on access remain in place even during major family celebrations, such as the November Eid al-Fitr. Families of some al-Ramadin villagers, after having traveled for a considerable length of time from other West Bank cities, were not allowed entry into the village. Brief, harried reunions took place at the checkpoint.

As the village falls into a complicated maze of administrative, territorial and military control, its residents will find themselves gradually distanced from the land and people beyond the checkpoint’s ‘city gates.’ With resulting social and economic problems gathering, al-Ramadin is a microcosm of the cantonisation and isolation crippling already vulnerable communities in the West Bank.

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Notes

¹ http://www.un.org/unrwa/emergency/barrier/ case_studies/ramadin.pdf.

² http://www.poica.org/editor/case_studies/ view.php?recordID=636.

³ Arab Ramadin—South Hebron: Facing the Path of Apartheid. Community Voices, The Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign,17 May 2005.

⁴ http://www.un.org/unrwa/emergency/barrier/ case_studies/ramadin.pdf.

⁵ A flying checkpoint is a temporary checkpoint, and generally one that can be set up or dismantled very quickly.

⁶ http://www.Poica.org.

⁷ Arab Ramadin—South Hebron: Facing the Path of Apartheid. Community Voices, The Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign, 17 May 2005.

⁸ http://www.un.org/unrwa/emergency/barrier/ profiles/alfei.html.

Some Reflections on the Bil’in Generation

by Michael Warschawski

While I write this column, the Bil’in international conference has not yet begun. My only wish is that it will be a great success, both in terms of participation and content. For the next two days, 20 – 21 February, hundreds of Palestinian, Israeli and international activists will exchange ideas on the issues of the Israeli Occupation, non-violent struggle and cooperation between the various components of the resistance movement against occupation, colonialism and Israeli policies regarding the Segregation Wall.

During the course of the last year, the struggle in Bil’in has become the most emblematic symbol of resistance against the Israeli Occupation, and the Wall in particular. One can identify several reasons for this. First, unlike in many other mobilizations against the Wall and land confiscations, the struggle in Bil’in has been continuous: for more than a year and a half, hundreds of activists have been permanently mobilized in a variety of protest actions, with at least one demonstration per week, Second, it has been a consistently inventive, non-violent mobilization, able to unmask the Israeli military’s provocative violence, and its permanent lies aimed at justifying the use of violence against non-violent demonstrators. Third, the struggle in Bil’in has been real joint Palestinian- Israeli struggle, built on trust, mutual respect and true cooperation on the ground. Fourth, it opened a space to a longstanding international involvement and the continuous active presence of dozens of activists coming from all over the world.

This combination of factors can be understood only if one takes into account the specific characteristics of the main actors and leaders of the Bil’in struggle: a new generation of activists who, in their majority, were still children during the first Intifada and for whom the Lebanese war is almost prehistoric. This new generation is different from previous ones for at least two reasons: on the one hand it is motivated by a high sense of justice/injustice much more than by ideology, and, on the other hand, it is a very ‘internationalist’—or, to be more precise, global—generation, with almost no ‘national’, ideological or even sentimental bounds. For these Palestinian as well as Israeli activists, a cross-border attitude is almost natural, and the links they have been able to build throughout the last couple of years are not even necessarily built on a stricto sensu internationalist ideology, but rather, on a global perception of a world without borders.

This can also explain the relatively easy working relationship between the local activists and the internationals, all sons and daughters of the global movement, the post-Seattle generation.

I have heard old-time activists complain about the lack of a strong “political basis” to the activities in Bil’in, and especially to the Palestinian- Israeli cooperation. I do not share this criticism: there has definitely been a break of continuity with the long chain of accumulated experience during the last thirty-five years of struggle against the Occupation and Israeli colonialism (as well as with one and a half century of working class struggle for emancipation), and this may lead to a repeating of the mistakes of the past.

But this is precisely what Seattle and Bil’in are all about: after the major historical defeats of our generation and its difficulty in repositioning itself in a mono-polar world—in addition to an ongoing global preventive war of recolonization, and the need to react adequately to the overall neo-liberal political and ideological offensive— the new generation of activists has to find its own way, through its own experiences of trial and error. We have too many doubts and questions ourselves to be able to provide the confidence and the clear answers that this new generation may have expected from us. Worse still would be if we acted as if we had no doubts, and merely ended up repeating the slogans of the past, losing any chance to have an impact on all those young men and women who are living and acting in radically different global and local contexts.

It is in spirit that I am going to Bil’in demonstrations; it is in this spirit that I intend to participate in the Bil’in international conference: with admiration for the dedication and the political intelligence of the young activists who have carried this struggle until now, and with a readiness to learn new ways to make politics in order to be able to exchange experiences of different generations acting out of different contexts, and with modesty.

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The Bil’in Struggle Regroups—
Conference Summary

by Kobi Snitz and Abdallah Abu Rahman

The small village of Bil’in in the Ramallah district has earned itself a reputation for its creative struggle against Israel’s “Separation Barrier” (the Wall). To mark one year of struggle, the popular committee, which leads the struggle in Bil’in, has hosted a two-day international conference. The event, entitled “The Joint Struggle and the Nonviolent International Struggle Against the Wall and the Occupation,” began on 20 February 2006.

Around 500 people from Palestine, Israel, and abroad attended. The conference featured presentations, as well as workshops on the struggles at different locations in Palestine. The workshops, which were the focus of the meeting, offered an opportunity for activists to reflect on their experiences and propose new ideas, as well as ensure participants remained actively engaged. Workshops were practical and included topics such as avoiding scheduling conflicts between several demonstrations, how to apply political pressure on certain companies and the logistics of transportation to demonstrations.

Kadura Fares, Uri Avnery, Kais Abdelkarim, Kasem El Hatib and Mustafa Barghouti spoke at the opening session. Next, representatives introduced the workshops which focused on the struggle in their area—featured were the Salfit area, Tulkarem area, Bil’in, South Hebron Mountain, Jerusalem and its surrounding areas and the struggle in Israel and abroad. With the help of facilitators and translators (many from the Taawan organization), workshop participants discussed the pros and cons of joint struggle and the methods of nonviolent resistance, all from a practical point of view. Basic agreement on methods of struggle seemed to exist among participants. In areas with a history of joint struggle, the history of the protests was reviewed and lessons were drawn; proposals for the future included taking the initiative in confronting Israeli actions and ways of improving the coordination between the activists.

On the second day of the conference, two proposals were selected by the participants to be carried out in the future. The first was to hold a coordinated demonstration on the first Friday of every month, in different areas of Palestine, and to call on supporting organizations to hold demonstrations abroad. These demonstrations are to have a common theme such as a common symbol or type of direct action used. The second decision was to repeat the conference next year somewhere in Palestine where active popular struggle is going on, to preserve the experiences gained in this struggle and to rejuvenate activists after another year of struggle.

The conference was concluded with a march to a new center for joint struggle, which was established by the people of Bil’in on lands which are in danger of being appropriated by the construction of the Wall. Participants planted olive trees and inaugurated a new football field with a game.

The process of organizing the conference presented a glimpse of the difficulty of living under Occupation in Palestine. It was, apparently, easier for participants to arrive from Paris than it was to get to Bil’in from Tulkarem. Indeed, there were more Israeli or European participants than Palestinian participants.

Organizers also faced difficult political decisions about the conference program, especially concerning the speakers in the opening session. Perhaps the most difficult decision was the invitation of Hamas to the conference. After much debate, the popular committee in Bil’in asked them to attend. The Hamas declined, however, saying its representatives were busy with the start of the legislative session.

The conference was widely considered a success. The many contacts made and ideas exchanged are an opportunity for the struggle to gain strength; however, the true value of the conference will be graded by how it has impacted the participants. As one of the participants summarized, we have succeeded in the theoretical struggle. We understand what joint nonviolent struggle means; the question is, Will we succeed in practice? That is, will we see a large nonviolent joint intifada against the Wall and the Occupation?

Abdallah Abu Rahman is a member of the Bil’in Popular Committee Against the Wall and the Occupation, Kobi Snitz is an Israeli activist. They were both among the conference organizers.

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Greens, Calling for Palestinian Rights, Urge Divestment from Israel

Monday, November 28, 2005

Contacts:
Scott McLarty, Media Coordinator, 202-518- 5624, This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it
Starlene Rankin, M/edia Coordinator, 916- 995-3805, This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it
Mohammed K. Abed, Wisconsin Green Party, 608-332-9900, This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it
Justine McCabe, International Committee, 860-354-1822, This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it

WASHINGTON, D.C. — The Green Party of the United States has endorsed a statement calling for a comprehensive strategy of boycott and divestment that would pressure the government of Israel to guarantee human rights for Palestinians.

The resolution, introduced by the Wisconsin Green Party and passed in the Green Party’s National Committee, seeks reversal of Israel’s current policies. The text is appended below.

“Israel’s treatment of Palestinians—those who are Israeli citizens as well as those in the territories—is comparable in many ways to South African apartheid, and has resulted in a cycle of violence and lack of security for both Israelis and Palestinians,” said Mohammed Abed, a member of the Green Party of Wisconsin. “A stable and just resolution of the conflict requires the full realization of the human rights of Palestinians and Israelis.”

Greens allege that the ‘peace process’ will ensure neither peace nor human rights, and have called the Gaza Disengagement Plan a smokescreen to buy time and accumulate political capital for the Sharon government while it pursues a plan to force Palestinians into disconnected reservations o