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News from Within Vol. XXII No. 3   February 2006

Beyond the Hamas Ascendency
  

a publication of
The Alternative Information Center

Letter from the Editors

On 25 January 2006, the Palestinian people voted in the first Palestinian Legislative Council elections in ten years. While many projected outcomes of a Hamas plurality, in the final tally, taking seventy-six seats out of a total of 132, Hamas won a surprising majority position in the legislature.

Numerous Israeli and international politicians and media pundits have been arguing that this victory for Hamas in the elections was a deliberate Palestinian “vote against peace.” Yet, they exhibit no aspiration to understand the complicated social and political context of contemporary Palestine, the results of Israel’s longstanding unilateralist approach, the continuing expansion of the Israeli Occupation, or the very bases on which the Palestinians themselves made their voting decisions. Instead, a very simplistic equation—that a vote for Hamas is a vote for terror and against peace—is projected. These assertions do not stand up to the evidence, however.

First, it’s important to highlight that, due to a two-tiered electoral system featuring multi-member districts and a national proportional list, the elections results do not reflect a strict proportion of votes cast for a particular party or candidates aligned with that party. The multi-member district system penalizes ticket-splitting and rewards parties with greater cohesion.¹ Thus, Hamas was able to win without receiving the majority of the Palestinian vote, a little more than 44.4 percent, in comparison to 41.4 percent going to Fatah. Moreover, the remaining 14 percent of the popular vote went largely to secular parties, made up of former Fatah members and leftist parties such as the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine. This means that over 55 percent of the Palestinian vote did not go to parties or independent candidates aligned with Hamas. And significantly, time after time—including in the run-up to the elections— opinion polls of the Palestinian public have revealed that a majority of Palestinians are actually willing and interested in a realistic negotiated settlement.

Between 6-15 December 2005, a little over one month before the PLC elections, a joint Palestinian/Israeli opinion poll was conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.2 Fifty-five percent of Palestinians polled stated that they would support an agreement on final borders, based on the 1967 lines, except for about three percent of the West Bank, which would be exchanged for an Israeli territory of equal size. Moreover, 64 percent of the Palestinians polled supported “a compromise on ending the conflict that would state that when the permanent status agreement is fully implemented, it will mean the end of the conflict and no further claims will be made by either side.”

Yet, disregarding the implications of these polls, the current Israeli administration has taken the election results as a cue to continue its unilateralist approach with additional zeal, and begin to implement its designs to formalize control over large tracts of the OPT through annexation.

Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has declared that the Israeli government will not enter into any negotiations with a Palestinian government that includes Hamas, so long as Hamas does not lay down its arms and accept the Israel’s “right to exist.” This, despite the fact that, according to the same December poll discussed above: “50 percent of the Israelis support […] negotiations with Hamas if this is called for in order to reach a compromise agreement with the Palestinians.” While this poll was conducted before the elections, it was well known in Israel at the time that there was a significant chance Hamas would either finish the elections in a close second to Fatah or gain a plurality of the Palestinian vote. This reveals a significant disconnect between the Israeli government’s hard-line stance and the more conciliatory or ambivalent Israeli population.

Moreover, Acting PM Olmert stated on 7 February that Israel would make unilateral moves to determine ‘its final borders.’ In what can only be understood as an attempt to implement a plan originally spelled out as far back as 1967 by General Yigal Allon, Israel would annex significant portions of the OPT, leaving islands of Palestinian autonomy surrounded on all sides by Israeli control. Specifically, Olmert declared intentions to annex “the main settlement blocs and preserve united Jerusalem. [...] Ma’aleh Adumim, Gush Etzion and Ariel will be part of the state of Israel” (Aluf Benn and Mazal Mualem in Ha’aretz, 8 Feb). In addition, he vowed that Israel would retain control over the Jordan Valley, which would effectively cut the Occupied Palestinian Territories off from Jordan. Implementation of this plan would never be accepted by the Palestinian people and is a sure recipe for perpetual war. Moreover, this once again, reveals a strong disparity between the Israeli government and public over the willingness to make concessions. According to an opinion poll on the subject of Jerusalem, published in January 2006 by the Tazpit Research Institute for the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS), 63 percent of Israelis polled stated that they would be willing to give up control over East Jerusalem or more, in exchange for a settlement with the Palestinians. In addition, Israeli opinion polls, including the joint poll mentioned above, have consistently shown that the Israeli public is willing to make concessions based on the 1967 borders.

Potentially more devastating in the immediate future for the Palestinian population is the likelihood of a drastic cut in the flow of funds to both the PA and Palestinian civil institutions. Yet, while the US and Europe may have the freedom of stopping the flow of funds, this would not be so simple for the Israeli government to do. Israel can elect not to recognize Hamas and/or negotiate with it, but the victory of Hamas in the PLC elections does not give Israel the right to abdicate any of its legal responsibilities. By international law, Israel, as an occupying power, is legally responsible for the wellbeing of the population under its occupation. According to Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention: “In the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease one year after the general close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be bound, for the duration of the occupation. [...]” These obligations include the provision of education, food, medical supplies and health facilities, etc. (please see box on page 5 for specific obligations). The fact that up to the present, these basic services have been largely provided by the PA, local and international NGOs and civil society institutions, does not detract from the fact that, as the occupying power, Israel bears sole legal responsibility.

If either the Israeli government or international governments/institutions sever funding for the Palestinians, and there is a subsequent breakdown in the PA and/ or civil Palestinian institutions leading to a humanitarian crisis, the result would be nothing other than a war crime committed by Israel. The Israeli government has only three options regarding adherence to their obligations. It must either make certain that the PA and civil society institutions continue to function and provide for the basic needs of the Palestinian population, or take over these responsibilities directly. The third option, one that would release Israel from its legal responsibility over the Palestinians, is the one which Israel has not shown any willingness to entertain. Namely, an immediate and total end to the Occupation, recognition of the Palestinian Right of Return, and respect for the civil, human, and national rights of the Palestinians.

Some of the relevant articles from the Fourth Geneva Convention¹ relating to an Occupying Power’s responsibilities for the provision of basic services to the people it occupies:

Article 50
“The Occupying Power shall, with the cooperation of the national and local authorities, facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children. The Occupying Power shall take all necessary steps to facilitate the identification of children and the registration of their parentage. [...] Should the local institutions be inadequate for the purpose, the Occupying Power shall make arrangements for the maintenance and education, if possible by persons of their own nationality, language and religion, of children who are orphaned or separated from their parents as a result of the war and who cannot be adequately cared for by a near relative or friend. [...] The Occupying Power shall not hinder the application of any preferential measures in regard to food, medical care and protection against the effects of war, which may have been adopted prior to the occupation in favor of children under fifteen years, expectant mothers, and mothers of children under seven years.”

Article 55
“To the fullest extent of the means available to it the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate. The Occupying Power may not requisition foodstuffs, articles or medical supplies available in the occupied territory, except for use by the occupation forces and administration personnel, and then only if the requirements of the civilian population have been taken into account. Subject to the provisions of other international Conventions, the Occupying Power shall make arrangements to ensure that fair value is paid for any requisitioned goods.[...]”

Article 56
To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory, with particular reference to the adoption and application of the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics. Medical personnel of all categories shall be allowed to carry out their duties. [...]” In adopting measures of health and hygiene and in their implementation, the Occupying Power shall take into consideration the moral and ethical susceptibilities of the population of the occupied territory.

Article 59
“If the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal. Such schemes, which may be undertaken either by States or by impartial humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, shall consist, in particular, of the provision of consignments of foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing. All Contracting Parties shall permit the free passage of these consignments and shall guarantee their protection. [...]”

Article 60
“Relief consignments shall in no way relieve the Occupying Power of any of its responsibilities under Articles 55, 56 and 59. The Occupying Power shall in no way whatsoever divert relief consignments from the purpose for which they are intended, except in cases of urgent necessity, in the interests of the population of the occupied territory and with the consent of the Protecting Power.”

Notes:

¹ For a discussion of the entire poll, see here: http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2005/p18ejoint.html

² Over a 100 Fatah candidates ran as independents,for instance, and there were severalsmaller lists which appealed to Fatah voters, further diluting Fatah’s chances for legislative seats.

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The Palestinian Legislative council’s Elections:
A New Stage and Old Questions

by Nassar Ibrahim

Some have called the results of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections, which took place on 25 January 2006, an Earthquake; others describe it as a “Hamas Tsunami,” and still others have declared it a “comprehensive revolution.”

How do we evaluate the results of the elections in an objective manner, without emotion or ideology? What is the likely shape and scope of the coming phase?

First, the world must admit that the Palestinian people, in the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem, have given clear proof that they are a nation deserving of respect and honor. They were able, across the whole spectrum of Palestinian politics, and despite the trying circumstances imposed by occupation, to show a high standard of national responsibility, acknowledged by foreign observers who expressed their full satisfaction with the way the elections were performed.

The Palestinians passed the test of democracy with excellent results, giving the world a manifest impression that they are deserving of freedom as much as any other people. The elections opened new levels of commitment to people’s choice, the transfer of authority, and the effectiveness of a multiparty political system.

Evaluating the Results of the Election

The whole world agrees that the results of the elections came as a big surprise; even the Hamas movement didn’t expect such overwhelming victory. Fatah, on the other hand, in its worst nightmares, did not expect such a humiliating defeat.

Most had predicted a significant shift in the balance of political power within Palestinian society, in which there would be a shrinking in the number of seats for Fatah in the PLC and a concomitant increase in Hamas seats. But no one expected the gap to be so wide between the two political groups. Some political observers, on the other hand, forecasted that Fatah would still preserve a slight majority in the Legislative Council to face an ardent and strong Hamas, Left and independent opposition.

The results of the elections were radically different from these conservative expectations; what happened was in fact a revolution in the Palestinian social and political sphere.

Prior to the elections, there were some serious indications of what was to come, al- though they were not given the deserved political analysis or the required attention. When Hamas won the elections and took the overwhelming majority in the municipal elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip last year, there was a strong indication of the seriousness of the coming change in the PLC elections, a change that would go far beyond the political status quo which has long been prevailing in the region.

Before going through an analysis of the dimensions of this shift, let us take a look at the final results of these elections as announced by the Central Elections Commission.

From a first glance at the results, it is clear that Hamas and the independent candidates who support Hamas got 78 seats in the Legislative Council. On the other hand, all the others including the Fatah movement got 54 seats, of which 45 are for Fatah, 7 for the Left (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front, PPP, Fida and Mustafa Barghouti) and two for the Third Way (Hanan Ashrawi).

It is also clear from the results that the difference between Hamas and Fatah according to the Party system (The Lists System) was marginal (44.4 percent) for Hamas and (41.4 percent) for Fatah. This means that Fatah supporters backed the party on a national basis, but avoided endorsing particular candidates. The problem, and consequently the defeat inflicted on the Fatah movement, was the competition in the district vote, where Hamas got 45 seats from a total of 66, while Fatah got only 17, with 4 seats going to the independent candidates who were supported by Hamas.

The lesson derived from competition for the district votes, which was a knockout blow to Fatah from Hamas, was in fact a harsh lesson for the Fatah candidates from the public, who saw them as examples of corruption and failure. The results also revealed the insignificant presence of the Left in the street.

This fact showed clearly that the Left forces in the Palestinian society haven’t convinced the public that they were a realistic alternative force for change. What made things even worse for the Left was the weakness and disunity of its various movements. Consequently, the Palestinian Leftist forces wound up small, isolated and with a narrow constituency.

Some analysts contributed Hamas’s victory to religious factors and the underestimation of the strength of Hamas by the Fatah movement. They believe that Hamas would interfere in personal life and impose the wearing of the Islamic headdress.

In fact, Hamas achieved this overwhelming victory not through religious sloganeering but through its political role in calling for resistance, confronting the Occupation, and preserving the national rights for the Palestinians— those rights which were either stolen or overlooked in Oslo and the Road Map. The other factors which were a real catalyst for the victory of Hamas were its criticism to the Fatah and Palestinian Authority’s performance on both the social and economic levels, and the necessity of fighting corruption.

For this reason, Hamas raised the slogan of “Change and Reform” in the elections.

Therefore, the results of the recent election reflected an overwhelming Palestinian desire for change and significant restructuring of the political, as well as the social, body. The Palestinian people, who gave Fatah a period of ten years to rectify its position and institutions, are now evaluating the results.

The Palestinian people say they support the Hamas movement, not because it is better than Fatah, or because of its religious power, but because they are aware of the failures and unacceptable performance of Fatah. This means that the overwhelming support Hamas received from the Palestinian public is not an absolute, open one, or a blank check to do as it pleases. It is giving Hamas an opportunity, challenging the movement to work for the benefit of the people and provide political, economic, as well as security solutions, which Fatah failed to offer in the last ten years.

So, it is not a shift of ideological alignment from Fatah to Hamas, but one that challenges them both, whereby an account will be tallied at the end of the four years to discern the difference in performance between the two groups.

The election represents a historical turning point in the Palestinian political and democratic process. To be fair, we have to give Fatah credit for allowing the democratic process to move forward within Palestinian society, promoting the further development of democratic political forces in the entire region. And the elections were ample proof that no political leadership is immune to critique, and this will be true also in the future, whether they are Fatah or Hamas. Every four years, everyone will hold his breath, expecting the unexpected.

Thus, the victory of Hamas in these elections is not eternal or final; it is in fact an opportunity given to Hamas to prove that it is able to meet the current political and social challenges facing the Palestinians. Any future achievement by Hamas on the political and social fronts will stem from the desire of the Palestinian public for change, and the exposure of Fatah’s failure during the past years. However, Hamas cannot build a future by only exposing the failure of others. The important challenge facing Hamas is whether they will succeed in making positive changes.

So, while in the zero sum game of the electoral process, the failure of any one political force is a victory for the opposition parties, this fact is in no way a predictor of the opposition’s future success.

The Outcome as Reflecting the Present Sociopolitical Circumstances of Palestinian Society

For the Fatah movement, the results were catastrophic, taking into consideration the fact that the movement was the major power in the PLO and consequently, the Palestinian Authority, for a considerable period of time.

This defeat puts the Fatah movement in a new historic phase, in which it must come face to face with a number of questions about its role in the past years, its current circumstances, and its future challenges.

The biggest and most important challenge facing the Fatah movement at present is its capacity to read, comprehend and evaluate the depth of its failure. Will it be able to stand on its feet again and reorganize its base constituency? Will it be able to learn the necessary lessons from its previous experience, and utilize it for the future challenges? Or will it start blaming one side and criticizing the other, resulting in nothing but more turmoil within its ranks and leading towards further defeats?

The biggest challenge facing Fatah and the Left forces is not the fact that Hamas came out victorious, but the underlying causes for this great and unexpected defeat for Fatah and the Left.

Dealing with the crucial issues will lead to positive dialogue, self-criticism and understanding of the apparent challenges. Moreover, it will reveal the true causes of the defeat. The questions will not answered solely by evaluating policies and social programs and fighting corruption, but goes far beyond this.

Is Fatah’s political structure—created forty years ago— still suitable to lead the masses, or is the Movement in a bad need of infusing new blood into its organs?

I say this for a simple reason –there are some who attribute Fatah’s failure to the rivalry among its factions and its disunity. Though blame can be assigned this way, the more important question is still unanswered. Why wasn’t the Fatah movement united? And what caused these internal contradictions?

It was not internal rivalries, but the central political and economic forces within Fatah, who put their personal interests above the greater interests of the movement and the Palestinian public.

Additional factors leading to this electoral loss were the difference in the mentality and age between old and new Fatah members, the gap between the rich and poor, the political differences — between those who prefer resistance and those who adopt negotiations as a means to liberate the land, for instance, or between those who were for or against Oslo. All these factors contributed to division inside the Fatah movement and consequently led to the defeat of Fatah in the elections.

What made things even worse was the reluctance of the movement to struggle against its corruption and the personal interests of groups and individuals within the movement.

These factors intensified conflict within the movement, eventually leading to a breakdown. This was clearly reflected in the rejection by several factions, especially during the primaries and the recent elections of the Legislative Council, of orders from the Fatah hierarchy.

Fatah is now faced with a true internal challenge for a reorganization of its vision, programs, structure and leadership. There is another challenge facing Fatah, related to its strategy and ways of dealing with the results of the elections. Will Fatah act maturely and prudently or will it put itself in endless turmoil, ultimately leading to even more fatal mistakes in the future.

Fatah is now facing a number of challenges and has several options:

• To turn its back on all the calls of Hamas to participate in a coalition and bear a part of the responsibility, which would consequently push Hamas into a corner to face the political and social confrontation alone, without providing any cover for the new Hamas leadership. Yet, this will also mean giving Hamas free reign to restructure the Palestinian Authority in a way that would serve its policy. This will also lead to a very difficult relationship between the Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas on one side and Hamas leadership on the other.

• The second option would be for Fatah to participate in the government in order to protect its very existence and work to deter Hamas from inflicting a radical change in the government structure and its institutions.

• The third choice for Fatah is to reactivate the Palestinian PLO, with its different organs—The Palestinian National Council (PNC), and the Executive Committee—in an attempt to deter Hamas from fully controlling the Palestinian Legislative Council. This is a very important card in the hands of Fatah, as the PNC, the highest representative body, which represents all Palestinians around the world and has the authority to sign agreements as the PLO, is still the sole and the legal representative of the Palestinian people.

Whatever opposition or choices Fatah adopts, it is almost certain that it will not give Hamas a free hand to act unilaterally and will do its best to complicate things for Hamas and magnify its wrongs. In the light of these facts, how will Hamas respond?

It is quite clear that the size of victory has stunned Hamas. Inasmuch as they perceive it as a great achievement and a cause to celebrate, it creates many serious challenges for Hamas.

There is definitely a difference between Hamas as an oppositional resistance force, and Hamas as a leader of the Palestinian Authority. It resembles a childless bachelor who suddenly finds himself the head of a large family with many children.

Hamas has no choice but to behave in line with its great victory. It will likely act in a cautious manner, committing itself to the following:

1. A readiness for dialogue with all parties and forces, especially Fatah, in an attempt to form a coalition government according to a unified political and social program.

2. Calming the fears of the Palestinians, especially regarding their personal freedoms; therefore it is not expected to take any step that might provoke social resentment or an unfavorable reaction by any sector of Palestinian society.

3. Confronting and dealing with the Israeli reaction, which is the biggest challenge. It is expected that Hamas will prolong its truce with Israel. This is conditional on its capability of controlling the other forces, which might test Hamas’ reactions by committing attacks against Israel.

4. Making a quick move to achieve some substantial economic and administrative reforms on the ground, in order to prove its seriousness in dealing with essential issues.

5. Showing some elasticity by opening new channels for dialogue with Europe and the United States of America.

6. Pushing political negotiations slowly but steadily, with minor 13 changes, to prove its commitment to the key Palestinian national rights.

It is clear that Hamas is at a very sensitive crossroads; it will need great skills to tackle so many such delicate issues, and make its way through this political minefield.

The Situation of the Left Movements in Palestine Following the Elections

These are some of the likely outcomes of the elections, but there are also other issues at stake. The elections clearly reflect a crisis of the Left forces, who have failed to convince the Palestinian public of their platforms. This shows that either their program was not of great interest to the Palestinians or the Left did not succeed in letting the wider Palestinian public understand their program.

The marginal results of the Left, some of whom played a major role in the past, show that these forces are now stumbling gravely. Do the Left parties have the determination to revise and radically change their vision, conduct, programs and structure for the future?

The PFLP, DFLP, Peoples’ Party, FIDA, and the Mubadarah ‘initiative’ have no choice but to start a dialogue between themselves, based on self-criticism and evaluation, to reconstruct a new body that will move as one force capable of restoring the role of the Palestinian democratic forces, in order to save themselves from extinction.

A great responsibility lies on the PFLP, being the largest of the Leftwing movements, with its long history and credibility.

These Leftwing forces cannot overlook the results of the elections and continue to act on a narrow minded policy of party politics, which will only lead them from one crisis to another.

Democratic Maturation of the Palestinian Public

Another outcome of the recent elections for the PLC was the political maturity of the Palestinians. Some parties tried to manipulate the public with glittering slogans and electoral programs, spending huge amounts of money to gain votes, and were shocked to find that very few people cast votes in their favor.

The elections reflected the strict commitment of the Palestinians towards their history and national movement and this was shown clearly through:

1. The great setback in Fatah popularity and significant shift towards Hamas.

2. Hamas’ ability to preserve its lead and attract the silent majority of the people.

3. The PFLP’s preservation of its position as the third power in the street, despite the unexpectedly poor showing.

4. A great setback for the DFLP, the People’s Party and FIDA—those groups gained only two seats in the council.

5. The big surprise of the marginal results obtained by the “Mubadarah” group led by Mustafa Barghouti. This group overestimated its backing among the Palestinian public and the results were extremely disappointing.

6. The same criticism, applied to The Third Way led by Salam Fayyad and Hanan Ashrawi, which directed a very expensive European style campaign, and were largely ignored by the masses.

These various political players were deluding themselves, not understanding that the conduct and awareness of the Palestinian people are governed by two basic factors:

1. The link between Palestinian history and the current events; adhering to their national rights and working towards change, reform and reconstruction; sticking to their choice of resistance throughout the long history of confrontation with Israel.

2. So, the elections and the results were a clear message to the entire world, especially Israel, the United States and Europe, that solving the historic and complicated conflict cannot be done through intimidation and the imposing of rules and laws void of any credibility.

The policy of misleading the world by portraying the Palestinian national forces as terrorists does not change the attitude of the masses towards their leaders. The natural response in the face of any attempt to deal with the choices of the people will be faced by more solidarity and sympathy toward their leadership.

The threats uttered by the Israeli and American officials, as well as some European governments, will not scare the Palestinians or deter them from standing side by side with their newly elected leaders who are going to form the new Palestinian government.

Nassar Ibrahim is a Palestinian writer and journalist. He is also the Editor of the Arabic quarterly journal Rouy’ya Ukhra, published by the AIC.

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Preventing Peace:
Israel, the United States and the Rise of Hamas

The most important objective of Hamas is to end the tragedy of the Palestinians, a majority of whom are living in camps. We want to see our people live like other people everywhere—living on their land, free of massacres, assassinations or siege. As for destroying Israel, we haven’t the strength. [T]o speak as though we did is not at all logical. […] Mr. Arafat told them clearly that we accept two states, but they refused, and they will continue to refuse that in the future.
--Abdul Aziz Rantisi in 2002; co-founder of Hamas; Assassinated by Israel on 17 April 2004 after two previously failed attempts.

by Jennifer Loewenstein

There it was again in this morning’s papers, that worn-out, tired old phrase admonishing the Palestinians, now with their new Hamas-dominated Parliament, to put away extremism and accept the two-state solution, the commonly accepted formula for peace. Last week it was Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert who made the familiar plea; after him followed the usual suspects in the Bush administration. On 16 December 2005, well before the Palestinian Legislative Council Elections, the US House of Representatives passed a resolution (H.Res.575) threatening to cut aid to the Palestinian Authority if Hamas were to gain power. Following this, 73 US Senators sent a letter to President Bush stating that “if terrorist groups gain a substantial foothold in the Palestinian legislature, it will make it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for there to be any progress on the roadmap or on the road to achieving a two-state solution.” This time it was Niels Annen, the foreign policy spokesperson for German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Social Democratic coalition partners. “Ms. Merkel must show that Germany stands side by side with Israel and that it remains committed to a two-state solution on the Palestinian issue,” he was quoted in the London Independent.

The latest luminary to appear on the European stage, Angela Merkel marked her recent visit to Israel with a promise, and a precedent-setting move, not to meet with the newly elected Hamas leaders although the latter had explicitly requested such a meeting. In Britain, another shining light of principled decision- making, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, reminded listeners that Britain could not deal with Hamas until it renounced violence because violence contradicted democratic values. Mr. Straw’s comment apparently provoked no indignation.

All these years of pledging their “commitment” to a “two-state solution,” the boundaries for which were implicitly set out in UN Security Council Resolution 242 after the June 1967 Middle East War, and one would think the collective political, economic and strategic pressure of the United States, Western Europe and Israel could have seen to it by now that the Palestinian people had a state. Are all these powers really so ineffectual? Were Yasser Arafat’s PLO, his Fatah-dominated PA and the splinter nationalist and religious factions that have dotted the Palestinian political landscape up to now really so powerful that they could prevent the combined pressure of the developed world from establishing a mini-state, an economically unviable village nation, on the 22 percent of land left of historic Palestine—the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?

Something is wrong with this picture. After all, the PLO fully endorsed a two-state solution— that same solution based on UN resolution 242—eighteen years ago, in 1988. Arafat, the Palestinian Authority, most of the small independent nationalist parties, a majority of the Palestinian people, and major Palestinian political figures such as Mahmoud Abbas, Hanan Ashrawi, Haidar Abdel Shafi, Mustafa Barghouti, Salam Fayyad, Marwan Barghouti, Mohammed Dahlan, Yasser Abed Rabbo, Ziad Abu Amr, Saeb Erakat, the late Edward Said and many, many others have also long supported a two-state solution based on the pre- 1967 war borders. But no such solution is yet in place. Why? If all the key players, and majorities in Israel, Western Europe, the United States and among the Palestinian people, are claiming to want a two-state solution— not that this is necessarily the best or most just solution—what then is holding it up? Hamas?

Hamas’ unexpected victory in the PLC elections owes itself above all to popular disillusionment, to say nothing of disgust, with the dominant Fatah party’s inability to deliver anything resembling the peace outlined by the treaties, documents and accords it has signed with Israel. It also proved unwilling to ameliorate the abysmal social and economic conditions prevalent throughout the territories and failed to formulate a clear set of goals and a realistic vision for the future. By playing the role of supplicant, it refused to divorce itself from the will of the Israelis and to stand up to them instead. Crucially, the PLO, with Fatah as its dominant bloc, refused to insist on an end to the USbacked Israeli takeover of Palestine. That’s why the most principled Palestinian negotiator, Haidar Abdel Shafi, refused to appear at the White House ceremony in September 1993, marking the signing of the Oslo Accords. As much the legacy of Arafat’s corrupt, anti-institutional and megalomaniacal rule as of the unmitigated misery caused by Israel’s occupation, the disintegration of Fatah—and the record of its elite as groveling and self-interested—fueled a popular protest that resulted in victory for Hamas. What appears to outsiders as Hamas’ hardline, uncompromising attitude toward Israel is seen locally as the advent of an organizationally capable political party genuinely concerned with the plight of the people and unwilling to bow to the occupier’s commands.

Nevertheless, in the short time Hamas has been in power, its top spokesperson in the Gaza Strip, Mahmoud Zahar, has already informed CNN’s Wolf Blitzer that if Israel is ready “to withdraw from the occupied area [of] 1967; to release our detainees; to stop their aggression; to make [a] geographical link between Gaza Strip and West Bank, at that time, with assurance from other sides, we are going to accept to establish our independent state,” and that “We can accept to establish our independent state on the area occupied [in] 1967.” In other words, Hamas is willing to accept a two-state solution wherein “Palestine” would exist in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. So what is holding this up?

There is no two-state solution in the area of Israel/Palestine because the Israelis, with the full backing of their American friends— and the effective cooperation of their European neighbors—absolutely do not want a two-state solution (or one that has any meaning), and every concrete ‘fact on the ground’ put into place since the ’67 war supports this conclusion. The Netanyahu government, the first to admit the possibility of a “Palestinian state,” was at least honest about it, saying that Palestinians can call the tiny, isolated fragments left to them a “state” if they wanted—or “fried chicken” for all it cared.

Israel, with full US and tacit European support, has repeatedly rejected a genuine two-state solution. Together these powers have rejected this solution throughout the regional wars of the ‘70s and ‘80s with Egypt and Lebanon; in the 1979 Camp David Peace Accords with Egypt; past the first Palestinian uprising in 1987; during and after the Madrid Conference of 1991; notwithstanding the Oslo Accords of 1993 and the 1995 Interim Accords which turned the Occupied Palestinian Territories into “disputed” territories and which gave Israel control over 60 percent of the West Bank; and regardless of Taba meetings (cancelled by Barak four days early) and the Geneva Accords (rejected by Israel and the US) and the bloody years marking the Al-Aqsa Intifada. But these same powers would have us believe that a poorly armed, poorly funded, dismally trained, poverty-stricken and (thus far) strategically incompetent rag-tag group of “militants” currently scrambling to overcome complete national disarray have somehow managed to dictate global policy on the region’s longest festering conflict; that it is now Hamas that leads the Palestinian “rejectionist” camp in refusing to accept the two-state solution.

And we believe it. The results of the recent PLC elections will simply be another excuse for preventing a genuinely sovereign and viable Palestinian state. Hamas will be blamed for Israel’s intransigence; for its stubborn, uncompromising refusal to share Jerusalem, holy city to the three great Western religions; for its deafness to the international legal demands to dismantle the settlements and tear down the Annexation Wall; for continuing its criminal and murderous attacks against Palestinian fighters and civilians alike.

Again and again our elected leaders will refocus attention onto Hamas, the same way they did with Arafat and Fatah for so many years, claiming that the blame for the bloodshed and the political stalemate lies with them. They will fail ever to mention that resistance to occupation is the right of all peoples (UN Res.42/159). They will demand that Hamas disarm, while billions of US taxpayer dollars flow into Israel’s military arsenal. They will (correctly) denounce Hamas as a terrorist organization for killing approximately 400 Israeli civilians over the years while censoring all mention of the fact that Israeli state terror has killed tens of thousands of Arab civilians over the past six decades, and nearly 3,000 Palestinian civilians in the past five years alone.

They will demand that Hamas renounce its charter because it calls for the destruction of Israel, refusing to see that Israeli policies have collectively aimed (and nearly succeeded) at destroying even the possibility of Palestine. They will pretend not to hear the crucial and implicit recognition of Israel in Hamas’ acceptance, for an indefinite amount of time, of an independent Palestinian state in the territory occupied by Israel in 1967 because it is far more useful to focus on the fact that Hamas won’t mouth back words that are dictated to it. They will forget the fact that it was Hamas, not Israel, that halted all violence over the past 11 months despite repeated and gratuitous provocations by the Israeli military, and they will fail to remind readers that the infamous suicide bombings were a response to the brutality of the occupation regime, not the cause of it. Indeed, the first one occurred in April 1994, 27 years after the occupation of 1967 began, and three years after the strangulating policy of closure was imposed on the territories.

Indeed, under these circumstances, Hamas has a formidable assignment in front of it. It must deal with the rejectionism entrenched in US-Israeli policies. It will have to face down the US media and its sister organizations in Western Europe, and—perhaps most dauntingly—it will have to take on the highly sophisticated and professional pro-Israel public relations machine with its continuous, mind-numbing repetition that Jews are the only legitimate victims.

No one can envy Hamas these tasks. Israel is, after all, effectively an offshore US military base; a “strategic asset” whose formidable military (the world’s fourth most powerful) can be reliably enlisted to aid US expansionist policies in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. It can be counted on to cheerlead—and assist when necessary— the American presence in Iraq. It can be counted on to maintain regional instability by intimidating Syria, manipulating Jordan and Egypt, and confronting Iran. As a result, Israel’s leaders are allowed to continue implementing their own chauvinist national vision by channeling billions of dollars into settlement building (there are already 129 settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem with 436,000 settlers and an additional 83 settlement “outposts”). They have, since 1991, maintained and expanded a regime of closure, checkpoints, roadblocks, travel permits and identity cards for 3 million inhabitants of the West Bank— entirely cut off from their compatriots in the Gaza Strip—and are currently overseeing the construction of a 750km long concrete monstrosity (also known as the “security fence”), 85 percent of which has been constructed on Palestinian land. With the West Bank chopped into hundreds of isolated and economically sterile hamlets surrounded by military outposts and crisscrossed by Jewish-only roads; with East Jerusalem, the cultural and economic heart of Palestine, encircled and cut off by the Wall, and the Gaza Strip imprisoned behind electric- wire fences, motion censors, walls, military bunkers and gun boats patrolling the coast—with all of these things existing before the eyes of anyone who wishes to witness them, Israel, the US and EU will continue to have the gall, the audacity, to maintain that the Palestinians, a nation of refugees, are the ones holding up real progress towards peace.

It was that great ‘man of peace,’ Ariel Sharon, who oversaw the intensification of all of these policies during his tenure as Israeli prime minister. Indeed, it was his goal to ensure the physical and political impossibility of a viable Palestinian state alongside Israel and to guarantee the continuation of Israeli unilateralism. With the disintegration of Fatah and the dismemberment of Palestine practically assured, the fate of Palestine has been more or less sealed unless Hamas, its allies and solidarity activists abroad genuinely attempt to make a difference.

Jennifer Loewenstein is a visiting research fellow at Oxford University’s Refugee Studies Centre. She is a longtime activist, who has lived in Beirut, Jerusalem and Gaza City. She usually resides in Madison, Wisconsin.

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“Shocking Results,” Same Policy

by Joshua Benjamin Friedman

In the wake of the recent Palestinian Legislative elections, analysts in the US began talking about the potentially devastating consequences of a Hamas controlled Government for President Bush’s Middle East peace plan. With Hamas in power—a party which will prove significantly more difficult for the US and Israel to deal with—many analysts and US officials have expressed reservations about the viability of President Bush’s policy in the region and foresee a decrease of US involvement in Israeli - Palestinian politics. As predicted, President Bush has officially refused to fund or negotiate with Hamas until it disarms its militant wing and officially recognize Israel. Hamas, for its part, seems unlikely to oblige. The movement gained power in Palestinian society not only by presenting itself as an alternative to the corruption of Fatah, but largely due to the reputation it cultivated for resistance to exactly the sort of pressure the US is trying to apply. Hamas has already suggested it will look to alternative sources of funding, and continues to express its unwillingness to cave under international pressure.

The US reaction should hardly come as a surprise. Even if the Bush Administration intended to negotiate with Hamas, the movement is listed as a terrorist organization according to the US State Department— a classification that makes negotiation with and funding of a Hamas controlled PA not simply difficult, but technically illegal. Moreover, many of those who have traditionally wielded influence inside the White House—namely the Christian Right and the hawkish neoconservatives— have generally taken an even more hard-line stance than the Bush Administration. Many are calling on both the White House and US Congress to not only shun Hamas, but also to label the Palestinian Authority itself a terrorist organization.

Of course, the response in the US has not been uniform, and there are voices of dissent and moderation. For example, members of prominent think tanks such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Middle East Institute (MEI) have urged more practical approaches. In the words of Clinton Swisher, program director for MEI: “We in the West are going to have to stop looking at Hamas as if they’re al-Qaeda or the Taliban: they’re not. […] We’ll have to deal with a group [Hamas] that is authentic of the Palestinian street. […] We have to come to terms with this.”¹ However, because such sentiments tend to arise, in general, from more liberal, progressive, or leftist circles, they maintain little clout with the current administration.

With regards to pubic opinion within the United States, matters concerning Islam and politics fit into a paradigm that does not easily lend itself to calm, careful analysis like that of Swisher. Historically, and especially since 9/11, the popular discourse on Islam within US society has rarely been characterized by the type of nuance one might expect in dealing with a religion that spans vastly different social, linguistic, historical, and political contexts. Particularly when it comes to political Islam, the fact that the religion maintains a different relationship to politics in, for example, Indonesia or Turkey, as opposed to, say, Afghanistan has not impeded the tendency in the US to lump together movements like Hamas or Hezbollah with the markedly different al-Qaeda. This is not to suggest that Hamas’s ascendance in Palestinian society is wholly disconnected from the rise of political Islam in the region, but only to point out that, in the United States, accounts of Hamas have tended to ignore those factors specific to Palestinian society—the consequences of the first and second intifadas, the ongoing Israeli occupation, and the political, cultural and economic effects of the Oslo process—out of which the Hamas emerged. In the US, one has come to expect the sort of over-dramatized and oversimplified reactions to matters of Islam and politics like those that accompanied the Hamas victory.

In this context, the prospects for an engaged US administration seem bleak; in its absence, we can expect Israeli unilateralism to continue more or less unabated. Many are claiming that the scaling back of US involvement in the region may signal the death kneel of President Bush’s “Road Map” to peace, which is predicated on negotiations rather than the unilateral actions of the Israeli government. However, to call this a shift in US policy is to suggest that the Administration’s recent initiatives in the wake of the Hamas landslide represent some drastic sea change in the US approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Indeed, despite the high profile unveiling of the Road Map in the summer of 2002, which supposedly signaled the engagement of the Bush Administration in the Israeli- Palestinian Peace Process, the US has continued to take a more or less ‘hands off’ approach. In this way, despite the controversy over the US decision to shun Hamas, such developments represent a continuation of, rather than a shift in, US policy towards Israel and Palestine.

Facilitating Israeli Unilateralism

Analysts who claim that the Palestinian elections represent a blow to the Bush agenda have misread US involvement in the politics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While the Road Map, which is predicated on negotiations, represents official US policy, it must be read in dialogue with Israel’s actions on the ground. From this perspective, while the Road Map may represent the official government line, in practice it functions as diplomatic cover under which Israel has been able to pursue its own unilateral agenda according to Ariel Sharon.

The prerequisite for the implementation of the Road Map was the emergence of, in the words of President Bush, “new leaders not compromised by terror.” To the United States, what this required was the departure of Yasser Arafat from the political scene and the facilitation of new elections—a process that in and of itself was four years in the making. Between the US and Israel there developed a consensus that Arafat would never accept peace with the Jewish State and should therefore be isolated until a more desirable leadership emerged.

The election of Mahmoud Abbas supposedly signaled the arrival of just such a leadership. However, although the US praised the 2005 election of Abbas, the White House did very little to support him. Not only did the Bush Administration take few steps to curb Israeli military actions against Palestinians— which continued even during the Abbas brokered ‘truce’ and drastically undercut the new President’s legitimacy on the Palestinian street—the Road Map placed requirements on the Palestinian President which were simply impossible to meet. The most problematic of these requirements was the Road Map’s insistence that Abbas completely halt militant operations against Israel and disarm groups like Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Fatah’s own Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.²

This request amounted to a ‘catch 22’; the Israeli military’s strategy during its re-incursion into the West Bank focused significantly on the infrastructure and personnel of the PA. Israeli tanks, helicopters and fighter jets bombed countless government buildings and, for long stretches of the intifada, PA police and other officials were explicitly targeted. One only needs to stroll through any Palestinian city to see what remains of the old PA police station or, in Nablus for example, even the city’s only fire department.

Such actions drastically crippled the PA and empowered Hamas. Undeniably, the ability of the PA to carry out even basic governing functions was significantly hampered by the Israeli offensive. This not only made Palestinian society even more dependent upon Hamas’s network of social services, but strengthened the image of the Islamic movement as the true defender of Palestinian national rights.

That Israel or the US believes that these attacks on the PA were justified is wholly beside the point with regards to their contemporary social and political consequences. Although the Bush Administration has consistently criticized—even during the Abbas era—the “unwillingness” of the PA to disarm militants, the fact remains that, largely as a result of the Israeli military’s tactical decisions during the Al-Aqsa intifada, the Palestinian Authority completely lacks the power to effectively do so. To suggest otherwise is absurd; Fatah does not have the ability even to prevent its own militants from taking foreign hostages in efforts to secure employment, let alone the legitimacy to check a movement like Hamas.

As the US called on the PA to adhere to the impossible requests of the Road Map, significant developments were unfolding on the ground.

Under the leadership of Ariel Sharon, Israel began implementing a different, though not wholly disparate, unilateral agenda. It is this program that continues today; it includes the disengagement from isolated and unmanageable settlements—like those in Gaza and the Amona outpost—the construction of the Wall around as much of Israel’s settlement infrastructure as possible, and the creation of isolated Palestinian cantons, which, if the PA wants, it can call “a state.” It is this unilateral plan which, particularly if Kadima is elected as predicted in the upcoming Israeli elections, will continue to take shape in the future.

Different Party, Similar Approach

Hamas’s unwillingness to disarm at the behest of President Bush deviates little from the political dynamic before the elections— in which a Fatah controlled PA was unable to disarm them. Had Fatah managed a victory, US policy, at best, would likely have continued as before: calling on the PA to do things which were not within its power, and consequently allowing the Sharon plan to proceed on schedule. At worst, Hamas would still be unwilling to disarm and—perhaps sensing a Fatah submission to Israeli demands—renege on the ceasefire.

Even with Hamas in power, it is unlikely that the White House will take a completely hands off approach. Already there is talk about the US dealing only with Abbas, or negotiating through the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), of which Fatah still holds the reigns. However, it is doubtful that Hamas will simply allow itself to be pushed aside if final status negotiations commence; in some way or another, the US and Israel will eventually be forced to reckon with the new Palestinian Government.

As far as the Palestinian people are concerned, US-Israeli-Palestinian agreements that attempt to sidestep Hamas are potentially dangerous, as they will undoubtedly ignite intra-Palestinian tensions. In the meantime, Israel will continue to build the Wall and the US will continue to call on Hamas to disarm and recognize Israel—all while Sharon’s plan, with or without him, continues to take shape. In this sense, the Bush agenda has not lost much of anything; for the US and Israel, it’s business as usual in the Occupied Territories.

Notes:

¹ “‘Earthquake’ in Middle East Challenges U.S. Policies Election of Militant Hamas Party Will Test the Efficacy of the Democratic Process,” Anna Badkhen in San Francisco Chronicle 27 January 2006.

² It is worth mentioning here another substantial impediment that faced Abbas even if he had managed to successfully confront Palestinian militant groups. According to agreements struck between the US and Israel, any Israeli-Palestinian peace plan was to leave in place all the major settlement blocks and completely reject the Palestinian Right of Return. It is unclear how Abbas, or any Palestinian leader for that matter, would have justified such an agreement to the Palestinian people.

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